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Abstract

This thesis offers the first global history of the Cold War in the eastern Mediterranean. It
examines the international linkages that bound Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus with superpowers,
non-aligned states, and transnational movements during the second half of the twentieth century,
and it considers the effects of such linkages upon the eastern Mediterranean’s domestic arenas.
Throughout, it demonstrates that two forces – synthesis of outside influence alongside
consolidation of internal identities – dictated the region’s experiences during the Cold War. And
though the international environment furnished the conditions within which the region’s societies
pursued the project of nation-building, indigenous forces and factors remained the fundamental
drivers of political and social change. Ultimately, the nations of the eastern Mediterranean
emerged from the Cold War period changed by decades living under the auspices of superpower
competition. But as events in the early twenty-first century would demonstrate, the Cold War
served as a catalyst, rather than a cause, for developments long underway in one of the world’s
most vibrant – and, at times, volatile – hubs of globalization.
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“Ancient Hellenism, like a vast wave, broke and ended at the foot of the last century; the ripples
of the wave still break quietly on the shore of some islands and Greek places still enslaved today.
And the language, which was spoken by kings, like Theseus, is now looked down upon by street
cleaners, because some pseudo-intellectuals were never able to free themselves from the honey
of Attica. The mountains are many-hued behind the light colored marbles… In such a land
splashed with color and light should not true men reappear?”
I.

Introduction: The Global Eastern Mediterranean

Manolis owned a bar in the Plaka district of Athens, an old government building
repurposed to serve ouzo and mezedes, the perennial Greek appetizers, on its balcony offering
breathtaking views of the Acropolis some six hundred feet above. He smoked cigarettes, equally
perennial features of Greek life and conversation, as he talked to me about his brothers, who had
been imprisoned in the 1960s during the years of the country’s military dictatorship. A man of
sixty-five, portly, clean-shaven, with light grey hair fading into white, he seemed a world away
from the long-haired, T-shirt-sporting youth of 1968 he described. “We were kids, just like the
ones at Berkeley and in Paris,” he said as he sipped raki, the Cretan firewater famous for its
pungent bite of resin and lavender. “We heard about the protests on the news and we felt a kind
of connection. But we were more interested in drinking and women than in politics. None of that
mattered to the colonels.”
Manolis and his brothers had organized a smaller neighborhood protest in support of the
first major student uprising at Athens Polytechnic University in the spring of 1968, just under a
year into Greece’s dictatorship of 1967-1974. Their efforts failed when a battalion of Athens
police forcibly broke the demonstration with batons and tear gas, then locked Manolis, his
brothers, and some twenty followers in a communal cell for the next three months. The situation,
at first glance, seemed to mirror student protests in the U.S. at institutions like the University of
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California at Berkeley, when state police had forcibly disbanded student groups occupying
campus lawns. But where California governor Ronald Reagan had at the time gone easy on
protestors, favoring political denouncement of their resistance over long-term imprisonment or
persecution, George Papadopoulos, the frontman of the Greek junta, opted for harsher penalties.
Manolis’s time in jail proved among the most harrowing episodes of his life – and it could have
happened to tens of thousands of students in the United States and Western Europe, had they
instead been part of the Greek protests. “It was a wake-up call,” Manolis remembered, using the
Greek word for “rebirth” – a fitting, though perhaps unintentional, allusion to his later political
transformation. “The problems of the world had come to Greece and we were a part.”
My encounter with Manolis, during my first trip to the Mediterranean in the summer of
2011, came as somewhat of an accident. I had just begun my undergraduate studies in Cold War
history and had a notion of my research interests, which lay in the experiences of the developing
world during the last half of the twentieth century, and my trip to Greece, on the sage advice of
an academic advisor to study classics, was the first stop in testing the waters of a robust
humanities education. I had roughshod knowledge of the region’s Cold War experiences, but
they seemed peripheral to the real contours of Greek history – the timeless elegance of the
Acropolis towering above Manolis’s bar, the deeds of Athenians and Spartans and their valiant
defenses against the Persian onslaught, the spread of Hellenistic culture under Alexander and –
only much later – the final chapters of the nation’s history as it won independence from Ottoman
rule. Modern Greece, by contrast, provided the worldly appeal of folk music drifting alongside
aromatic spices and the chatter of outdoor restaurants; but its recent past seemed paler, corollary
and even tangential to the events that had shaped the true Greek experience millennia ago.
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What I discovered as I spoke with Manolis – and, over the course of my trip, with many
others like him – was the unanticipated but undeniable centrality of the twentieth century. The
contours of Greek culture that conditioned my entire visit were often those that had emerged in
recent centuries, ever since the Greeks had thrown off the shackles of Ottoman dominion, and
within the conversations I held with Greeks young and old there were lasting memories of a
twentieth-century experience rarely discussed in lectures on contemporary European and world
history. For Greeks, the period between the First World War to the unraveling of the communist
bloc had witnessed political discontents, social upheavals, and economic crises that rivaled those
in many of the century’s more infamous, and far more documented, episodes. Nor were such
events widely discussed in works of history. As I absorbed literature on the Vietnam
counterinsurgency, I wondered why there was no comparable attention to the extensive
pacification campaigns the United States waged to wrestle control from communists in the Greek
Civil War two decades earlier. Though coups in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia had
stimulated countless historical treatments, precious few pages had been written about the regime
of the Greek colonels.1 Where Charles de Gaulle, various British prime ministers, and American
administrations throughout the Cold War attracted sustained scholarly attention among
specialists in transatlantic relations, accounts focusing on the eastern Mediterranean dimensions
of the Atlantic alliance were all but nonexistent.2 Upon my return to the United States, I resolved
to investigate further. Surely there must be a history that offered a cohesive narrative to the
eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War experience. Surely authors had answered the questions that I
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I had searched extensively, for instance, for an eastern Mediterranean analogue to works such as Stephen G.
Rabe’s The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America (Oxford, 2015) or Greg Grandin and
Naomi Klein’s The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago, 2011).
2
So commanding in Cold War history are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and their respective leaders that
any attempt to document the existing secondary literature would become a thesis in its own right. The transatlantic
story has been told from numerous perspectives

4
had posed – why the region played so little a role in current understandings of the twentieth
century, and how its societies had evolved throughout the period.
But at all turns, I found precious little on the eastern Mediterranean in the twentieth
century. Key accounts existed, to be sure – the works of notable Philhellene C.M. Woodhouse
furnished a fantastic recounting of modern Greek history, told from the top down, but
nonetheless illustrative, as did Robert Holland’s masterful narrative of the Cyprus crisis in the
1950s.3 And historians of the late British Empire had acknowledged the importance of Greece
and Cyprus to London’s imperial strategies following the Second World War. A particularly
influential mentor of mine even wrote the first history of the Cyprus insurgency within the
context of a global system.4 Yet beyond these works, few syntheses of Greek, Turkish, and
Cypriot history had linked the eastern Mediterranean’s experiences to the broader processes of
globalization after the Second World War, even though the region had played such an integral
role in many of globalization’s most notable subprocesses: decolonization, neutralism and selfassertion in the developing world, and socioeconomic transformation in the wake of the
neoliberal turn.5
The lacunae became all the stranger as I witnessed just how prominent a role the region
was playing in global politics at the time of my research. As I completed work for another major
in international relations, the headlines I consulted on world affairs revealed a European
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Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959 (London: Clarendon, 1999).
Indeed, the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War has long been a story weighted toward the beginning, and told from
British perspectives as London faced the pressures of decolonization. Recent works like Benjamin GrobFitzgibbon’s Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) have
sought to correct this narrative.
5
Some of the more important works to touch on the history of the eastern Mediterranean in British imperial strategy
are Lawrence R. Pratt, East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939 (Cambridge, 2008).
William Roger Louis, perhaps the most respected living historian of the British Empire, also briefly touches on the
role of Cyprus in British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar
Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), while the best account of the post-WWII Cyprus insurgency (and one I will frequently
reference throughout this thesis) is Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame.
4
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integration experiment plagued by the financial downturn of 2008 and the ensuing social
disrepair of the EU’s southeastern member states. Greece and Cyprus, despite consistently strong
tourism revenues and persistent cultural importance, by the mid-second decade of the twentyfirst century had entered their eighth consecutive year of economic decline. Turkey, its internal
politics blighted by ethnic disturbances and withering critiques of the government’s human rights
abuses, likewise stood as an embarrassment to the European Union (the July 2016 coup attempt
and subsequent purges, which have more recently dominated news coverage, only serving to
entrench such perceptions). And all nations in the region had been crippled by the massive influx
of refugees from Syria’s civil war, with attendant domestic political ramifications for the rise of
extremism. The message, regardless of sources consulted, was all too clear. Not even a century
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, whose demise heralded a new age of European and
global politics and made way for nations to explore the frontiers of independence and selfsufficiency, the eastern Mediterranean had become the new sick man of Europe. Journalists and
experts alike pointed to the region’s history as the key to understanding its present predicament.
Some even spoke forebodingly of threats to the stability of government and culture altogether.
“In past weeks and months,” wrote acclaimed Balkan historian Mark Mazower in the run-up to
Greece’s 2012 elections, “Greek institutions have taken a battering in the eyes of the world…
today, with the country’s welfare state in shambles and illegal entry into Greece showing little
signs of easing up, the prospects [for the survival of Greek democracy] are ominous.”6
I began to suspect that this was the reason for the lack of a cohesive eastern
Mediterranean Cold War narrative: perhaps the real stories were buried in the recollections of
citizens and in the often-inchoate realms of memory, language, and cultural symbol. To better
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Mark Mazower, “For Greece and Germany a democratic trial looms,” The Guardian June 11, 2012.
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understand the outward appearance of the 21st-century eastern Mediterranean, I might need to
look inward. And such an approach, informed by the analyses of scholars like Mazower, initially
seemed the best path forward in unraveling the eastern Mediterranean knot. Not satisfied with
existing accounts of a nation’s external conduct, the historian of foreign relations can find
comfort in investigating the internal workings of a society to examine links between the domestic
and diplomatic realms, as scholars of American foreign relations like Kenneth Osgood and
Robert Dean had done with great success.7 But this avenue, while promising, ultimately yielded
little fruit. Few works of history dealt with the Greek, Turkish, or Cypriot domestic scenes
whatsoever; even fewer diverged from the overarching diplomatic narrative to narrate events on
the ground. When I turned to sociology and ethnography, new and fascinating insights emerged –
around dramatic changes in civil society during the Greek Cold War, on shifting relationships
between religious authorities and the lay population, and on political expression in modern Greek
life. Scholars like Neni Panourgiá had trod new ground in illuminating the perspectives of
everyday Greeks, and their narratives posed new questions. Yet even these sources were heavily
topical, often grounded in case-study approaches and rarely delivering the sort of broader canvas
I sought. What could the experiences of a particular Greek village reveal about the nation as a
whole? And how could individual cases shed light on deep global linkages?
My first academic forays into eastern Mediterranean history – two honors theses on the
region’s twentieth century – stimulated many questions, but I ultimately remained disappointed
in what I saw were major gaps in my analyses. I had set out to recount Greece’s Cold War – and
had implied as much in my title – but had actually only scratched the surface. While my thesis
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For examples of “intermestic” studies, see Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda
Battle at Home and Abroad (Kansas, 2006) and Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of
Cold War Foreign Policy (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War) (University of Massachusetts, 2003).
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had contributed much in the way of diplomatic narrative, it was still, ultimately, a history told
from above, and from the perspectives of traditional players – the United States and Great Britain
above all – rather than from the indigenous voices I sought to amplify. I had material from a
secondary thesis in international relations, The Cyprus Crisis: 40 Years Later, that delved deeper
into the modern history of Cyprus to consider questions of Cypriot nationhood against the
backdrop of ethnic conflict, and this approach had certainly brought me closer to my goal. But its
subject matter relied heavily upon a case-study approach, and I was reticent to combine it hastily
and haphazardly with my work in history. Scholarship on the eastern Mediterranean, then,
remained fragmented. In the words of Linda Colley, speaking of the state of contemporary
history in the 1960s and 1970s, it was “thoroughly compartmentalized,” with various strands
“operating along parallel tracks” that were destined to coexist without meeting.8
Three years later, this thesis aims to redress this imbalance. It offers the first sustained,
interpretive global history of the eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War, a period during
which the fates of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus joined those of nations across the globe as the
world entered a new and dangerous era of international relations under superpower auspices. It is
the story of political deadlock and vociferous parliamentary debate, of individual policymakers
and the forces that alternately compelled them into activity and forced them into submission. It
recounts invasions, counterinsurgencies, and the shockwaves of falling empires, of economic
downturns and unprecedented booms, of terrorism, diplomatic impasses, and cultural warfare. In
short, it is a story familiar to students of the Cold War, who know well the influence of
superpower actions upon smaller states caught in the vortex of international politics following
the Second World War.
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Linda Colley, quoted in David Cannadine, ed., What is History Now? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 132.
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Yet this thesis also tells new stories about the eastern Mediterranean’s societies during
the Cold War period, of social transformations, cultural ferment, and identity shifts that all had a
hand in shaping the region during the latter half of the twentieth century. It takes much of its
inspiration from authors like Theodore Couloumbis, Alexis Alexandris, and Kevin Andrews,
whose histories utilized anthropological and ethnographic perspectives to great effect in
delivering compelling insights on past experience.9 To accomplish its task, this thesis engages
with a wealth of sources in other disciplines complementary to historical scholarship, but largely
unincorporated into histories of the region: economics, demography, anthropology, and, above
all, sociology. It also considers the pre-Cold War genesis of eastern Mediterranean identities,
expanding analysis to encompass the era of national consolidation and identity formation in the
early twentieth century.
For all its attempt to present novel vantage points, however, it would be inaccurate to
claim that the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War years were the story of Greeks, Turks, and
Cypriots working in isolation – within a “troubled triangle,” to use the words of one of the
region’s most accomplished historians.10 The regional experiences of the eastern Mediterranean
in the era of superpower confrontation are also the mutually reinforcing stories of policymakers
in Washington and London, diplomats in Moscow and Bonn, and intellectuals in Cairo, Buenos
Aires, and Jakarta, all of whom engaged in worldwide connections – often unknowingly – with
developments in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. To be sure, the colonels who staged the Greek
coup of 1967 were powerfully driven by Greek cultural circumstances, shared long-standing
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See works such as Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974
(Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), and Kevin Andrews’ magisterial travel account The Flight of Ikaros: Travels
in Greece During the Civil War (Reprint: Paul Dry, 2010).
10
I borrow the phrase from Theodore Couloumbis, whose seminal 1983 work The United States, Greece, and
Turkey: The Troubled Triangle proposed a new paradigm for understanding the trilateral relationship of the three
key eastern Mediterranean states during the early Cold War period.
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experiences in the Greek armed services, and seized power based on visions of the proper course
of the Greek nation. Turkish Cypriots throughout the Cyprus crisis likewise interacted with their
Greek Cypriot counterparts according to lifeways and historical memories profoundly influenced
by their Turkish heritage. Yet the eastern Mediterranean Cold War was but one of many global
cold war experiences, and it is from this perspective that I have sought to write its history – not
to diminish the importance of regional specificities so crucial to rich historical understanding, but
rather to elucidate the international ties that bound Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus with other world
regions. Whether indirectly – as through the influence of Latin American intellectuals and
revolutionary movements upon the Greek left – or directly, such as the impact of American
Middle Eastern and African policies upon views of the Mediterranean, the global dimensions of
the Cold War profoundly shaped the region’s experiences. Readers should therefore expect a
regional history in the pages that follow, but one that exchanges deep granularity for holistic
scope – and, in so doing, aims to illuminate the longitudinal trends that underpin the region’s
current global position.
My thesis is the first to employ a combination of primary materials – memoirs of Greek,
Turkish, and Cypriot politicians, intellectuals, and citizens, as well as American, British, and
Soviet diplomatic sources – to tell the story of the eastern Mediterranean Cold War. It augments
existing understandings of the Cold War in the developing world by forging linkages between
Greek and Turkish history and developments in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East. And it is the first treatment of eastern Mediterranean Cold War history to engage with
recent scholarship in ethnography and anthropology to paint a history of identity alongside that
of diplomacy.
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This thesis is also a response to broader debates on historical methodology in the age of
globalization, perhaps best encapsulated in Lynn Hunt’s Writing History in the Global Era. Hunt
identifies four strands of Anglophone historiography in the twentieth century: Marxism,
modernization, the Annales school, and the history of identity. Globalization, a fifth paradigm
emerging in recent decades, has, in Hunt’s view, represented a significant challenge to the
previous four, for reasons beyond the scope of this introduction.11 The pages that follow seek to
demonstrate that there is no need to choose between such paradigms, at least not with respect to
the eastern Mediterranean. I borrow heavily from global history and international relations
scholarship as I attempt to paint a truly global view of the region’s Cold War experience. But I
also rely on deeper considerations of the region’s longer-run sociocultural character, as well as
investigations of its many identities, to recount its path through the twentieth century.
The following chapters are divided into thematic segments, organized chronologically.
Chapter 1 traces the pre-Cold War foundations of eastern Mediterranean identities and global
roles during what I term the era of consolidation – the momentous century between the 1820s
and the end of the First World War during which the region’s key states, through intellectual and
social ferment and often violence, formed themselves into modern nations and searched for
belonging in the modern global system. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 treat the Cold War period proper by
charting the region’s course through the most tumultuous period of its recent history – the thirty
years between the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in 1944 and Turkey’s 1974 invasion of
Cyprus. During these decades, the region’s age-old ethnic identities and animosities met the full
force of bipolar confrontation as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus became the focus of intense
economic, military, political, and cultural competitions between the Western alliance and the
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Lynn Hunt, Writing History in the Global Era (W.W. Norton, 2015), especially pp. 13-43.
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Soviet bloc. Yet while changing the nature of the eastern Mediterranean’s global involvement,
the Cold War period also effected a resurgence of questions around national self-esteem and
identity, as sociological and cultural shifts marched alongside the new international role into
which the eastern Mediterranean fell. As crises in the 1950s and 1960s reflected, unprecedented
changes were underway in the region, exacerbated but not dictated by either Soviet or American
influence. This was particularly true for the eastern Mediterranean, where powerful historical
memories and cultural legacies found deep expression in the Cold War climate.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 continue the narrative of the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War by
telling the heretofore-underrepresented story of the region’s indigenous experiences during the
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, decades during which the Cold War system became increasingly
international – with associated repercussions, and deepening global connections, for Greeks,
Turks, and Cypriots alike. My goal in these chapters is twofold. I first wish to cover the period
beyond which many existing studies end due to a lack of primary sources or narrative focus,
engaging with newly released material in U.S. foreign relations and international affairs to paint
a picture of the international Cold War system at the end of détente. But I also seek to bridge the
story of the eastern Mediterranean with another school of international history scholarship, that
of the “global Cold War” championed most notably by Norwegian scholar Odd Arne Westad,
and since enriched by pioneering works by historians of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the
Middle East.12 While rarely considered emblematic of the Cold War in the Third World, the
post-WWII eastern Mediterranean exhibited several of the most salient characteristics of
conventionally acknowledged developing regions. It saw the rise of increasingly powerful
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The global Cold War literature is vast, but begins most notably with works such as Robert J. McMahon’s The
Cold War on the Periphery (Cambridge, 1996) and Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War (Cambridge, 2006),
both of which redefined research ambits and encouraged a proliferation of area studies following the opening of
archives in the former communist and developing worlds.
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nationalist movements. Its leaders began seeking identification with non-aligned camps pledging
allegiance to neither bloc, with associated political returns at home. And subaltern forces,
wielding new societal and intellectual influence within eastern Mediterranean societies, began
exercising new forms of political power. It was during the 1970s and 1980s that such forces
reached their apex, bringing the global Cold War to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Such
considerations blend a new brand of cultural Cold War history, best represented in the works of
authors such as Matthew Connelly, Marc Selverstone and Alessandro Brogi,13 with an original
analysis of the Reagan administration’s global Cold War policies to recount the region’s path
through the 1980s and the end of the Cold War. I conclude the thesis with a chapter assessing the
legacies of the Cold War period in the last decade of the twentieth century, as well as its
continuing significance for events in the twenty-first. Though the seminal events of the period
occurred prior to the fall of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1991, the Cold War’s ramifications,
I demonstrate, continue to manifest in the realms of political culture and historical memory.
At the time of this writing, the eastern Mediterranean shows no signs of relinquishing its
paramount role in global affairs. European integration remains at the top of international
concerns, as Britain’s 2016 exit from the European Union casts doubts upon the future of the
experiment altogether. The barbarity of terrorist activity throughout the Middle East, as well as
the ongoing crisis in Syria, continue to place strains on both Greece’s and Turkey’s relations
with its neighbors and major international powers alike. And though the coming decades of the
21st century will be marked by a number of momentous transformations in the balance of global
politics – demographic challenges in China, the United States, and other major world powers,
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See, for instance, Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins
of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford, 2003) and Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War Between the
United States and the Communists in France and Italy (The New Cold War History) (UNC, 2011).
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continuing contestations of sovereignty in key regions, and the challenges of radicalism and
globalization – the national fates of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the eastern Mediterranean basin
will be intimately tied with the course of global developments writ large. The pages that follow
seek to provide a historical perspective on such changes and to serve as a canvas upon which to
examine new developments as they unfold in the twenty-first century.
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II. The Era of Consolidation, 1821-1923
Ian Dragoumis by 1906 had achieved a sizable following in Hellenic intellectual circles.
A diplomat of considerable repute in the legal and academic realms, he had long witnessed the
modern Greek nation’s course through European balance-of-power politics and now lamented its
path into the future. Writing in an Athens newspaper, he outlined in sweeping terms the marked
difference between the current period and the world his ancestors had known. In the past, Greeks
had been able to synthesize foreign influences and indigenous strivings to create a composite
national character and, in turn, a Hellas strengthened, rather than eroded, by international
connection. Now, however, the frequent visits of Western intellectuals and tourists, as well as
renewed diplomatic interest in Greece by Westernized nations, threatened to destroy the labor of
countless Greek generations toward the formation of a cohesive national identity. “We have lost
that which made us Greeks – proud Greeks, a proud people,” Dragoumis lamented in a letter to
his brother-in-law, a successful financier in the Greek community of Istanbul. “At all turns, we
struggle to find that which once bound us as Hellenes.”14
The intensity of Dragoumis’s diatribe against foreign influence, coming on the heels of
international humiliation and domestic political instability, is perhaps unsurprising. But it
nonetheless reflected the convictions of a modern Greek, of good professional and political
standing, looking simultaneously outward and inward to draw connections between the solemn,
age-old identity of the Greek nation and the challenges of modern international involvements.
And, specific though his warnings may have been to the Greek example, Dragoumis’s thoughts
were representative of broader shifts. Against the backdrop of more visible changes in Europe
proper, the eastern Mediterranean by the dawn of the twentieth century was transforming in
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profound ways. Centuries of Ottoman rule inculcated an ethos of struggle throughout the basin,
and the decades immediately following the Greeks’ successful bid for freedom represented a
great challenge for the region as the fallout from the first successful war of independence settled.
In the shadow of Turkish control, new identities formed – national, civic, and cultural. Age-old
animosities and notions of kinship met the more modern forces of nation-state politics and
international interconnection. And, as the twentieth century dawned, actions taken by the new
government in Athens – and by the ailing administration in the Sublime Porte – propelled the
eastern Mediterranean onto the world stage in unprecedented ways. But dramatic as such
changes were for the inhabitants of the region, not all shared Dragoumis’s dire assessment. For
many, the international era represented opportunities to fulfill long-held dreams regarding the
destiny of the Nation.
This chapter traces the era of consolidation in the eastern Mediterranean, which lasted
from the end of the Greek War of Independence to the fallout of the First World War. The period
covered – nearly a full century – witnessed momentous transformations in both regional and
global politics. Any account offering a comprehensive history of these years would be sure to
mire in the weight of such developments, just as Alexander’s troops mired in the twin traps of
inhospitable climate and modern warfare in Crimea. Yet two key themes emerge in our analysis
of eastern Mediterranean developments. The first, implied in the name of this chapter, is
consolidation – political, but also cultural, social, and intellectual. As Greece charted the waters
of independence, it also confronted the challenges of nation-making – assuaging the discontents
of restive political groups who benefited unequally from the achievement of independence, as
well as the more pragmatic infrastructural and economic tasks associated with the erection of a
new state apparatus. Turkey, too, during these crucial years experienced dramatic transition, as
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erstwhile empire transitioned to modern state, and as subjects within that state reacted to the
changes. In both instances, consolidation often ran afoul of long-standing ethnic and cultural
identities, which persisted even as governing powers sought to fashion new realities for their
citizens.
The second major theme of this chapter, deeply interconnected with the first, is synthesis
– both within and without eastern Mediterranean societies. In the period between Greek
independence and the first global conflagration of the twentieth century, the eastern
Mediterranean, entering a prolonged process of consolidation, absorbed intellectual and cultural
influences from nations far and wide. As currents of thought and culture from Eurasia and the
Americas pervaded Greek society, traditional notions of eastern Mediterranean lifeways
increasingly accommodated new conceptions of the nation, civic duty, and even family roles.
Amidst such transformations, the character of the Greek nation changed considerably. With such
developments mirrored in the late Ottoman Empire in the rise of opposition groups like the
Young Turks, the stage was set for a paradigm shift in the ways the eastern Mediterranean
powers conceived of their identities and their relationships to one another and the outside world.
Yet the processes of consolidation and synthesis, though seemingly contradictory, in
reality progressed with a mutually reinforcing cadence throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The formidable task of creating new nations exposed many of the cleavages
that had long defined eastern Mediterranean life; but on the heels of nation-building, the
synthesis of foreign ideas and cultural currents facilitated new readings of history and identity
that solidified the region’s role in a new global landscape. By the second decade of the twentieth
century, Greeks and Turks at all levels of society were irreversibly ingrained in the twentiethcentury international system and directed toward the tribulations it held.
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Identity Challenges to National Consolidation
The Greek revolutionaries had faced a formidable task in galvanizing popularresistance
against Ottoman control, but the task of building a modern nation proved an even greater
challenge. While the major endeavor of 1821-1828 had been mustering enough support – and
arming enough insurrectionists – to cleave Greece away from a struggling imperial master
incapable of adequately defending its fringes, the overriding post-independence imperative was
reaching and consolidating control over a nation of some four and one half million residents,
sprinkled across the vast geographic expanse of Greece and entrenched in old identities with
little connection to a conception of the modern nation-state.15
The most important of these identity strands was the Orthodox faith. At the time of Greek
independence, the vast majority of Greeks centered their lives around Orthodoxy, actively
attending religious services and rituals with immense significance to the comings and goings of
everyday life. The last official Ottoman records of births and deaths in Thessaloniki cite more
than ninety thousand Orthodox ceremonies, from baptisms to marriages and funerary rites, in the
year 1790 alone – more than twenty times the combined number of Catholic and Muslim rites.
And existing accounts of Greek life under Ottoman rule are replete with references to Orthodox
ritual, from the organization of village activities according to church bells to the influence of
liturgies upon the persistence of ancient Greek.16
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But in Greece, as elsewhere, religious identities blended with deeply held understandings
of ethnicity and history to constitute a more complex sense of community. Orthodoxy held
profound spiritual significance and organized the cadences of Greek life, but it derived much of
its potency and relevance from connections to concrete historical occurrence and ethnic
identities. To be Greek Orthodox was also to be a member of a race whose journey to the present
had been marked by struggles and tribulations – a Hellenic climb to Golgotha – and now stood
poised to reap the rewards of such trials. As Greece entered the modern era, expanding
populations, contact with the Catholic other in the form of Frankish and Venetian presence in the
eastern Mediterranean, and, most of all, Ottoman occupation of areas with majority Greek
populations turned the focus of Hellenism toward the past tribulations and future fates of
geographically defined Hellenic domains.
The resultant irredentism of modern Greeks – the sought-after redemption of what I term
“the captivity of Hellenism” – blended a quasi-mythical reading of history that placed Greeks
and their sufferings at the center of Western history with a calculation of geopolitical factors that
made possible the correction of historical wrongs through reclamation of Hellenic lands. Per this
interpretation of the past, the Hellenic ethnos – the nation-as-ethnicity – had since ancient times
come under assault from outside forces, first in the form of the great Persian Wars of the 5th
century BC, later by barbarian invasions from the east, and, most notoriously, from Ottoman
conquests. Temporal waypoints marked nadirs of the narrative: 1204, when the Fourth Crusade
had led Frankish mercenaries to loot Constantinople, and especially 1453, when the armies of
Mehmet II had conquered the city and defiled the greatest bastion of Orthodoxy, the Hagia
Sophia. In the face of such ignominies, it was the duty of all true Greeks to strive for the reunion
of ancestral Greek lands – and their sizable Greek populations – with the mother country. In this
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endeavor, the dictates of the Orthodox Church and its officials assumed near-otherworldly
significance as the avenue through which Hellenic culture could be redeemed. As Ecumenical
Patriarch Dorotheos asserted to David Lloyd George in February 1920, speaking on behalf of
Istanbul’s Greek minority at a key moment of crisis in the captivity narrative:
The Greeks of Constantinople and the neighborhood assembled today
in their churches and proclaimed their unshakeable wish to obtain complete
national re-establishment. They regard Union with the mother-country
Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future… and
entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme national authority, with
the task of transmitting the present resolution [for Great Power support of
Greek control of Istanbul]. The idea of a Greek nation will not be realized
So long as Constantinople is not united to Greece by a strong tie.17
The Greek War of Independence only intensified such yearnings, giving rise to new
opportunities for the achievement of Hellenism’s greatest territorial objectives. If the mother
country could be freed from the Ottoman yoke, in short order other prizes – especially the
grandest, Constantinople – could be reclaimed as well. At all levels of society, political goals
seemed commensurate with Orthodox faith. The legendary Greek revolutionary Yiannis
Makriyannis spoke in his memoirs of pervasive associations of insurrection with religious fervor,
and upon the outbreak of hostilities, Orthodox priests in more than one hundred Greek villages
enjoined their flocks to aid in the coming struggle, often through direct enlistment.18
The challenge involved marrying long-standing ties to Orthodoxy with the newer notions
– and goals – of the Greek nation-state, a task requiring the redefinition of ethno-historical and
religious identity to include modern nationalism. If Greeks found in their religious practice a
connection to ancestors and their deeds, the erection of a new state apparatus – much less one
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seeking to become part of the modern world – was an endeavor at odds with tradition. As
discussed below, the exigencies of geopolitics provided just such an avenue for the marriage of
custom and modernity.
Orthodox ethnic nationalism represented the key identity point upon which Greeks
organized their lives, and stood as the most formidable force for the new Greek government to
harness in its efforts to gain and sustain regional and international legitimacy. But other identities
persisted in the age of the modern Greek state. Other than religion, none had as much daily
impact on Greek life as socioeconomic status. By 1800, the majority of Greeks within the
Ottoman Empire were employed in agricultural work. But a substantial number – some four
hundred thousand – had achieved solid standing and commercial success as members of the
imperial merchant class. Often regarded as the exemplar of such groups, the Greek minority of
Istanbul by the first decade of the nineteenth century wielded considerable influence in Ottoman
social circles, frequently ingratiating themselves to high-ranking Ottoman officials through
service or intermarriage. The community also wielded great influence among mainland Greeks,
whose institutions – particularly the Orthodox Church – all benefited from extensive minority
patronage. Aside from such economic considerations, the Istanbul minority stood as a powerful
symbol of Hellenism’s captivity at the hands of the Turkish enemy. The fact that Istanbul Greeks
enjoyed considerable privileges – including the right to speak Greek when petitioning the
government – mattered little in the eyes of ethnic nationalists.19 Wealthy Greeks, however, also
symbolized the power of an emergent bourgeoisie to demand sociopolitical and diplomatic
influence commensurate with their considerable economic sway – a prospect sure to clash with
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the designs of early Greek politicians, who arose largely from the military and religious classes
or had returned from foreign education and residence to take up governmental roles.
The importance of socioeconomic identities in the decades following Greek
independence should not be inflated. To Greeks of all stripes, ethnicity, religion, and history
constituted by far the most relevant identity matrix in the first decades after independence. But as
the Greek state sought to consolidate control over its far-flung lands – which, as will be
discussed, grew by the beginning of the twentieth century to encompass the territories of ancient
greater Hellas – differences in socioeconomic standing constituted a formidable barrier to
widespread support for state initiatives. It was one thing to be an agricultural laborer in the
Peloponnese whose life would be exponentially improved by the installment of modern city
technologies and trade networks with major powers; it was quite another to face the ramifications
of independence as a successful merchant based in Istanbul and forced to do business with
erstwhile Ottoman subjects, and another entirely to relinquish power in the form of taxes and
property to a distant and young government. To aid in the cooptation of such potentially restive
identity groups, the modern Greek state absorbed, and in some cases turned outward toward,
international influences in order to forge a new – though historically conscious – national
identity.

While Greece contended with the myriad facets of nation-building, the dying Ottoman
Empire likewise faced the challenges of competing identities among its populace. Throughout
the empire’s history, Ottoman sultans had sought to promulgate a cohesive imperial identity
premised upon a mythical history. But their efforts had never been entirely successful. The
empire’s vast territorial expanse encompassed hundreds of ethnic groups whose incorporation
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into the sultan’s dominions fell short of adherence to a deep identification with Ottomanism. As
a result, ethnicities as diverse as Greek and Armenian, Kurd and Arab waged constant struggles
against the homogenizing tendencies of sultanic rule.20
By the nineteenth century, a new identity – secular nationalism – had begun to gain
ground throughout the empire. As Western European influence penetrated the Ottoman Empire
through the establishment of educational institutions, military advisorships, and mercantile
activity, groups of young students and military cadets in the late 1800s began organizing in
underground societies to protest the authoritarianism of the current regime in Istanbul. The
Young Turks – as the aggregate of such groups came to be known – favored the inauguration of
a constitutional monarchy and quickly gained support throughout the ambits of the empire, with
key chapters emerging in Thessaloniki, Epirus, and across Anatolia.21 Where Greece recognized
and responded to such challenges, the Ottoman state not unreasonably regarded groups like the
Young Turks as existential threats to be vigorously managed if not eliminated. The last sultans
devoted considerable resources to stamping out underground organizations through the
employment of secret police and informants akin to the czarist policies of the later Romanovs.
The result was a political system that by the end of the nineteenth century proved incapable of
adapting to wide-ranging regional and international changes.
Tasked with ensuring consolidation of fragile political gains – or, in the case of the
Ottomans, teetering political systems – the governments of the eastern Mediterranean invested
great energy in allying the goals of nationalism with traditional identities. For both the Greek

20

On ethnicities in the Ottoman Empire, see especially Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and
the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
21
On the Young Turks and Young Ottomans, the best accounts are Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks and the Ottoman
Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918 (Utah, 2014) and Hasan Kayali, Arabs
and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918 (University of California,
1997).

23
revolutionaries and their Ottoman counterparts, various segments of society simultaneously
represented opportunities to ensure national cohesion and potential pitfalls in the way of its
achievement. The solution was to employ such segments strategically to forge national identities
that synthesized old and new in the service of the state. For help, both Greece and Turkey – often
consciously, but frequently involuntarily – turned outward.

Intellectual and Artistic Synthesis
It is a characteristic behavior of new states to look outward for inspiration in forging their
governmental and sociopolitical systems. This was certainly the case for Greece, which in the
decades following independence directly and indirectly absorbed influences from the greater
European continent and beyond. Starting during the war of independence, foreign influence
contributed greatly to both tangible and intangible goals of the new Greek state. It also aided in
the consolidation of power and national identity over the various segments of Greek society
unevenly benefited by the new regime.
The greatest influences on Greek life were British and French. European interest in the
Hellenic world had been strong prior to the country’s war of independence, with “grand tours” of
the classical world by European youth echoing the prominence of classical training in university
educations across the Continent. But as the storm clouds of revolution against Ottoman rule
mounted in the first decades of the nineteenth century, Greece’s northern neighbors, led by the
British example, flocked to the seat of Western culture to participate. Between 1801 and 1820,
more than thirty thousand British youths journeyed to Greece during or after their university
educations – many choosing extended stays, and some opting for a more permanent stay
altogether.22 Inspired by ongoing currents of Enlightenment thought that held social contracts
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and self-rule as the new standards of modern civilization, the Philhellenes – lovers of Greece and
Greek culture – sought to offer their services to the birthplace of democracy, now crushed under
the boot of Muslim dominion:
Greece… that land, the fostering nurse of civilization, where the spirit of
antiquity still seems to linger amidst its olive groves, its myrtle bowers, and
the precious relics of its splendid edificies; where both sacred and profane
history unite in forming the most interesting associations; where Socrates
taught the lessons of his incomparable ethics, and a still greater than
Socrates disclosed the mysteries of the ‘unknown God’ to those that sat
in darkness.23
Their lasting impact proved immense. In their connection with Europeans further north,
Greeks saw reflections of an ancient past whose legitimacy in the modern world appeared
validated by the willingness and enthusiasm of cultural kin to aid in the independence struggle.
But the Anglo-French influence often took second place to the Slavic/Orthodox, which
frequently drove the military and diplomatic orientations of the new Greek state. Russia had
played a minimal role during the War of Independence, wary of the impact that a loss of
Ottoman territory would have on an increasingly delicate eastern Mediterranean and Balkan
balance of power. But from the 1830s onward, the strategic importance of Greece to Russia’s
long-term planning vis-à-vis the declining Ottoman regime, as well as the considerable cultural
exchanges between Greece and Russia, gave rise to a burgeoning military and religious
exchange. Russian imperial advisors played integral roles in the Greek War of Independence,
providing training and strategic support to militias and a nascent Greek fleet – the latter of which
would go on to crucial importance in the military campaigns of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. And in the czar, Greeks found a champion of the faith unafraid to intervene
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in favor of Hellenic interests. St. Petersburg, always seeking to maximize its influence relative to
the Ottoman Empire, throughout the late nineteenth century closely monitored the sultans’
treatment of Orthodox communities, on several occasions threatening commercial and
diplomatic repercussions for perceived abuses.24
But more surprising than the European influences were those from even further abroad.
As a result of close ties established with the United States soon after independence, Greece
enjoyed a thriving mercantile relationship with the western hemisphere that blossomed during
the era of Greek independence, when the Hellenes’ struggle against Turkish rule attracted the
interest of revolutionaries old and young in the New World. Such interactions mirrored the
interest of Western European Philhellenes, but were far more political. Nicholas Biddle, the
distinguished financier who would go on to serve as the final president of the Second Bank of the
United States, wrote fondly of Greece and its revolutionary history in journals he kept of his
sojourns across the eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 1806-1807. “I had long felt an ardent
desire to visit Greece,” he reflected in the first of his many journals. “The fate of a nation whose
history was the first brilliant object that met my infancy, & the first foundation of my early
studies was so interesting that I had resolved to avail myself of any opportunity of witnessing
it.”25 Given the ensemble cast of American patriots who soon joined the Greeks’ bid for
independence – including the nephew of George Washington himself – Biddle stood in good
company.
Americans further south likewise took note of events in Greece. Simón Bolívar,
envisioning a sovereign future for the present-day nations of Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and

24

Alexandris, pp. 32-33.
Quoted in R.A. McNeal, ed., Nicholas Biddle in Greece: The Journals and Letters of 1806 (University of
Pennsylvania, 1993), 49.
25

26
other South American states, sought to emulate the Archaic Greek example of league diplomacy
through his formation of the Amphictyonic League, an alliance of Latin American republics
bound by their former relationship with the Spanish Empire. But Bolívar also enthusiastically
followed the modern Greek struggle against foreign influence, seeing the insurrectionists as
brethren in a worldwide struggle against imperial rule and a model for the forcible reclamation of
ancestral identities: “In absolute systems, the central power is unlimited… but, in the final
analysis, the satraps of Persia are Persian, the pashas of the Grand Turk are Turks… Subject to
the three-fold yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice, oppressed people the world over have been
unable to acquire knowledge, power, or civic virtue.”26 (The same sentiments moved
revolutionaries in Ireland, who watched both the Latin American and Greek examples with great
enthusiasm. Writing of convicted insurrectionary William O’Connell, an observer of the Irish
independence movement reflected: “Countries have been driven mad by oppression. He hoped
that Ireland would never be driven to the system pursued by the Greeks. He trusted in God they
would never be so driven. He hoped Ireland would be restored to her rights; but if that day
should arrive, if she should be driven mad by persecution, he wished that a new Bolivar might
arise, and that the spirit of the Greeks and of the South Americans might animate the people of
Ireland.”27)
The ramifications of foreign influence for later Greek life were profound. Among the
most obvious impacts, Greek artists, intellectuals, merchants, and everyday citizens were now
tied more than ever to the Western tradition, in which they found both admiration for their own
past and avenues to the future. Greek military officers through interactions with the Russian
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Empire found a champion in an era of complex balance-of-power politics, and a cultural tradition
that offered a distinct and welcome counterpart to Greek Orthodoxy. While Western Europe
served as a political, civic, artistic, and intellectual model for the modern Greek nation, the
Slavic world represented a powerful tie to the Orthodox tradition. And such relationships were
frequently bilateral, as Greece represented an emergent nation in geopolitically valuable real
estate that melded well with Russia’s self-appointed role as protector of the Orthodox world.
Foreign interactions also gave Greece a crucial stake in the modern international system.
Invigorated by the military, commercial, and moral support of nations outside its borders, the
Hellenic Kingdom now counted itself among the powers of Europe proper. It could fashion its
political workings, social relations, and diplomatic conduct upon European lines – and as it did
so, could rely upon European support as it navigated an impetuous international arena.

Regional Conflict, The Great War, and the Triumph of Irredentism
The dual forces of consolidation and synthesis transformed the internal workings of
eastern Mediterranean society throughout the nineteenth century, engendering a marriage of
long-standing ethnic identities with more modern civic and intellectual currents and offering the
region’s governments a path toward consolidated nationhood. But the period also witnessed
large-scale shifts in the realm of foreign affairs, which frequently dovetailed with domestic
developments. For both Greeks and Turks, the last decades of the nineteenth century presented
diplomatic challenges centering on the legitimacy of the state within the international arena.
Greece, its independence secured, now faced the formidable task of establishing normal relations
with its neighbors – which included its erstwhile Ottoman overlord and territories in the Balkans
and eastern Europe still nominally under its control. The ailing Ottomans, more so than ever
before, sought to prevent the outright collapse of the ruling regime as foreign powers encroached
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on old territories and exploited new weaknesses. In both nations, the pressures of foreign
policymaking were exacerbated by internal calls for the reclamation of lost lands or the
redemption of past ignominies. Irredentism would become the closing chapter of the age of
consolidation, and through bitter irony would inaugurate the era of dissolution.
Irredentism had enjoyed a long pedigree in Greece prior to the nineteenth century,
borne along on waves of history and myth. The ancient Greek epics of Homer, Aeschylus and
Thucydides instilled in every Hellene an abiding pride in the exploits of ancestors whose valiant
struggle against Persian incursions redeemed fallen Greek lands and peoples; the fall of
Constantinople in 1453, though several centuries past, by the late 1800s had been burned into the
Greek national fabric as an equally legendary infamy whose reversal would eventually come at
the hands of Hellenic resilience. But by the age of the modern Greek nation-state, more
pragmatic geopolitical factors had also entered the irredentist lexicon. Britain and France, the
Mediterranean’s traditional European protectors, now viewed the region through the lens of
emergent imperial powers whose competition promised to change a delicate strategic calculus.
And, as ever, the Greek minority of Istanbul – by 1890 some two hundred thousand in number –
represented the strongest symbol of Greece’s claim to the ancestral lands of Byzantium.
Early Greek governments moved swiftly to consolidate control over unredeemed lands.
As early as 1844, Ioannis Kolettis, the first modern Greek prime minister, voiced his support for
the conquest of Greek-speaking lands in an impassioned speech to the National Assembly:
The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part: the smallest,
poorest part of Greece. The Greek is not only he who inhabits the
Kingdom, but also he who inhabits Ioannina, Salonika or Serres or
Constantinople or Trebizond or Crete or Samos or any other region
belonging to the Greek history or the Greek race… There are two great
centers of Hellenism. Athens is the capital of the Kingdom. Constantinople
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is the great capital, the dream and hope of all Greeks.28

The early conquests came soon, and the international environment proved the catalyst for Greek
irredentism’s first triumphs. Wary of the new Greek state’s instability following the rule of
Bavarian-born king Otto, Britain in 1862 informed the Greek government of its intention to
transfer administration of the Ionian Islands to Athens. Fourteen years later, growing tensions
between the Great Powers over colonial conflicts in Africa and the Middle East forced their
consideration of Greece’s claims on the collapsing Ottoman Empire, resulting in the cession of
Thessaly and parts of Epirus to the Hellenic Kingdom under the treaties of Berlin and
Constantinople.29
Territorial expansion also involved more active initiatives by the Greek state, and here,
too, international motivations played a key role. When in January 1897 rebellions in Crete
against the Ottoman administration reached a fever pitch with widespread massacres of the
island’s Orthodox population, Greek public opinion, its fury stoked by impassioned outcries
from clergy, compelled the Athens government to send supplies and naval support to aid in the
insurrection. In response, the Ottoman government deployed troops along Greece’s eastern
border, provoking border clashes that soon erupted into skirmishes and, within a week, a full
declaration of war on the Hellenic Kingdom. The ensuing campaign revealed the ill-preparedness
of the Greek military and the determination of its Ottoman counterpart to prevent territorial
losses. Throughout April and into early May, initial Greek advances into Epirus were steadily
reversed by Ottoman forces under Ahmed Hifzi Pasha, resulting in nearly nine thousand Greek
casualties. An armistice signed on September 20 forced Greece to cede border areas and pay
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hefty reparations to Istanbul, the latter provision enforced through international supervision of
the proceedings.
Humiliated, Greek society continued to look abroad for new conquests to complete the
kingdom’s expansion and redeem the shame of 1897. Led by Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretanborn officer who had distinguished himself in the island’s recent rebellion and thereafter played a
prominent role in domestic Greek politics, the nation’s armed forces in 1912 joined with
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro to form the Balkan League, an alliance of newly independent
states of the former Ottoman Empire intent upon expanding their territorial reach and eliminating
vestiges of Istanbul’s control. A series of armed conflicts over the next year resulted in the
August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, by which all Balkan League states claimed substantial gains.
The Kingdom of Greece took the greatest share of the spoils – large regions of Epirus,
Macedonia, formal control of Crete, and a revised border with Bulgaria that greatly expanded
Greek access to the Aegean. Venizelos was quick to warn the nation that “expansion should not
proceed so fast or so haphazardly that Greece’s backbone – the solid, Greek-inhabited land mass
which had to support the territorial accretions – was distorted or broken.”30 For now, the
Kingdom could rest on the laurels of its greatest victory since independence.
The eastern Mediterranean had no choice as to the terms of its involvement in the
European conflagration of 1914. For several reasons – not least the region’s geographical
proximity to the Balkan powder keg, as well as age-old ties to transnational Orthodox identities –
Greece was all but forced to take sides in the growing storm clouds engulfing Europe. Turkey,
though taking a more forward role with its attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet in October
1914, likewise was doomed to participate. With a long history of Russo-Turkish conflict on the
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Ottoman fringes, confrontation between the sultan’s armed forces and those of the Entente was
all but a foregone conclusion.31
Much less certain was the domestic fallout of the eastern Mediterranean’s entry into the
First World War. Neither the Greek nor the Ottoman governments had vested interests in the
outbreak of war, with social discontents, economic instability, and political cleavages weakening
the domestic front in both nations. Yet victory for either side promised massive territorial shifts
with similarly momentous implications for the eastern Mediterranean powers. From the
beginning, influential segments of Greek society viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate
gains made in the late nineteenth century and to redeem its disappointments over recent Balkan
conflicts. While the Greek government under Constantine I favored neutrality, liberal factions
under the charismatic Venizelos, their eyes and dreams on a share of postwar territorial spoils,
pushed for entry into the conflict on the side of the Allies. When war did come in early 1917 at a
moment of great weakness for the Central Powers, the fruition of the Megali Idea seemed closer
than ever before.

Postwar Fallout: The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Making of the Modern
Eastern Mediterranean
No student of modern history will fail to acknowledge the Great War’s profound
effects on the shape of European politics, culture, and society in the early twentieth century. Its
aftermath for eastern Mediterranean politics was likewise transformative. In the wake of the
Central Powers’ defeat, the region’s fate hinged upon the terms of the numerous postwar
agreements by which victorious powers sought to prevent a return to the competition and
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conflicts that had given rise to unprecedented bloodshed. Yet the actions and inactions of the
Great Powers were far from the only decisive factors influencing the trajectory of the eastern
Mediterranean’s future. The Greek and Ottoman governments – and, by war’s end, the political
successors to the rule of the Sublime Porte – also played key roles in the shape of events.
By far the most dramatic shifts occasioned by the war’s end occurred in the former
Ottoman Empire, which had finally and decisively collapsed. Imperial policymakers who had
hoped to forestall the inevitable through alliance with the Central Powers found their diplomatic
designs utterly destroyed in the postwar settlement. Under the Treaty of Sevres, the Empire
ceded all non-Turkish lands under its control to the Allied administration, marking the beginning
of the partitioning frenzy that would see the establishment of British and French mandates in
Palestine and Syria, respectively.32
The sociocultural effects on the Ottoman polity were equally momentous. Seeing in the
collapse of the empire a final opportunity to pursue their dreams of parliamentary government,
opposition groups scrambled to make their impact upon the emergent postwar settlement. The
successors of groups like the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, who had embraced Tanzimat
reform in the late 1800s and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in the early
twentieth century, clamored louder than ever for the realization of their visions. Ethnic
discontents grew in tandem with the calls by the Young Turks’ descendants. In 1919 alone, more
than seventy disturbances rocked Anatolia and other regions of eastern Turkey as Arabs,
Albanians, Russians, Kurds, and other minority groups of the former empire demanded a share
of voice in the coming territorial and governmental settlement. The most powerful opposition
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group, the Turkish National Movement under army officer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, rapidly
gained ground in such developments and by May of 1919 had begun to wage war against
occupying Allied forces. The most promising faction to many by virtue of Atatürk’s ambitious
reform platform, the Nationalists soon emerged as the clear successor to centuries of rule by the
sultans.33 But Atatürk’s goals included far more than the expulsion of foreign influence and the
establishment of a self-sufficient Turkish state. He also sought to effect a wholesale
transformation of Turkish society through the elimination of the vestiges of Ottomanism and the
inculcation and erection of modern, secular values and institutions.
Though falling short of an outright regime rupture, the years coinciding with and directly
following the conclusion of the First World War stimulated similarly dramatic developments in
Greek politics and diplomacy. As the Central Powers’ war effort faltered in late 1916 and early
1917, the rift between Constantine and Venizelos over Greece’s wartime stance reached fever
pitch. Frustrated by his lack of influence and seeking to marshal pro-Entente elements of Greek
society, Venizelos in April of 1916 erected a shadow government in northern Greece and
continued to push for Allied support in his campaign against the king. His efforts paid off in May
of 1917 when Constantine, forced into abdication and exile, relinquished the government to
Venizelos. The former prime minister wasted no time in signaling his irredentist aims. Almost
immediately, he ordered the Greek military to assault Bulgarian forces near Greece’s
northeastern borders and began planning his long-awaited campaign against the Ottomans.34
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The collapse of the Ottoman polity gave the Venizelos government an unprecedented
opportunity to fulfill the Megali Idea. With enormous tracts of land in Asia Minor detached from
formal control, Greece could stage its most ambitious operation yet to reclaim its ancestral lands
and expand the ambit of the modern Hellenic republic. The Venizelist offensive began on May
15, 1919, when twenty thousand Greek troops, supported by Entente navies, landed at Smyrna
and quickly took control of the city. Sporadic Turkish resistance represented an aberration from
the norm of surrendering or fleeing enemy troops, allowing Greek forces to advance far into Asia
Minor with great speed. By the spring of 1920, Venizelos’s armies had erected a broad strategic
perimeter along the western and northern borders of Anatolia in preparation for deeper thrusts
into the heart of Turkey. Nearly a century to the day after its independence, Greece stood poised
to fulfill the ancient dream of retaking Constantinople for greater Hellas.35
Its victory would be short-lived. As the Turkish National Movement gained political
influence throughout Turkey, its military strength grew commensurately – as did Allied
unwillingness for continued intervention in the course of developments. Faced with profound
instability at home and violent situations across other areas of the empire and in new mandate
possessions, Britain in early 1920 ended formal military involvement in Anatolia by withdrawing
advisors and material support. France followed suit soon thereafter, and the United States
maintained only humanitarian and official diplomatic presence in the region.36 Greece was left
alone to wage a rapidly expanding war against a numerically superior enemy increasingly
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gaining domestic and – amidst global calls for self-determination and Atatürk’s promises to
endorse new Middle Eastern protectorates – international support from Europe’s great powers.
Ultimately, the strength of Atatürk’s movement proved overwhelming. The Asia Minor
campaign resulted in a decisive victory for Turkey, and Atatürk, hailed as a hero for his
resistance to both Allied pressures and Greek aggression, embarked upon an ambitious program
of national consolidation to ensure the stability and safety of his new state. His endeavors soon
transformed the nation, washing away many of the adverse effects of Ottoman bureaucratic
inertia and civic inefficiencies. Abroad, his triumph against a disciplined, relatively wellequipped Balkan military supported by the Entente inspired deep respect. The anticolonial
Khilafet Committee of Bombay, a key instrument of Muslim resistance to British imperial rule in
India, wrote personally to Atatürk shortly after the Asia Minor campaign to express its
admiration: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha has done wonders and you have no idea how people in
British India adore his name… We are all waiting to know the terms on which Angora [Ankara]
offers peace to the Greeks.”37 This would not be the first time foreign revolutionaries looked to
Ankara’s example. As coming decades would show, Turkey had assumed a crucial role in the
growing global non-aligned movement.
But peace, when it came, was bitter. Sensing an opportunity to consolidate his party’s
political, military, and territorial gains in one motion, Atatürk pressed Western diplomats, still
haggling over the ultimate fate of the eastern Mediterranean, on the ethnicity question. His
principal target was the Turkish Greek community. Well versed in the history of the minority’s
preponderant influence in Ottoman affairs, and with his thoughts increasingly turned toward
solidification of national strength against the irredentist designs of the Hellenic Kingdom,
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Atatürk sought a wide-ranging population exchange by which some half a million Muslims
residing in Greek lands would be repatriated in Turkey along with the de jure denaturalization of
a million and a half Turkish Greeks. He did not have to wait long. Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian
scientist and diplomat commissioned by the League of Nations to handle postwar refugee
resettlement, regarded such a population exchange as the only viable option to settle, if only
temporarily, the volatile region’s long-standing ethnic disputes. Only through such an exchange
would the League stand any chance of satisfying both the security demands of Atatürk’s regime
and the Greeks’ ancient desire for reunion with diaspora Hellenes. And, speaking from his
experiences resettling refugees from the Russian Empire on the war’s eastern front, Nansen
regarded a population exchange as an ideal opportunity to devolve decision-making power onto
Greece and Turkey – a significant gesture of support for the legitimacy of both regimes, but
especially for the new Ankara government. “The amelioration of the lot of the minorities in
Turkey [depends] above all on the exclusion of every kind of foreign intervention and of the
possibility of provocation coming from outside,” Nansen wrote to the League after a meeting
with Turkish representatives. “Such an exchange will provide Turkey immediately and in the
best conditions with the population necessary to continue the exploitation of the cultivated lands
which the departed Greeks have abandoned.”38
The final transfer accomplished precisely what Nansen had outlined. Under the terms of
the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations concluded in
Lausanne in January of 1923, some two million individuals – the majority of them Anatolian
Greeks – would be forcibly expelled and relocated to their “native” lands. “As from 1st May,
1923,” the treaty stipulated, “there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals
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of the Greek Orthodox Religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the
Moslem religion established in Greek territory.”39 The net effect for Turkey, therefore, fulfilled
Atatürk’s wishes – an acknowledgement of the Turkish state’s legitimacy on the playing field of
the modern nation-state, as well as a purge of a powerful commercial class capable of
challenging his party. As historian Caglar Keyder concluded, “With this drastic measure, Turkey
lost around 90 percent of the pre-war commercial class, such that when the Republic was
formed, the bureaucracy found itself unchallenged.”40 Atatürk and the Republican Party in the
aftermath of the exchange set about deepening their consolidation projects, with the formidable
barriers of external influence and internal opposition at long last eliminated.
For Greece, the outcome of the Asia Minor expedition could hardly have been more
catastrophic. The Greek government, reeling from the financial and human costs of a brutal,
protracted conflict far from its borders, was ill prepared for the influx of millions of refugees
following the population exchange. Between October 1922 and mid-1925, nearly two million
Greek refugees poured into the homeland, placing unsustainable strains on an economy and body
politic already mutilated by the myriad physical and sociocultural costs of domestic political
conflict and foreign war. In processes similar to those underway in other major European urban
centers, disillusioned veterans and destitute immigrants mourned their economic and human
losses in the port communities of Piraeus and slums of Athens. Struggling to cobble together new
lives, they found hope, purpose, and inspiration in the revolutionary dictates of communism now
bleeding through the cracks of Greek society. The Greek Communist Party (Κοµµουνιστικὀ
Κὀµµα Ελλἀδας, ΚΚΕ), constituted in 1918 just months after the Bolshevik Revolution, now
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discovered a ready supply of followers. Its days of limited influence in Greek politics had come
to an end.41
Greece would reel from the numerous costs of wartime defeat for decades. But perhaps
most significant was the irreparable blow dealt to the Greek psyche. With the failure of Greek
governments to achieve the Megali Idea put on full and painful display, a prolonged period of
national soul-searching – and deep internecine conflict – commenced. Political divisions would
only become greater as the bankruptcy of both adventurist, nationalist foreign policy and
traditional monarchical rule gave fodder to ongoing arguments about the ideal shape of the
modern Greek state. And the twin pillars of ethnic identity and irredentism, while by no means
banished to the realm of history, would forever have to contend with the ghosts of Asia Minor
and the memories of humiliation at the hands of the Turks. Eternal Greece, the land of the
Hellenes, would have to wait for the fulfillment of its dreams – and when it came, it would not
be as a result of a triumphal entry onto the modern world stage, supported by allies long thought
to share a unique connection to Greek civilization. The mood among Greeks was perhaps best
captured by an Englishman named Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies,
watching the Greek drama unfold as he began an illustrious career in postwar British politics:
This story carried us back to classic times. It is true Greek tragedy, with Chance
as the ever-ready handmaid of Fate. However the Greek race might have altered
in blood and quality, their characteristics were found unchanged since the days of
Alcibiades. As of old, they preferred faction above all other interests, and as of
old in their crisis they had at their head one of the greatest of men. The interplay
between the Greek love of party politics and the influence exercised over them by
Venizelos constitutes the action of the piece. The scene and the lighting are the
Great War; and the theme, ‘How Greece Gained the Empire of her dreams in spite
of herself, and threw it away when she awoke.’42
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Conclusion
The age of eastern Mediterranean consolidation witnessed the transformation of the
region from an imperial basin to a globally networked system of nation-states. In just under a
century, the character of the region’s two great powers – the newly independent Greek state and
its former master, the ailing Ottoman Empire – shifted dramatically under the weight of both
domestic and international developments. If the nineteenth century recast the world according to
a new balance of power between globally committed nations, it also remade identities. Nowhere
was this truer than in the eastern fringes of the Mediterranean basin.
Though regional identities expanded during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
to encompass modern notions of nationalism and citizenry, new currents failed to replace the
long-standing importance of religion, ethnicity, and history to the eastern Mediterranean’s
inhabitants. As Greeks entered the late 1920s, they took with them many of the patterns and
allegiances that had long organized life. The Orthodox faith emerged from the cataclysms of the
era almost wholly unscathed – and even reinvigorated by a resurgence of ethnic identity in the
wake of national humiliation. Greeks from all walks of life continued to seek encouragement and
direction in the words of the Patriarch and his priests, and the ways they conceived of politics,
diplomacy, and the nation’s future still passed through the prism of Orthodoxy.
But in some realms, the age of consolidation effected lasting changes. Perhaps nowhere
was this clearer than in foreign affairs. At the outbreak of the rebellion for independence, Greeks
had regarded the outside world with suspicion, their understandings conditioned by deeply
ingrained ethnic histories of conflict and civilizational clashes with the Other. The struggle for
freedom forged crucial new linkages with both Western and Eastern Europeans, as well as with
revolutionaries in the Americas. Such connections proved essential to the health of the new
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Greek government, as those segments of society most capable of challenging its rule –
particularly the growing intellectual and merchant classes – found new roles within the nation’s
international relationships and devoted their energies to the goals of the nation-state.
The remainder of the era would shatter Greeks’ initial hopes for a future defined by
international participation. As ethnic identities met the realities of the modern global system,
calls for reclamation of Hellenic lands drove the Greek government into adventurist foreign
policies that ultimately foundered alongside broader European dreams in the hecatomb of the
First World War. Turkey, site and symbol of ancient animosities and seat of irredentist Hellenes’
most important claims, had gained international legitimacy at the expense of Athens. Ethnic
Greeks, far from reunited triumphantly as citizens of an expansive Greek empire, faced an
uncertain future as the fallout of catastrophic defeat and demographic flux settled. As Greece
sought to heal its wounds and Turkey found a new path into the future, both nations explored
new terrains defined by the conflicts between age-old identities and new international roles.

41
III. The Special Relationship Confronts Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern
Mediterranean, 1947-1960
On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman addressed a joint session of Congress
convened to discuss the worsening strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Near East. In one
of the most momentous declarations of the postwar period, Truman spelled out the dire
circumstances of Greece and Turkey, the two great allied powers of the region. The struggling
Turkish government faced mounting pressure on its northern border from the Soviet Union,
which sought to gain naval access to the crucial Dardanelles. The Greek monarchy, newly
reinstated after years in exile, was likewise beleaguered by the threat of international
communism, though in this instance an indigenous branch prosecuting an intensifying guerrilla
war. Only the United States, unique among a world of war-weary nations in its capability to offer
extensive military and economic assistance, could stem the tide. “The very existence of the
Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by
Communists,” Truman warned. “No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary
support for a democratic Greek government… the United Nations and its related organizations
are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.” Laying the template for Greece’s
involvement in America’s global strategy, he concluded soberly: “Should we fail to aid Greece
and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the
East.”43
The Truman Doctrine profoundly shaped postwar international relations. Tangibly, it set
the stage for the unprecedented military and economic influence the United States would come to
exercise in Europe over the next decades. Rhetorically, it codified America’s commitment to
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global involvement in order to prevent the spread of communist influence wherever it threatened
friendly regimes. Moscow did not miss the message. While Soviet U.N. spokesman Andrei
Vyshinsky’s accusation that Truman’s statement sought to “split Europe into two camps” may
not have accurately described its intent, it certainly captured its repercussions.44 If the Cold War
had seemed possible from an assessment of the geopolitical balance at the conclusion of the
Second World War, the Truman Doctrine made such confrontation unavoidable. In little over a
year, the European Recovery Program began in earnest; by 1949, bloc polarization was in full
swing, with Soviet crackdowns on the peoples’ democracies of Eastern Europe, the formation of
NATO, and the beginnings of Eastern bloc integration through organizations like Comecon
presaging the solidification of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.45
For the eastern Mediterranean, Truman Doctrine aid accelerated the processes of change
sweeping the region. Now part of Washington’s global strategy, Greece’s foreign relations would
from the late 1940s be driven by its role in the Western alliance. In many respects, such ties
represented a continuation of Greece’s steady drift into international involvement since the late
nineteenth century. But the sheer scale and significance of the nation’s stake in the early Cold
War dwarfed anything it had previously experienced. Greek politicians could no longer control
the foreign factor for domestic gain, as they had in prior decades; now, it forcibly intruded upon
the comings and goings of political life, an unavoidable and omnipresent topic of national
discourse. And debates that once had a regional audience now found themselves broadcast on the
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grandest of stages, as Anglo-American policymakers eyed Greek political and cultural tensions
with strategic interest.46
Turkey likewise cast its lot with the Western bloc following the promulgation of the
Truman Doctrine, and for Ankara the 1950s proved equally global. Like its western neighbor,
Turkey’s foreign policy elites embraced the Atlantic alliance as a safeguard against the ongoing
threat of the Soviet Union, which still loomed on the nation’s northern border and sought to
foment insurrection from within. They also used Marshall Plan aid to pursue their ambitious
domestic agendas, which by the postwar era had frequently come to question the secular,
modernizing tendencies of Kemalism. And, just as had happened in Greece, the conjunction of
foreign influence and domestic transformations resulted by the end of the 1950s in a state of
political deadlock, with ideological polarization exacerbated by the resurgence of often-militant
indigenous identity. Though historians of modern Turkey have conspicuously overlooked the
foreign factor as a key driver of historical developments, it was Turkey’s increasingly prominent
international role that laid the foundations for shifting domestic climates and ultimately shaped
its experience of the early Cold War period.47
But grassroots domestic transformations accompanied these broader diplomatic shifts,
often as corollary effects of the region’s growing importance to the Western alliance. As
Marshall Plan aid facilitated modernization and recovery in Athens and Ankara, old elites – often
at the service of Washington and London – regained standing in fractured political arenas only
tenuously supported by the rule of law and the defense promises of the Atlantic community. As
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they assumed or reassumed the mantle of leadership, these elites clashed with segments of
society inspired and empowered by changing international dynamics. Reduction in regulations
and trade barriers subjected Greek and Turkish markets to the vicissitudes of the new global
economy, bringing unprecedented – but in all cases, unevenly distributed – benefits to the
societies of the eastern Mediterranean. Surges in labor union membership, a natural result of
increasing productivity across industries, raised the specter of communism – a prospect all too
real following the near-victory of leftists in the 1948 Italian election, and increasingly on the
minds of American policymakers as they confronted communism in Latin America and Asia.48
With populist segments in Greek and Turkish society embracing centrist and leftist parties’
messages, elites who had assumed or reassumed the mantle of leadership found themselves
challenged by opposition movements with real potential to seize governing power – often for the
first time.
The resultant tension between newly reinstated conservative elites and leftist groups with
growing influence – a mirror of parallel tensions between the peculiarities of national situations
and the growing role of global concerns in policy – dominated the domestic politics of both
Greece and Turkey in the first decade of the Cold War. And, in common with other regions
seeking a new path in the postwar international order, domestic developments in the eastern
Mediterranean continued to share close links with events on the foreign policy stage. As Great
Britain and then the United States deepened their involvement in the region, they replaced
traditional foes as the locus of outward condemnation. Their presence also provided a canvas
upon which Greeks and Turks painted ongoing struggles over ethnic and national identities.
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Haunted by the monolith of international communism, the two leading Atlantic powers
confronted the twin specters of political instability and ethnic conflict in the eastern
Mediterranean. Despite their preponderant standing in world affairs, neither proved capable of
forestalling or resolving the centrifugal forces of the 1950s.

U.S. and NATO Influence: Questions of National and Regional Direction
Through its key role in bringing the Greek communist insurrection to an end, the United
States by 1950 had cemented its preponderant influence on the nature and course of the nation’s
domestic affairs. America’s supremacy, though thought by some to represent but one facet of its
“architecture of intervention,”49 was in fact as much a simple function of America’s global reach
as its deliberate intervention in Greek life. Post-civil war Greece could pursue no action with
bearing on U.S. foreign policy interests outside of the strategic umbrella of Washington –
precisely because such interests had become truly global. While the Greek case was regarded as
a pressing foreign policy matter in its own right due to the recent attempt by communist
guerrillas to seize the reins of power, the nation’s proximity to Eastern Europe, the Middle East,
and North Africa, as well as its strategic ties to a now-declining British Empire, would have
rendered it a centerpiece of U.S. policy in any case.50
And the American official presence, while conspicuously represented in the form of
military equipment and political advisors, needed little concerted effort to emerge as a
determining factor in postwar Greek life. It found a crucial internal vehicle via a cadre of
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conservative figures lifted to political ascendancy after the government’s war victory and only
too happy to accommodate the new hegemon. In the words of Andreas Papandreou, a young
politician soon to play a key role in Greek history, “There was no attempt to hide the fact. It was
taken for granted, both by Washington and by Athens. Cabinet members and army generals,
political party leaders and members of the Establishment, all made open reference to American
wishes or views in order to justify or to account for their own actions or positions. And the
Americans in Greece, for their part, found it necessary frequently to make public comments on
the economic and political situation in order to guide public opinion into the paths that they
considered desirable.”51
As with its commitments in other regions, the United States saw its mission in Greece
primarily through the lens of concerns over the growing strength of international communism.
KKE’s insurgency, admitted a 1947 policy paper, had not been a “friend or ally of the USSR.”
But as an “instrument of Soviet policy,” it highlighted the virulent potential of Soviet influence
in unstable regions. Specificities in the Greek domestic situation may have influenced the
nation’s communist movement, but at their heart remained Moscow’s determination to extend its
hand into the fragile underbelly of Europe. “It remains true that the paramount factor in the
Greek political scene,” the paper maintained, “is the international rivalry and that all other
questions… are subsumed in and assimilated to this larger question.”52 Among a transatlantic
foreign policy apparatus increasingly sharing the notion of monolithic communism with London,
such views – largely ignorant of Greece’s recent past – went unchallenged and unqualified.53
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From Athens, the story was different, even if its characters remained consistent. Greek
politicians, too, viewed international events through the prism of budding East-West
confrontation. But their overriding preoccupations in the aftermath of the civil war were the
reconsolidation of domestic legitimacy and assertion of Greek foreign policy goals on the
diplomatic stage. Disagreements over how best to assert such goals and chart the proper course
of Greek diplomacy arose from competing visions of Greece’s relationship to American
hegemony and European integration schemes, in turn underscoring divisions between right and
left. Conservatives, who after the civil war enjoyed a monopoly of governing power, embraced
U.S. advisory assistance and economic aid, emphasizing what they viewed as the axiomatically
beneficial aspects of Greek alignment with the Atlantic alliance. For such figures, America
represented the best safeguard against both external aggression from Greece’s communist
northern neighbors, as well as the surest buttress against the incessant threat of a resurgent
communist movement. By virtue of its geography, the Greek state had no option of maintaining
neutrality in the budding conflict. Siding with the West promised defense benefits Greece could
not provide herself, while offering a framework within which the country’s own foreign policy
goals – particularly vis-à-vis Cyprus, whose union with Greece under enosis remained a top
priority – could be negotiated.
Among opposition figures on the left – and, increasingly, among large segments of the
Greek public – the role of a U.S.-led West in the nation’s future offered more uncertainty than
benefit. Haunted by memories of the Asia Minor catastrophe and the crippling depression that
followed, progressive politicians advocated for the renunciation of nationalist aims and the
embrace of international organizations governed not by hegemonic powers but through
collectively legislated, mutually beneficial relationships. Unchecked nationalism on the part of
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world governments, such voices argued, had been responsible for the twin cataclysms of global
warfare and economic depression in the first half of the twentieth century; cooperation was a sine
qua non in ensuring a prosperous and peaceful second. “We believe in the need for true, fair, and
sincere international cooperation, [which is] necessary because of the progress of technical
independence of nations… The problems which humanity will face after the war will be so
difficult and threatening that their solution will demand [application of policies to] geographical
areas wider than today’s national organizations,” asserted a 1942 statement by radical group
PEAN (Πανελληνιος Ενοσις Αγωνιζοµενον Νεων, the Panhellenic Union of Struggling Youth).
Such sentiments found postwar resonance in the platforms of parties such as NUP (Εθνικο
Ενωτικο Κοµµα, the National Unionist Party), whose leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos endorsed
the notion of a pan-European organization devoted to continental cooperation and the
preservation of peace among member-states:
My thoughts are constantly there [Europe]. It is impossible for me to distinguish
my concern for Greece from my concern for Europe as a whole.
Nationalism in our days is provincialism. How could a new Greece be
comprehensible without a new Europe, without a new world? Only naïve
or retarded people could imagine that an enlarged Greece is sufficient for
the happiness of the Greek people. The nineteenth century is one thing,
the twentieth quite another. For the happiness of the Greek people it is
necessary to have that which is necessary for the happiness of all European
peoples: a new Europe, truer, founded on a new and comprehensive,
organically integrated, supranational political regime.54
Despite the ferocity of recent Greco-Turkish acrimony, the scene from Ankara closely
mirrored the one in Athens. Catapulted to ascendancy in the aftermath of the Second World War,
the Turkish Democratic Party, like Greece’s conservatives, had by the late 1940s utilized
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Marshall Plan aid and Anglo-American strategic support to cement its control of the government
and to implement long-desired reforms. These included a wide-ranging agricultural
mechanization program, modernization of energy and transportation systems, and the
rehabilitation of metropolitan infrastructures – sweeping transformations that resulted in average
economic growth of ten percent per-annum, as well as unprecedented surges in support among
the working and agricultural classes. Led by noted opposition leader Adnan Menderes, the
Turkish Democrats acted strategically to enrich Atatürk’s investments in public education and
welfare programs, winning widespread popular support before indigenous communist influence
made further inroads. Menderes’s own actions – most notably his public redistribution of
inherited estates and enterprises – only served to reinforce the party’s postwar mandate.55
Menderes’s reforms in Turkish society and culture, by contrast, while best encapsulated
in gestures and attitudes rather than legislation or official pronouncements, reached even further
and represented a distinct break with past governments. In contrast to Atatürk’s strict emphasis
on modernization at the expense of traditional customs, Menderes early on indicated his
tolerance of Turkey’s Islamic heritage. During his 1950 election campaign, the candidate had
vigorously supported the legalization of Arabic-language Islamic calls to prayer, banned under
Atatürk in an attempt to rid the republic of Ottoman influences. Once in office, Menderes
reopened mosques and Islamic ritual sites across Turkey, a prelude to his 1951 overtures to Iran
and Saudi Arabia, among other Muslim states.56
The Democratic Party maintained popular support throughout the early 1950s, riding it to
another victory in the 1954 elections. But by mid-decade changing economic fortunes,

55

See especially Hugh and Nicola Pope, Turkey Unveiled: A History of Modern Turkey (Overlook Press, 2011), pp.
325-328.
56
Ibid.

50
occasioned by high importation of foreign products and failure to sustain investments in
agricultural technologies, led to the rise of opposition groups advocating a new approach to
Turkish politics based on a return to the Kemalist cultural paradigms. Though such groups often
constituted groups of vocal figures with little concrete influence at the polls, Menderes reacted
swiftly. In 1955 he began crackdowns on opposition press outlets, jailing journalists critical of
his regime’s reforms and instituting tribunals for the trial of “disloyal” elements among the
intelligentsia. The prime minister’s moves deeply alarmed senior military officials, whose
foremost charge had long been the defense of Kemalist ideals. In secret they began contingency
plans – akin to those assembled in Greece and other NATO nations – for a forcible takeover of
power in the event of constitutional crises leading to political instability and the threat of a
communist coup.57
Though Menderes and his party registered widespread support until the end of the
decade, the Democratic Party’s reign and sudden crackdown revealed significant cleavages in
postwar Turkish society. The economic miracle that had so benefited Western European nations
in the aftermath of the ERP hit Turkey in waves, boosting employment and productivity in
aggregate but delivering the typical shocks of innovation and modernization to many industries.
The resulting discontent among marginalized or threatened groups provoked expressions of
opposition that, while engendered by economic factors, reflected a broader question over
Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the globalized world. Henceforth, the republic would have to choose
between national concerns and international involvement – and the choice, more often than not,
proved painful, as resurgent ethnic identities clashed with the realities of postwar global politics.
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As we will see, the Cold War conflicts of the 1950s gave fuel to these tensions, often with
disastrous results.
Perhaps more importantly, the Menderes years highlighted the importance of the military
as a political and social force in postwar Turkey. Though the martial tradition had played
important roles during the Ottoman era, Atatürk’s years had signaled a sea change toward
democratic means of power transition and consolidation. For more than three decades since the
Greco-Turkish War, political debates in Turkey had unfolded through the channels of
parliamentary discourse and regular elections – punctuated by ethnic disturbances and the
grievances of restive identity groups, but always within the confines of a state with widespread
legitimacy. As the Democratic Party’s repression and subsequent events were to prove, such was
not to be the case for long in the maturing Cold War climate.
The clearest effect of U.S. and NATO influence in the postwar eastern Mediterranean
was a transformation in the strategic roles of the Greek and Turkish governments. Athens and
Ankara had long served as the southeastern gateway to Europe, with all the attendant
involvement of great powers with vested interests in the region. But now, from the perspective of
Anglo-American policymakers overseeing transitions of power in a volatile area, the eastern
Mediterranean carried the potential either to facilitate communist infiltration or to stem the tide
of Moscow’s influence. London, Washington, and their pro-Western proxies were determined to
see the latter happen, and their policies – crafted with the goals of ensuring regional stability and
of preventing emergent states from embracing socialism in the post-imperial era – reflected such
concerns.
But such stances in foreign policy had residual domestic effects as the diplomatic,
economic, and sociocultural dimensions of foreign influence trickled into each society. For
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Greek and Turkish citizens, the chief transformations of the early Cold War were psychological
– forging new identities from the ruins of civil war, exploring the opportunities and weathering
the challenges of economic boom and bust, or negotiating clashes between old and new identities
altogether under the auspices of new governments. The Anglo-American foreign factor, in short,
coexisted with and mutually reinforced new frontiers of regional identity in the eastern
Mediterranean. It would be precisely these identity questions that would prove inflammatory
when they met the full force of the new international order.

Cyprus, Diplomacy, and the Istanbul Riots
As we have seen, the Greek and Turkish governments, their internal politics driven by the
deepening Cold War dominance of the United States and its allies, contended with shifting
dynamics in politics, society, and culture on the home front. But regardless of their internal
debates or diplomatic concerns, the unifying focus of American, British, Greek, and Turkish
governments during the 1950s was on the status of the island of Cyprus. Perhaps the most acute
concern came from Whitehall, as it watched with growing apprehension the role of the eastern
Mediterranean in the coming decline of the British Empire. As unrest shook the Middle East
throughout the late 1940s, with oil crises in Iran and the 1948 Palestinian uprising capturing the
attention of both British and American leaders, maintaining a firm foothold for London in an
area so prone to revolutionary influence became a sine qua non of any successful regional policy.
Instability in the eastern Mediterranean basin had to be carefully managed, lest great power
rivalries or the insidious threat of the communist monolith disrupt the fragile world order. As
Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, observed in a
December 1945 memorandum:
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At the present time the Near East, which for the purpose of this
memorandum may be considered to include Turkey, the Aegean and
Eastern Mediterranean Islands, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf area, and Afghanistan,
is a breeding ground for international misunderstandings… The most
important interest of the United States in the Near East is not based,
as a fairly large section of the American public appears to believe, upon
American participation in petroleum extraction or in profits to be
derived from trade, but upon preventing developments from taking place…
which might eventually give birth to a Third World War.58
Henderson also outlined the interest of the four great powers he saw playing the greatest
role in the development of eastern Mediterranean affairs: Britain, whose main stakes in the
region included keeping trade conduits with the rest of the Empire open and restraining Russian
expansionism; France, whose “national pride” and “desire at least to appear to continue to play
the role of a great empire” made it reluctant to withdraw from regional commitments; the Soviet
Union, imbued with a desire to eliminate a “third barrier” to its southern expansion; and the
United States, which sought to pursue a “policy of the open door” predicated upon support of
independence movements, national self-determination, and giving “full consideration to the
welfare of the people of these countries” with the goal of readying them “to play a role in world
affairs appropriate to their number and talents.”59 Though Britain stood as the “great dam”
restraining Soviet expansion, Moscow’s growing influence in the Near East made it
“unjustifiable” for the United States to refuse to bolster its presence in what was now “a major
political battlefield.”60

58

FRUS, 1946: The Near East and Africa, pp. 1.
Ibid, pp. 2.
60
Chester W. Nimitz to James Forrestal, July 23, 1946, “Russia” folder, Box 15, Clifford Papers, Harry S. Truman
Library.
59

54
In the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere, American anti-colonial rhetoric coexisted
with but was frequently subordinated to the actions of beleaguered European empires,
particularly when their problems involved the risk of newly independent nations tilting into the
Soviet orbit. As tensions with Moscow worsened in the late 1940s and then burst into open
hostility with the Korean War, official U.S. attitudes toward calls for Cypriot self-determination
evinced a similar preference for the preservation of the status quo. They also reflected broader
concerns about a new, but equally serious, threat to Washington’s global strategy – neutralism.
As a July 1952 telegram from Dean Acheson to the embassy in Athens stated, American views
on the Cyprus problem were
well known to [the] parties directly concerned. Restated briefly, they are
that the US [is] not party to problem but does not believe it useful for
the Greek government to press the matter… public restatement of our
position at this time is unlikely to alter the approach of either the Greeks,
Cypriots, or British to the problem. On the other hand, such reiteration
Would probably provide additional propaganda material to those groups in
ME (Middle East) and elsewhere which have belabored us for our approach
to other problems involving aspirations of local groups in that area.61
Britain was only too happy to follow suit. Despite the vehemence of Cypriot calls for
independence and their endorsement on the mainland by Greek politicians of all parties, dreams
of enosis were repeatedly dashed by British authorities, whose lip service to Hellenic concerns
foundered on the realities of imperial strategy. Amidst the suite of issues facing the Empire, from
guerrilla wars in Malaya and Kenya to the aftermath of the Indian partition and the task of
charting Britain’s role in the first stages of the European integration experiment, Cypriot and
Greek concerns were a secondary – if still strategically vital – concern. Western control of the
eastern Mediterranean, of which Britain’s Cypriot role formed a crucial pillar, was a non-
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negotiable bulwark against instability on the Western alliance’s vulnerable southern flank. But it
must be done at a minimum of cost, and certainly with none of the agonizing commitments now
materializing, for London, Paris, and Washington alike, in Southeast Asia.
Policymakers in London made no secret of such views. It was thus a great insult when in
1953 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed Greek prime minister Alexandros
Papagos that the acknowledgement of Cypriot rights to self-determination was out of the
question because the Cyprus issue, in the British government’s view, “did not exist.” As a
shocked Papagos later recalled, Eden angrily demanded to know whether the Greek government
intended to demand union of New York City’s sizable Greek population with the home
country.62 Eden, like most British statesmen of the era, saw the writing on the wall: the Empire’s
days were numbered, and the modus operandi of Britain’s foreign policy thus shifted to stopgap
measures designed to ensure favorable regime transitions upon independence.63 But Cyprus was
different. Located so close to the vital regions of the Middle East and North Africa, it was
indispensable to the effective execution of British global policies in a way other territories were
not – especially after the 1954 relocation to Cyprus of the War Office’s Middle East
Headquarters for Land and Air Forces. For the time being, the importance of Cyprus as a
strategic outpost made the prospect of its abandonment out of the question. As Henry Hopkinson,
a junior minister at the colonial office in London, reported in July 1954:

British administration in Cyprus, besides bringing much prosperity to the
island and safeguarding the rights of all sections of the population, has
maintained and still maintains stable conditions in this vital strategic area…
the efficient administration on the island, in which a large number of
Cypriots play a most effective part, has brought about vast improvements in
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health, agriculture, communications and many other fields… Her Majesty’s
Government fully recognises that the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking
parts of the population have close cultural links with Greece and Turkey.
Without sacrifice of those traditions, Cypriots have before them the
prospect of expanding opportunities in economic, social and constitutional
development.64
Stakes became higher, however, when the Cyprus question came to international
attention through the forum of the United Nations. As the psychological reconstruction of the
Greek body politic made national prestige a major issue for both right and left, the plight of
Greek Cypriots – bonded with the motherland in the Orthodox faith, Hellenic language, and a
rich shared history – constituted a glaring example of Greek honor trampled upon by the
exigencies of great power strategy. The Greeks thus opted for an expansion of the Cyprus
question to the global community, raising the issue of Cypriot independence at the Ninth General
Session of the United Nations, held between September 21 and December 17, 1954.65
Greece’s actions put the Western allies in a difficult situation. Britain, already tasked
with the resolution of far-flung, increasingly violent insurgencies, sought simultaneously to
preserve its standing on Cyprus and to prevent yet another colonial disturbance from causing
embarrassment at the United Nations. The United States, while overwhelmingly concerned with
the prospect of an internal threat to NATO cohesion in the form of Greco-Turkish conflict over
Cyprus, could not countenance British failures to recognize Cypriot demands in so public a
forum. The Anglo-American strategy thus became one of careful placation – keeping the Cyprus
question localized and seeking its management through cooperation between the regional powers
themselves. “We fully appreciate the distress and difficulties which any such discussion [of
Cypriot independence] would create for you in the General Assembly, and we are ourselves not
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unconcerned,” U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill on September 21, 1954, the day the Ninth General Session convened.
“However, the question as to how to vote on inclusion of this matter on the agenda poses an
exceedingly difficult problem for us… because we have consistently and publicly adhered to the
principle of the right of discussion in the General Assembly. We fought very hard for this at San
Francisco [in 1945] in the face of Soviet opposition.” Still, Dulles went on, the United States
would do everything within its power to make sure the issue never got off the ground in the first
place. “If the item is included on the agenda,” he assured Churchill, “we shall actively oppose
the passage of any resolution and will do all possible to keep any discussion to the absolute
minimum.”66
In the meantime, Washington and London sought to resolve regional tensions through
efforts at multilateral negotiations among the involved nations. Between the spring of 1954 and
the beginning of the Ninth General Assembly in September, the U.S. State Department
repeatedly lobbied the Menderes government to take a more active role in the resolution of the
Cyprus crisis, while cautioning Ankara that any settlement should take into account the reality
that “Western unity is of paramount importance.” Turkish officials, “while making their position
clear, should also show a desire to work for the mutually satisfactory solution of the problem so
that it will not poison NATO relationships or jeopardize future Balkan alliances.”67 Neither the
British nor the Americans informed Greece of their overtures to Turkey.
In addition to Greek support on the global stage, Cypriot pleas for self-determination
found a powerful indigenous spokesman in the person of Michail Christodolou Mouskos, better
known to history as Makarios III, the archbishop and primate of the autocephalous Cypriot
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Orthodox Church. A native of the island, Makarios had spent the Second World War studying
theology under German occupation at the University of Athens, and in subsequent years received
a scholarship to pursue further study at Boston University. Upon his return to ecclesiastical life
in Cyprus in 1950, he had thus encountered the two most formative influences upon his later
political endeavors: the experience of subservience to and occupation by foreign powers, and a
close knowledge of the Western – and especially American – political and sociocultural systems.
Both would prove indispensable in his international dealings.
Makarios’s return to Cyprus coincided with the beginning of the period of intensifying
calls for enosis, and the archbishop deftly capitalized on the power of his position, his
considerable diplomatic acumen, and the Greek world’s resurgent ethnic identities to stoke the
fires of Cypriot nationalism. Upon his assumption of the archbishopric, he received the title of
Ethnarch – the de facto leader of the Greek Cypriot community. This is essential in
understanding the depths of Makarios’s phenomenal power over both Greek Cypriots and
mainland Greeks. As head of church, state, and oppressed community, the archbishop came to
embody the captivity of Hellenism, and the pathway to its salvation, in a way no leader, not even
Venizelos, had done in modern times. His distance from formal politics and insistence on
speaking in spiritual terms promoted a widely held perception of sanctity in a world of constant
political turmoil. And Makarios wasted no time in cultivating this quasi-messianic image. As he
later revealed to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci,
In my world, [the joining of temporal and spiritual power] is fairly
common… in my opinion, the Church should interest itself in all
aspects of life – the Christian religion doesn’t confine itself to taking
care of the moral progress of men, it’s also concerned with their social
well-being… Besides, I don’t lean on a party. I’m not the leader of a
political party who goes around asking people to elect him. I simply serve
the people in the two capacities that they insistently and almost
unanimously offered me… I’m strong because I’m weak. Because I have
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neither a party nor an army nor a police force behind me. And because I
don’t even know the rules of politics. Because I follow certain principles
that are Christian principles and not games, tricks, political maneuvers.68
For a man ignorant of the rules of politics, Makarios manipulated them skillfully. An
anti-imperialist through and through, the archbishop made no secret of his desires to see Cyprus
liberated from the British yoke. Although he stopped short of endorsing outright violence, he
vowed to adopt whatever means necessary to ensure the survival of the independent Cypriot state
that would follow Britain’s exit. Cyprus had to remain a sovereign state independent of foreign
interference in the deepening Cold War, and Makarios would shape the nature of its government.
Though his commitment to Orthodoxy precluded serious consideration of Soviet-style
communism, socialism, in his view, offered a tantalizing mixture of anti-colonialism and social
justice. It had, furthermore, demonstrated its credentials as the active motor of recent history,
having gained ground in some of the world’s most traditional religious societies, nations in Latin
America:
I can say I really have nothing against socialism. Among all social systems, it’s
the closest to Christianity, to a certain Christianity, or at least to what Christian
teaching should be… And let me add that, in my opinion, the Future belongs to
socialism. It will end by prevailing, through a kind of osmosis between the
communist countries and the capitalist ones. Spiritually it’s already happening.
The socialist, that is, egalitarian, spirit is permeating all human relationships… In
the last thirty years a great change has happened in the world. Thirty years ago
who would have imagined that colonialism would be over and that war would no
longer be accepted as a means for subjugating a country?69
Makarios consciously tapped into the growing power of the global non-aligned
movement, as well as Anglo-American fears of its potential to disrupt regional stability, to attract
international attention. His efforts were not in vain. The archbishop’s conspicuous flirtation with

68
69

Quoted in Oriana Fallaci, Interview with History (New York, 1977), pp. 319-320.
Ibid, pp. 327-328.

60
destabilizing movements and alliances quickly caused concern in Washington and London.
Combined with his independent initiatives to bring the Cyprus issue before the U.N. Security
Council, he alone constituted one of the greatest threats to alliance cohesion in the eastern
Mediterranean basin. “The paladin of Greek nationalism,” as U.S. ambassador to Greece Charles
Yost termed him, was a potentially dangerous rogue in a region and era when stability was
essential. Particularly alarming was the possibility of Makarios’s Cyprus – already a central
concern of Greek foreign policy – becoming the primary thespian in the passion play of Hellenic
nationalism. “If Makarios goes ahead [with agitation at the United Nations],” Yost concluded,
“he may publicly accuse [Greek prime minister] Papagos of the betrayal of Cypriots, which
would have a most serious effect upon the position of the Papagos government in Greece…
Certainly there are few issues on which the opposition could cause more embarrassment to the
government than that of the ‘betrayal of Cyprus.’”70
As Britain increasingly felt pressure on Cyprus from both Athens and Nicosia, top
officials in Washington, echoing their earlier assessments of the situation, supported the
Empire’s policy of status quo maintenance out of strategic considerations while publicly
acknowledging the legitimacy of Cypriot demands. The failure of the General Assembly to pass
a resolution in favor of Cypriot independence, according to Dulles, “gained some time” for the
British “which should be used in [an] effort [to] avoid even more difficult situations” should the
matter be raised again. “We intend to retain a reasonably flexible attitude regarding Cyprus so
we will be free to exercise our influence usefully… in general, we are anxious to preserve
harmony in NATO and are interested in seeing orderly and evolutionary development of the
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political rights of the Cypriot people.” But such rights would have to be gained through “mature”
discussion and negotiation, a category into which calls for enosis did not fall:
In examining problems, the U.S. must weigh heavily whether Cypriots
are willing to adopt a constructive long-range attitude… it does not appear
a sign of political maturity to ask that the British promise a plebiscite
before holding discussions. This attitude will only restrict their opportunity
to develop political experience and responsibility… Cypriots ask for the
sympathy of the free world, but should remember that any increase in
freedom requires an equal increase in responsibility and cooperation.71
Cyprus, in other words, would soon follow a road to independence and self-government –
but its development would have to happen on the terms of a rapidly coalescing consensus on
development in Washington that placed heavy emphasis upon capitalist development as an
essential play in the grand geopolitical game with Soviet Russia.72 Even as the decisiveness of
particular circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean joined cracks in the Soviet bloc as
evidence for diversity within the ranks of international socialism, the U.S. and Great Britain
continued constructing the monolith.
As 1954 came to a close, Anglo-American policymakers rested on their laurels, confident
in the success of their gradualist approach to the Cyprus situation. The Greeks and Cypriots, by
all indications, seemed willing to pursue a longer-term process toward a peaceful solution.
Careful inclusion of Ankara in future talks would assure that all potential points of disagreement
were covered, and that the destabilizing inertia of ethnic nationalism in the eastern
Mediterranean would be contained. “Some of our people who have been traveling recently in
Greece,” wrote Churchill to President Eisenhower in late September, “have come back and
spread stories to the effect that Greece and Cyprus are quite ready to be reasonable and
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conciliatory – of course I do not know how accurate are their observations and their reporting.
But this kind of thing does serve to give you some idea of why I am interested in the other side
of the story.”73 Through careful management, policymakers in both London and Washington
hoped that the unpredictable forces unleashed by a Cypriot uprising could be preempted. Their
miscalculation proved disastrous.
On April 1, 1955, General George Grivas, a former Greek Army officer, led coordinated
attacks on British military installations across Cyprus. In the key cities of Nicosia, Limassol, and
Famagusta, police stations reported well organized, hit-and-run strikes on waypoints and
barracks, all perpetrated by small bands of guerrillas armed with grenades and small arms.74 The
outbreak of hostilities caught the British by surprise, but the island’s administration reacted
swiftly. Four weeks after the first explosions, on April 27, 1955, the government formed the
Cyprus Internal Security Committee, composed of the heads of the military and intelligence
outfits stationed on the island. Unremitting harassment from EOKA pushed the committee by
June to pursue a harder line toward the rebel movement, which culminated in the late summer
with the execution of nineteen young insurgents in Limassol. In September, Her Majesty’s
Government dispatched John Harding to the island as its first military governor, tasked with
bringing the insurgency to an end. By November 26, the new governor had declared a state of
emergency. Cyprus had joined the mounting list of insurgencies facing the crumbling British
Empire.
At the heart of EOKA’s campaign stood a self-assigned mission to strike at the heart of
imperialism – “by deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice, to draw the attention of international
public opinion, especially among the allies of Greece.” But the organization’s credo revealed the
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centrality of a historic ethnic identity as well. In leaflets distributed to EOKA fighters throughout
April 1955, Grivas – operating under the nom de guerre Digenis, the name of a Byzantine
general who had perished defending Constantinople against Ottoman assault – exhorted his
fellow Cypriots to rise against British rule:
With God’s help, with faith in the righteousness of our struggle, with the aid of all
Hellenism, we hereby take on the struggle to rid us of the British yoke, with the sacred
motto left upon us by our ancestors – EITHER WITH IT, OR ON IT… From the depths
of the centuries we are watched by all those who shone upon Greek history to maintain
our freedom, those who fought in Marathon, in Salamis, the 300 of Leonidas and those
who more recently fought in the Albanian epoch. We are watched by the fighters of
[18]21, who taught us that liberation from an occupier always comes through BLOOD.
We are also watched by the rest of Hellenism with anticipation, but also with national
pride.
The declaration went on to castigate the British and their supporters for their collusion in
the captivity of Hellenism: “GLOBAL ENVOYS: Take a look at your own actions. It is a
disgrace in the 20th century for a nation to have to shed blood to gain its freedom, the holy gift
for which we fought on your side and for which you yourself claim to have fought against
Nazism and Fascism.”75
Greek public opinion, though similarly surprised, reacted favorably to the beginning of
EOKA’s campaign and espoused its anti-imperialist agenda. Athens news stations closely and
enthusiastically followed the exploits of Digenis and his followers. As the British novelist
Lawrence Durrell, at the time visiting Cyprus to finish his Alexandria Quintet, recalled, “The
moral pressure exercised by Athens radio, which went into raptures at every evidence of what is
described as an open insurrection, was backed up by the local clergy whose public utterances

75

Χρυση Αυγη, October 2005, pp. 19; George Grivas, “First Declaration of EOKA.”

64
reached new heights of bloodcurdling ferocity… ‘Freedom is acquired on by blood!’ shrilled
Athens radio.”76
The initial high hopes did not last, however, for as early as May 1955, it had become
clear to at least a few Greek officials that Washington had no intention of pushing Britain toward
a favorable resolution of the Cyprus issue. Despite Dulles’s assurances to the contrary, the Greek
ambassador George Melas had in a May 25 conversation expressed his concerns that the British
forces on Cyprus “would not have acted as they did unless they had general U.S. support on the
Cyprus question.” Greece understood the rules of the game in the eastern Mediterranean: Britain
may have been hanging Cypriot rebels, but could not have done so without the backing, tacit or
otherwise, of America.
As it turned out, London itself sought ways of bringing the conflict to a rapid conclusion.
With negotiations on the Malayan Emergency just over the horizon, British policymakers rushed
to find a multilateral solution to the Cyprus imbroglio, acting out of perennial concerns over
broader exposure – and embarrassment – on the international stage. The Eisenhower
administration, again eager to preserve the threatened status quo, followed suit. The AngloAmerican solution – reaching out to Turkey in earnest in an attempt to bring both Athens and
Ankara to the negotiating table – inflamed the situation even further. The outbreak of violence on
the island had changed the terms of the dispute not only for the British and the Greeks, but also
for Turkey, which reacted with alarm at the vulnerability of Cyprus’s Turkish community in the
face of Grivas’s onslaught. And such concerns were soon validated by actions. By the summer of
1955, Turkish Cypriot casualites had begun to mount – no doubt due, in large part, to John
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Harding’s decision to expand the ranks of auxiliary police forces by recruiting heavily from the
Turkish community.77
The expansion of talks to include Turkey came at a time when the ethnic dimensions of
the Cyprus conflict made any Greco-Turkish dialogue doomed to mutual intransigence. Public
opinion in both countries throughout the first year of the Cypriot insurgency had resolutely
condemned the other government’s position as untenable and unjustifiable at best, jingoistic and
self-consciously aggressive at worst. Xenophobia spread rampantly throughout both Greece and
Turkey, but especially in the latter, where Menderes’s government officially sponsored antiGreek press campaigns after its 1954 election victory.78
Britain was acutely aware of such developments and quickly moved to exploit them to
her advantage. As 1955 wore on, British forces’ failure to find a favorable end to the Cyprus
emergency steadily became clear. The difficulty of quelling a strategically competent and widely
supported insurgency had taken its toll; also, the wider challenges of managing crises elsewhere
in the empire and facing mounting domestic opposition to overseas ventures gave British
officials incentives to extricate themselves from the eastern Mediterranean imbroglio. Turkey’s
new interest in Cyprus provided a convenient opportunity to do just that. “Apart from restoring
order in Cyprus, a need which this development [Greek and Cypriot calls for Cypriot selfdetermination at the UN] underlines,” pronounced the Foreign Office in the late spring of 1955,
“we can only do our best to appease the Turks by giving them full information about our
intentions, whilst continuing to make clear that we, not they, rule the island.”79
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But British actions were often far more sinister in nature. To officials stationed in Ankara
and Athens, the vitriolic exchanges between Greeks and Turks offered opportunities to do more
than include Turkey in a British problem. Exploitation of xenophobic sentiment could transform
the Cyprus issue into a Greco-Turkish affair altogether. As early as August 1954, Sir Charles
Peake, the British ambassador to Greece, had suggested to Greek officials that “Greek-Turkish
ties are anyway superficial… nothing would be lost if, for instance, something were to happen to
Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki.”80 Much more blunt were statements from the Foreign Office –
“a few [anti-Greek] riots in Ankara would do us nicely” – and from Labour politician John
Strachey – “The Greek minority in Istanbul… could be for Turkey a trump card should Greece
consider annexing an independent Cyprus.”81 Such incitements resonated with the Turkish
government and public. Between 1954 and 1956, nationalist student organizations and irredentist
publications railed against the alleged role of Istanbul’s Greek community and the Istanbul-based
Ecumenical Patriarchate in exacerbating tensions over Cyprus and fomenting conspiracies to
ensure its domination by Greece.82 Such voices frequently invoked history to condemn their
targets, as evidenced in an article from leading nationalist newspaper Cumhuriyet:
Neither the Patriarchate nor the Rum [Greek] minority ever openly supported
Turkish national interests when Turkey and Athens clashed over certain issues. In
return, the great Turkish nation never raised its voice about this. But do the
Phanar Patriarchate and our Rum citizens in Istanbul have special missions
assigned by Greece in its plans to annex Cyprus? While Greece was crushing
Turks in Western Thrace [in 1922-23] and was appropriating their property by
force, our Rum Turkish citizens lived as free as we do, sometimes even more
comfortably. We think that these Rums, who choose to remain silent in our
struggle with Greece, are clever enough not to fall into the trap of four or five
provocateurs… If the Greeks dare touch our brethren, then there are plenty of
Greeks in Istanbul to retaliate upon.83
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It was in this context of insurgency, diplomatic deadlock and mutual hostility that GrecoTurkish relations, already strained by the outbreak of violence, took a turn for the worst. On
September 6, 1955, Turkish news stations reported that the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki –
none other than the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in northern Greece – had been bombed
by Greek nationalists the previous evening. As it turned out, no such bombing had actually taken
place. An usher at the consulate, it was soon discovered, had planted a device in its basement and
then informed superiors of its presence. Yet the fuse had been lit, and when it ran its course the
explosion was catastrophic. News of the incident spread across Turkey on government news
stations and official radio broadcasts. In Istanbul, municipal officials in all the city’s districts
incited Turkish citizens to descend upon the city’s Greek minority. Over the night of September
6th and into the next morning, tens of thousands of Turks ransacked Greek businesses, pillaged
households, and committed acts of violence, some resulting in deaths, on the community’s Greek
Orthodox religious leaders. In little more than twelve hours, four thousand homes, one thousand
businesses, 73 churches, 26 schools, and virtually all of the Greek community’s infrastructure
had been irreversibly damaged or destroyed. Human costs included some 30 dead, several
hundred injured, and, in the case of several priests, forcibly circumcised.84
The anti-Greek pogrom cast salt into pressurized, age-old ethnic wounds and greatly
intensified the stakes of the ongoing Cyprus conflict. Greek Prime Minister Papagos addressed
the nation on September 17 to decry a grievous affront to national honor: “It is with great
emotion that I am addressing the Greek people today, mainly to extol the coolness, wisdom, and
self-control with which they reacted as a civilized people, to blows affecting the Nation’s soul…
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I deeply share the Greek peoples’ indignation on account of the tragic events in Turkey against
our holy Orthodox Church and our brothers in Turkey.”85 Foreign Minister Stefanos
Stefanopoulos, in a note to the Turkish foreign ministry dated September 9, had been much more
blunt, spelling out the significance of the pogrom for future Greco-Turkish cooperation on the
Cyprus issue: “In the fact of this recently created situation, the Greek government cannot limit
itself to a mere expression of stern protest, for it is, at the same time, obliged to call to the
attention of the Turkish government the broader political consequences which will possibly be
provoked by the anti-Greek manifestations.”86
It was in this charged environment that the second and latter installment of the Cyprus
drama unfolded. On December 3, 1957, the British government replaced John Harding as
Governor of Cyprus with Sir Hugh Foot, previously the island’s colonial secretary from 1943 to
1945. Foot had been fingered by Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan as Harding’s replacement
after the Cyprus Emergency had settled into a bloody stalemate. The outgoing governor grasped
the reasons for the leadership transfer. His harsh handling of affairs on the island had done
Britain more harm than good, and though Macmillan had assured him that no other official could
have performed the task “with greater distinction… courage, fairness, and skill,” it was
nonetheless time for the empire to dispense with violence and conclude this chapter of the
decolonization saga through peaceful means. “I don’t know anything about Sir Hugh Foot,”
Harding wrote to his son three weeks following his dismissal, “but I am sure there are definite
advantages at this stage in having someone in the post who has no connection with the harsh
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measures I have had to adopt to hold and control the island, and has no military label attached to
him.”87
Foot may have had no personal connection to the Cypriot counterinsurgency’s brutality,
but he certainly had to contend with its repercussions, the largest of which was the diplomatic
impasse that had precluded meaningful and conclusive discussions on Cyprus’s future. His job
was doubly complicated by the recent events in Istanbul, which made distrust among the island’s
Greek and Turkish communities an even greater obstacle. Only a period of respite, the governor
believed, could mend wounded sensibilities and pave the way for peace. Despite advice to the
contrary, upon his arrival to the island in early December, Foot delivered a speech to the Cypriot
people in which he eschewed the violent approach of his predecessor and extended hope for
future fruitful dialogues: “I earnestly ask everyone on the island to pause today to consider the
course we should follow. Cyprus cannot be doomed to a future of hate and fear. The people of
this lovely island must one day again work and live together in peace and respect and
happiness.”88
The tangible expression of such sentiments was the eponymous Foot Plan, in which the
governor proposed a four-point program for the future of Cyprus predicated on the end of
violence, constitutional discussions leading to self-governance, and, finally, a conclusive
settlement agreed upon by both the Greek and Turkish governments. The plan, which hinged
upon the outcome of the all-important provision regarding Greco-Turkish talks, was short-lived.
Initially supported by both the British and the American, within a month of its promulgation in
January 1958 it had been flatly rejected by both Athens and Ankara, neither of which would
accept the prospect of communal reunification over a solution favorable to their respective
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communities.89 Ethnic politics, unsuccessfully managed by the United States and the United
Kingdom and then actively promoted by the latter, had hijacked attempts at resolution of the
Cyprus conflict.
Throughout 1958, Foot’s governance did little to forge a final solution on the island’s
future. Though the incidence and intensity of violence decreased during his tenure, EOKA
carried out several high-profile assassinations of British military officials and Greek and Turkish
Cypriot commanders. Only in December of that year did progress come with joint Greek-Turkish
talks, organized by Macmillan and held under the auspices of a NATO council, on Cyprus’s
future. By February 1959, detailed plans for a conference between the three nations had been
hammered out and announced in a communiqué, followed shortly thereafter by the
announcement that Cyprus would become an independent republic the following year. Its goal of
national liberation achieved, EOKA immediately ordered a ceasefire. The Cyprus Emergency
was over.90
In the wider context of postwar international relations, the Cyprus conflict was of limited
significance. The United States and the Soviet Union each regarded the island’s troubles for what
they were – disturbances on the periphery of their spheres of influence which, though capable of
expanding into broader conflicts, were not likely to transcend regional boundaries. The docket of
issues facing the superpowers was simply too long throughout the 1950s for Cypriot protests and
British imperial decline to garner deep attention. Yet the same centrifugal forces the British and
Americans sought to contain throughout the emergency had by its conclusion been unleashed.
The source was neither the perfidious extension of Moscow’s monolithic influence, nor the
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operation of its global acolytes, but the tempestuous state of internal eastern Mediterranean
politics and resurgent ethnic identities.

Conclusion
On August 16, 1960, Cyprus officially achieved its independence from Britain under the
terms of the London-Zürich Agreements. Henceforth, the Republic of Cyprus would be governed
by a constitutional arrangement that divided administrative and government positions between
the Greek and Turkish communities, with the latter receiving a permanent veto in constitutional
affairs and having rights to a minimum of 30% of the seats in parliament. Archbishop Makarios
would serve as the republic’s first president. In addition, the three “mother states” – Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom – were, under the accompanying Treaty of Guarantee, granted
international sanction to intervene on the island as guarantor powers in order to preserve the
stability of the new Cypriot government. For all parties involved, the conclusion of the Cyprus
dispute yielded mixed returns. The United Kingdom, now in the last stages of decolonization,
had managed to extricate itself from a brutal counterinsurgency campaign and had even managed
to retain control over two sovereign bases on the island. Turkey, which from the beginning had
advocated taksim, or division of the island along ethnic lines, saw in the London agreements a
sizable concession, but ultimately a workable arrangement that would allow Turkish Cypriots
considerable influence in the new country’s governance. The United States, throughout the 1950s
staunchly opposed to the formation of any centrifugal forces within NATO, had averted a serious
Greco-Turkish confrontation, successfully assisted in the United Kingdom’s demarche, and now
took its place, as it had done with Greece, as the dominant outside influence in Cypriot affairs.
The challenges of the 1960s in the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere, now passed to the
Americans.
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For Greece, the outcome was far more questionable. Like Turkey, it had managed to
avoid a hot war over Cyprus. But the war of words and incitement of identities the island’s
dilemmas had provoked – between Greece and Turkey, between Greece and her AngloAmerican allies, and, as would be seen in the early 1960s, within Greece itself – proved equally
costly to the nation’s fractious political scene. The irresolution of the Cyprus dispute would
come to be viewed by Greeks as the latest iteration of foreign policy disappointments plaguing
the modern Hellenic ethnos. As with the Asia Minor catastrophe, it would soon take its place as a
central pillar of indigenous debates over the proper course for the Greek nation.
The 1950s, moreover, witnessed the coalescence of two patterns that would shape the
eastern Mediterranean for the rest of the Cold War: the resurgence and politicization of regional
ethnic nationalisms, and the failure of great power hegemons to effectively respond to their
challenges. In refusing to acknowledge Greek and Cypriot appeals for the expansion of the
Cyprus issue to international forums, American policymakers sacrificed their eastern
Mediterranean allies’ concerns upon the altar of Cold War grand strategy. Employing many of
the same heuristics they used elsewhere to combat the threat of international communism, they
hoped to contain the burgeoning crisis between Greece and Turkey before it could complicate
other diplomatic efforts. In so doing, they stifled opportunities for allies to vent grievances, to
take a hand in the development of their own foreign policy agendas, and, ultimately, to
participate in the Western alliance framework so many in both Athens and Ankara had initially
welcomed.
Even more seriously, the United Kingdom, by executing a protracted and brutal
counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus and by provoking – often deliberately – Greco-Turkish
animosity, severed cultural ties that had long underpinned Anglo-Greek relations. At the same
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time, Britain cemented itself as colonial oppressor nonpareil in the Greek political lexicon. If
Greeks learned a hard lesson in the 1950s, it was that the dreams of supranational condominium
and equality between nations in an open forum were just those: visions in the ether, rapidly
dissipated when the exigencies of international relations came into focus. They and their Cypriot
cousins – particularly the charismatic and ambitious Archbishop Makarios – would not soon
forget. The great desiderata of British and American postwar policies in the region were
predicated upon stability, ensuring that domestic political developments avoided treacherous
turns to leftism and that dangerous international orientations like neutralism were defeated before
they could mature and be manipulated by Moscow or Beijing.91 Ironically, the Anglo-American
attempt to preserve the equilibrium in eastern Mediterranean affairs foundered on the rocks of
age-old suspicions and animosities inflamed into modern hatreds over Cyprus.
Yet the special relationship’s missteps and lost opportunities, while significant, should
not be overstated. Despite the trials of the 1950s, a great crisis seemed to have been averted by
decade’s end. The immediate threat to NATO’s southeastern flank was, for the time being,
attenuated. The Greek and Turkish governments, despite lingering tensions and festering
disputes, had settled into stable, if grudging, coexistence and even mutual cooperation under the
terms of the London agreements. Britain, humiliated at Suez and forced to concede defeat to the
EOKA rebels, relinquished its role as great power arbiter of eastern Mediterranean affairs to the
United States. The latter, moreover, had the resources to help sustain the new republic and
seemed committed, in the words of Eisenhower’s successor John F. Kennedy, to “whatever use
of U.S. resources may be required” to hold the line and ensure the Cypriot state’s security.92
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Cyprus was independent. A constitutional framework had been established for its governance. If
there was another explosion of tension on the horizon, it seemed to stem more from the task of
managing the new state’s role in global bloc politics – a minor endeavor when compared to the
dilemmas facing the Western alliance in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
Perhaps most importantly, the full force of Greek ethnic nationalism – which had historically
destabilized the volatile region, and had threatened to do so again over Cyprus – had been
dammed. Though written five years earlier, a 1955 American intelligence memorandum on the
state of affairs in the eastern Mediterranean accurately summarized the prevailing view of U.S.
foreign policy officials in 1960: “Regardless of internal political developments, Greece’s
strongly pro-Western orientation is unlikely to change over the next few years… although the
enosis issue is likely to be a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the
US, it is unlikely that Greece’s alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other
issue.”93
The coming years demonstrated the prematurity of such optimistic assessments. While
the Cypriot constitution provided for the sharing of power between the island’s two
communities, it failed to take into account the aspirations and machinations of the republic’s
president. And though a geopolitical equilibrium prevailed on NATO’s southeastern flank for
now, its persistence into a decade of increasing demand upon the Western alliance’s stretched
resources was far from certain. The great error of British and American policies in the 1950s was
their failure to adequately navigate and then reverse the tide of ethnic discontent for decades kept
at bay, but now cascading through the eastern Mediterranean. When the dam finally burst in the
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coming years, the transforming dynamics of the Cold War gave regional identities their largest
canvas yet.
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IV. Cyprus and the Stalemated Sixties
The assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 sent shock waves
throughout the United States and the world. U.S. embassies and consulates across the globe
suspended normal communications duties as nervous and confused phone calls poured in.
Governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain expressed sorrow and sympathy at the news.
Washington-based CBS correspondent Roger Mudd eloquently captured the prevailing mood of
pervasive mourning in his 2008 memoir: “It was a death that touched everyone instantly and
directly; rare was the person who did not cry that long weekend. In our home, as my wife
watched the television, her tears caused our five-year-old son, Daniel, to go quietly and switch
off what he thought was the cause of his mother’s weeping.”94
Attentions soon shifted to Kennedy’s vice president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, who now
found himself thrust suddenly into the most powerful political position on the planet. Though by
his own admission unprepared and unwilling to assume the responsibility before him – “I ask for
your help – and God’s,” he told assembled officials as he exited the presidential airplane upon
which he had been sworn into office – the new president had no intention of dramatically altering
Kennedy’s policies. Domestically, LBJ pledged to carry forth the legacy of sweeping reform
outlined by his predecessor’s administration – much of which he inherited – remarking that “no
memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory than the
earliest possible passage of the Civil Rights Bill for which he fought so long.”95
There were similar continuities in foreign policy. Johnson maintained both the diplomatic
team and the foreign policy commitments of the previous administration – most notoriously the
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deteriorating stage of affairs in Southeast Asia, but also a deepening American role in the world
at large, from the developing nations of Latin America and Africa to the processes of détente
underway with the Soviet bloc.96 The Texan also agreed with Kennedy that “flexible response,” a
full range of non-nuclear warfare that included the use of conventional forces as well as new
mechanisms of psychological and cultural warfare, was the best way to confront communist
influence in the Third World. But to familiar commitments and underlying beliefs LBJ brought a
fresh ethos premised upon ideologically driven action that differed considerably from the
Kennedy administration’s more pragmatic, social justice-based approaches. Whereas his
predecessor had emphasized the need to promote democracy as a means to an end in the fight
against Soviet imperialism, Johnson espoused an abiding belief in the primacy of American
ideals themselves. The allegiance and partnership of global allies had to be won not out of
strategic considerations, but genuine convictions. As White House Press Secretary George Reedy
put it,
To a considerable extent, our foreign policy has failed because it has been
based on the assumption that we must do things simply to counter the
Soviets. We have advertised to the whole world that we are willing to help
India because we don’t want India to go Communist. We have advertised to
the world that we will help in the Middle East because we don’t want
Western Europe to lose the oil resources of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia…
this has, naturally, led to a great deal of skepticism among the uncommitted
people.97
Scholarship on the Johnson administration’s foreign policy, inundated with accounts
seeking to describe and explain the Vietnam debacle, have in recent years begun to consider the
extent to which LBJ and his advisers responded to such international concerns – what H.W.
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Brands terms “the wages of globalism.” 98 Historical reassessments illuminate important
dimensions of the administration’s diplomatic activities, especially significant challenges, such
as Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated military
command, domestic turmoil in West Germany, and ongoing financial crises involving the British
pound sterling, which all constituted trials of U.S. foreign policy. Such investigations have
become something of a cottage industry within scholarship on Kennedy’s successor, reversing
orthodox understandings of the Johnson years and attributing much of their successful handling
to the skillful, but heretofore upbraided, official and personal diplomacy of the administration.
Yet the story of Johnson and the eastern Mediterranean has, with a few notable
exceptions, been almost entirely neglected in this new historiography. Such omissions obscure
the formative impact of the Johnson years on the development of eastern Mediterranean politics
and identities and, ultimately, upon the course of the region through the international
environment of the late twentieth century. From 1964 to 1968, two major events occupied the
bulk of American attention in the region: the ongoing Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, and
the related domestic political instability within Greece that eventually led to the 1967 coup d’etat
of right-wing military generals. Faced with the inheritance of a discredited imperial power and
demonstrating little willingness to engage with more systemic problems in the Anglo-American
approach or to learn from Britain’s mistakes, LBJ and his foreign policy team missed
opportunities to defuse rapidly escalating tensions between Greece and Turkey. Opting for a
policy of stability founded upon the erroneous assumption that international neutralism and not
ethnic nationalism motivated key players in the eastern Mediterranean, they misinterpreted the
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winds of change blowing through the region, ultimately sacrificing grand visions of an effective
foreign policy upon the altars of diplomatic expediency and international distractions.

The Cyprus Crisis of 1963-1964
The administration’s handling of the ongoing Cyprus crisis prompted its first major
diplomatic initiative in the eastern Mediterranean, and proved itself the latest iteration in a
predictable pattern of U.S. responses to regional problems. After the 1960 declaration of Cypriot
independence, internecine violence escalated as the island’s communities jockeyed for influence
in a new governmental arrangement. Bitterness that had until recently been directed against
British rule now turned inward upon itself, and by the first year of the new decade Cyprus’s
stability seemed threatened by the threat of renewed bloodshed.
The island’s troubles were only aggravated by Makarios’s presidency. As the figure most
identified with Cyprus’s path to independence, as well as the man responsible for navigating the
nation through treacherous waters of Cold War diplomacy, Makarios received at the time, and
has ever since maintained, considerable attention. Contemporaries in the political and diplomatic
realms vociferously debated the effectiveness of the archbishop’s role in eastern Mediterranean
crises, some decrying his ironhanded, intransigent rule of Cyprus and others lauding his
unwillingness to compromise national sovereignty in the face of withering pressure from the
great powers. What is beyond doubt is the shrewdness with which Makarios manipulated
Cyprus’s circumstances during the 1960s in order to capitalize upon both regional and
international tensions, propelling himself and the Cypriot nation onto the global stage in ways
perhaps not even he had foreseen.99
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By January of 1964, it was clear that the situation on Cyprus had little hope of solution
through the current diplomatic environment afforded by the 1960 agreements. David OrmsbyGore, the British ambassador to the United States, noted to Johnson that recent talks between the
three guarantor states in London looked “very black,” with both joint efforts at conflict
resolution and reconciliation between the island’s feuding communities becoming more and
more unlikely. The question now turned from defusing the situation to an exploration of possible
means by which the inevitable conflict could be contained once it erupted, at least until a longerterm solution was achieved. And other global crises were fast shortening the timeline within
which a successful solution to the Cyprus dilemma could be reached. The United Kingdom,
ending a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya and beginning another in Kenya, pushed
strongly for multilateral military intervention by way of a NATO peacekeeping force containing
a contingent of American troops. Domestic support for foreign adventures was at an all-time low,
and Whitehall could no longer shoulder the burden of the brewing Cypriot crisis alone.100
Johnson rejected such proposals outright. In his view, the problem was a British one –
borne from the decline of the empire’s imperial project, and its resolution therefore a British
responsibility. In a January 25 telephone conversation with Under Secretary of State George
Ball, the president all but washed his hands of U.S. obligations to participate in Cypriot
peacekeeping affairs, pointedly remarking on London’s impotence: “I think that the British are
getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can’t handle Cyprus.” At a
conference later the same evening, administration officials – Ball chief among them – presented
to Johnson a stark assessment of the Cyprus situation and suggested that before deciding to
refuse the British request, more information be obtained regarding the composition and size of
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the proposed force. But LBJ still resisted advice. Asking “everyone to go slow on any plan to use
U.S. troops in Cyprus” and suggesting that Britain send more troops for the time being to
stabilize the situation, the president pointed out that “we have helped them [the British] in the
past and they must now continue to carry this burden in Cyprus.” With the coming American
elections representing a test for Johnson to win the highest office in the land in his own right, the
introduction of further military commitments anywhere else in the world was a measure to be
reserved “as a last resort.”101
For now, the administration regarded troubles on Cyprus as another item on the plate of
global disturbances and opportunities in front of the United States. Washington had enough to
occupy its attentions with the worsening situation in Vietnam and the domestic ramifications of
Johnson’s first actions in building the Great Society. The prospect of a hot war in the eastern
Mediterranean, though a frightening prospect, could be averted through peaceful means. On
January 26, Johnson instructed Ball to form a special mission to the capitals of guarantor powers
Britain, Greece, and Turkey, as well as Cyprus, to forge a new settlement.102
Yet the administration’s efforts to keep the struggle on Cyprus limited proved fruitless,
with Makarios again emerging as the flaw in the plan. Far from a feeble figure subject to foreign
manipulation, the archbishop thwarted American efforts to keep the issue confined to the region
by playing his strongest hand – appealing to the United Nations Security Council. By calling on
the UN to honor Cypriot sovereignty and throwing into broad exposure Anglo-American
consideration of a NATO peacekeeping force, Makarios in a single stroke deftly utilized
Cyprus’s political capital as a non-aligned state, thus safeguarding its opportunities for future
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economic and military support from the Soviet bloc and (so he thought) increasing his leverage
with the West.103
As it turned out, the archbishop struck at an ideal time. Makarios’s vehement protests
ensured that the Greek nationalist version of the Cyprus drama – a passion play in which
Cypriots were crucified upon the cross of Western imperialist diplomacy – would receive serious
hearings in the communist world. Though the 1964 crisis took place at the beginning of détente,
the proximity of Cyprus to both the strategically crucial Middle East-Africa nexus and to the
Soviet Union itself made superpower confrontation a foregone conclusion. The showdown came
with a February 7 note from Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to President Johnson, in which
the Soviet leader pledged his support for Cypriot self-determination and condemned Western
proposals for NATO action. The island its struggles, Khrushchev insisted, were “being exploited
as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus… a
sovereign, independent state, a member of the UN,” and such meddling, if continued, “could
present a serious danger for real peace.” Noting the island’s closeness to the southern extreme of
the USSR’s borders, Khrushchev warned that “the Soviet Union, although it does not border
directly on the Republic of Cyprus, cannot remain indifferent to that situation which is
developing in the area of the eastern Mediterranean.”104 Johnson’s reply asserted that
Khrushchev had, in fact, based his objections on an erroneous assessment of the state of affairs;
the United States, Johnson maintained, “has been cooperating with the governments concerned,
including the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, for one purpose alone, that of assisting the
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Cypriots to restore a peaceful situation in Cyprus.”105 But the die was now cast. The island had
attracted Soviet attention, and its issues were now problems whose international significance
could be exploited in the developing global cold war with Washington – aided by the island’s
president and his solidarity with the non-aligned movement. Makarios, with characteristic
deftness, had tested the Cold War’s diplomatic waters and had the efficacy of his balance-ofpower maneuvers confirmed. The Ball mission now shifted its charge from an acknowledgement
of U.S. concerns for Cyprus’s problems to a race against time to resolve the crisis before it
became a foreign policy disaster.
Ball’s mission commenced in mid-February 1964 amidst a tenser-than-ever situation on
the ground. Relations between Greece and Turkey were at a nadir that called to mind the prelude
and aftermath of the 1955 pogrom, with Athens charging that Ankara was planning an invasion
of Cyprus and Turkey continuing to advocate partition of the island (rightly viewed by the
Greeks as a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee). And Cyprus itself reeled in turmoil, its
parliament’s Turkish minority having walked out just weeks before, the remaining members
legislating only in the interest of the island’s Greek population and insisting that negotiations
over the future of the Republic could take place only if Ankara relinquished its rights, under the
recently concluded Treaty of Guarantee, to intervene in Cypriot affairs.106
Ball flew to Nicosia on February 13 and immediately launched into heated discussions
with Makarios about the necessity of a Cyprus peacekeeping force. As the tentative armistice
occasioned by the London conferences broke down across the island, which Ball called “a
battlefield” marked by “a pervasive atmosphere of imminent crisis,” the Under Secretary and the
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archbishop waged their own series of battles. In the meetings, Makarios insisted that he would
consider the issue of an international force at a later date; for the time being, his efforts would
focus instead on procuring a U.N. Security Council resolution that would reaffirm “the territorial
integrity and political independence of Cyprus.” Ball, who considered the proposed
postponement “criminally foolhardy” in light of the escalating violence and resultant regional
tension, “told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic
discourse.” Several hours of conversation resulted in a stalemate, and Ball left Cyprus convinced
that the only way to effectively deal with the crisis was a negotiated settlement involving Athens
and Ankara, but not Nicosia.107 In his view, Makarios was neither liberator nor crusader, but a
dangerous, volatile power center in an already unpredictable situation. Neutralism had found a
foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, and the memory of recent reversals at its hand convinced
Ball that its advance had to be stopped decisively.108
LBJ agreed. The president had firsthand experience with Makarios from a visit to Cyprus
he had taken as vice president in 1962, when the archbishop had first used Cypriot neutrality as a
bargaining chip in relations with the West.109 By the conclusion of Ball’s mission, Johnson saw
that the only hope for a peaceful end to the situation on the island was in weakening Makarios.
To this end, on February 20 the president dispatched telegrams to Prime Ministers Ismet Inönü of
Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece in which he emphasized the necessity of GrecoTurkish partnership in order to preserve the stability of NATO and save the worsening situation
on Cyprus. In typical Johnson fashion – and signaling the dawn of personal presidential and
cabinet diplomacy as a key element of American conduct abroad – the president urged Inönü and
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Papandreou to settle their differences in pursuit of an agreement to ensure lasting, decisive peace.
He extended the message especially to Papandreou, whom he perceived, by virtue of the Greek
leader’s recent electoral landslide and his ostensible mandate as a competing leader representing
a more mainstream Hellenic identity, as the figure most capable of restraining Makarios.
Congratulating Papandreou on his political successes and reminding him that “the
common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount,” LBJ
expressed his hope that Papandreou’s election, which provided him “the necessary freedom of
action,” would result in a more productive Greek-Turkish dialogue culminating in the
neutralization of the Cyprus dilemma.110 Johnson handled the worsening diplomatic situation in
the eastern Mediterranean by imploring leaders to see past old animosities and talk out current
problems, but he had misjudged the depth and severity of a crisis well beyond conventional
diplomacy. Regional political realities had progressed far past the stage of formal discourse,
which, in any case, would no longer do any good in the face of rapidly mounting domestic
discontents in both Greece and Turkey. By this point the prospect of conclusive bilateral talks
between Athens and Ankara was little more than wishful thinking, as Papandreou’s primary goal
– enosis – was wholly unpalatable to Inönü. And if the Greeks conceded to discussions with the
Turks, the result would inevitably be an agreement by which either side used its current influence
on Cyprus – which shifted rapidly as violence ebbed and flowed on a landmass scarcely the size
of the Peloponnese – to construct a settlement. In the charged climate of 1964, anything short of
an all-or-nothing resolution was unthinkable. Johnson’s administration had followed in the
footsteps of Eden and Eisenhower, mistaking deeply rooted ethnic intransigence for a transient
issue to be mutually resolved.
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Moreover, Johnson had taken for granted that Papandreou’s government could exercise
leverage over Makarios and thereby tame the more radical Cypriot contributions to Greek ethnic
nationalism. Yet the reality was quite different. By Mid-February 1964, Makarios was revered
not only by Greek Cypriots, but a sizable portion of the mainland Greek public. Far from a pawn
to be manipulated in the service of Athens politicians, the archbishop, to many, represented a
powerful voice of Hellenic nationalism and therefore posed a potent political threat to
Papandreou and his party. Any move against Makarios, political or otherwise, would constitute a
significant gamble, and the stakes were increasingly the hearts and minds of the Greek people.
Yet Papandreou decided to play his hand. On one point, the American president was
correct: the Greek prime minister’s landslide electoral victory gave him unprecedented control
over the conduct of Greek foreign policy, and he assumed that now was the time to act on the
Cyprus issue. On February 26, 1964, he sent a note to Makarios insisting that the ethnarch follow
Greece’s lead with respect to the island’s affairs. The Greek government would soon negotiate a
Cyprus settlement that would include enosis, and for his part, Makarios would be expected to
accept these conditions. In no uncertain terms, Papandreou made it clear that his brand of enosis
would be mainland-driven, its progress and ultimate direction monitored, even dictated, by the
Athens government.. Should Makarios accept the arrangement, the age of Cypriot diplomatic
independence – as well as the archbishop’s unrestrained control over the conduct of that
diplomacy – would be over.111
To Makarios, such an arrangement was preposterous. Any settlement on enosis
concluded in Athens would necessarily involve the Turks, and by the early spring of 1964 the
Cypriot president had invested far too much political capital in the exclusion of Turkey from the
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bargaining table. Turkish antagonism, as James Miller has demonstrated, formed a key element
of Makarios’s foreign policy, and the leader had shrewdly observed that the main interest of the
United States lay in safeguarding NATO cohesion in the eastern Mediterranean. By inflaming
the passions of both Turkish Cypriots and the government in Ankara, Makarios forced
Washington to tame Turkish aggression, thereby gaining support and psychological collateral in
his quest to further the aims of Greek ethnic nationalism.112
By April, U.S. diplomats in the region had come to the conclusion that Papandreou’s
plans for enosis constituted the most realistic and effective way to resolve the crisis, provided
that Turkey was granted a significant territorial concession in exchange. Yet such a deal proved
much too bitter for Papandreou, who, aside from having nothing substantial to offer the Turks in
the first place, possessed such confidence in a favorable outcome for the Greeks that it bordered
on hubris. And the prime minister was not alone on this score: by the late spring of 1964, Greek
public opinion would accept nothing short of unconditional enosis. Throughout April and May,
Greek Cypriot-led attacks on Turkish minority members escalated, and Ankara’s patience grew
thinner by the day. It seemed that Makarios’s provocations could only go so far before the
delicate diplomatic balance upon which his entire strategy hinged was finally disrupted.
Push came to shove in early June. The Turks, infuriated by the wanton harassment and
slaughter of Turkish Cypriots, began preparing for an invasion of the island. Alarmed, President
Johnson himself directed a letter to Inonu in which he reminded the Turkish leader that any
unilateral action he took with Cyprus would be unsupported by NATO. Even worse, it might
encourage Soviet reprisal – and this was to say nothing of the very real possibility that a
Turkish invasion would result in vicious retaliation against the Turkish Cypriot community,
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which would undoubtedly be seen as collaborationist.113 The planned intervention never
occurred. Johnson’s harsh admonishment succeeded in restraining Ankara from taking direct
military action, but it was not lost on the president that Makarios had once again used American
power to keep Turkey on a leash. Convinced of his ability to bring Greek and Turkish leaders
together under U.S. supervision and also of the necessity of a swift settlement, Johnson moved
even more forcefully throughout the late spring of 1964 to bring both countries together for
renewed talks.
Turkey eagerly jumped on board. Greece, per usual, was not as enthusiastic. Johnson’s
June 11 meeting with Greek ambassador Alexander Matsas proved inconclusive, with the
diplomatic avoiding the idea of direct Athens-Ankara discussions and insisting that cooperation
with Makarios was necessary for the time being.114 The same unwillingness to settle manifested
itself during George Papandreou’s visit to the United States later in the month. In meetings
with American officials in Washington and New York, Papandreou repeatedly shot down the
U.S. suggestion of employing veteran cold warrior Dean Acheson as mediator in Athens-Ankara
talks. The Greek leader insisted that such discussions were useless; and in fact, he appears to
have had no reason to pursue peace at the moment, exuding the same overconfidence and using
his resistance to Washington as an opportunity to enhance his image with the Greek public. By
the time he left the country, the prime minister conceded only that discussions – albeit under UN
and not U.S. mediation – were a possibility.115
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Through the remainder of the summer, such a possibility became ever more appealing to
Papandreou, who, especially after an abortive attempt to secure Charles de Gaulle’s support for
his intransigent Cyprus policy, increasingly found himself without allies.116 In mid-July, the
Greeks agreed to participate in U.N. talks in Geneva mediated by Acheson. Like Ball and
Johnson, Acheson sought an agreement involving enosis coupled with a satisfactory concession
to Turkey. In the face of the aforementioned Greek opposition to any such compromises, he
reminded Papandreou’s government that at least a small Turkish base on Cyprus was necessary
in order to ensure the safety of the island’s increasingly marginalized and vulnerable Turkish
community. After much haggling, Papandreou suggested exchanging Kastellorizon, a small
Greek island in the Dodecanese, for control of Cyprus. Turkish bases there, as well as the
presence of Turkish forces on Cypriot soil (albeit a contingent under a NATO flag – what
Papandreou termed “NATO with a fez”) to protect the minority populations, came to be seen as
acceptable compromises in order to avoid a shooting war. On the Makarios issue, Papandreou
promised the neutralization of the archbishop’s excesses and his backing of the enosis-based
compromise solution. When asked how such control would be achieved, the prime minister
replied simply that “a Greek flag would defeat Makarios.”117
Toward the end of July, Acheson sent to the Greek and Turkish governments a
memorandum outlining the positions of either side and suggesting points of further negotiation.
In a remarkably shortsighted gesture, Papandreou delivered a copy of the memo to Makarios,
who was visiting Athens at the time. Immediately Makarios condemned the proposals and
rebuked what he regarded as a duplicitous attempt by Washington to betray the Greek people.
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Furthermore, and to the intense embarrassment of Papandreou’s government, the archbishop had
the document published and widely disseminated.118 To American diplomats stationed in Greece,
the entire incident seemed to prove that, despite his arrogant promises to rein in Makarios,
Papandreou, and not the archbishop, was the subordinate in the relationship. Perhaps even more
significantly, Makarios’s overwhelming objection to the Acheson memorandum demonstrated
that the Cypriot president was committed above all to the island’s continued independence, no
matter how much he echoed Papandreou’s desire for Athens-driven enosis. Papandreou had had
enough. His focus now turned to engineering a coup against Makarios, after which the Acheson
provisions could be enacted.
But the firestorm created by Makarios proved uncontainable. Sensing Papandreou’s
domestic weakness following the archbishop’s revelation of the Acheson memorandum, Turkey
hardened its line on Cyprus, demanding greater concessions in exchange for enosis. Turkish
hostility once again played into the hands of Makarios, who secured both a United Nations
resolution reaffirming Cypriot independence and an assurance of Soviet support if the Turks
invaded. And all the while Greek Cypriot soldiers began offensives against Turkish Cypriotoccupied areas to the north of the island, further darkening the prospects of a successful
settlement and thus strengthening the archbishop’s hand. Following a series of Turkish air strikes
on Greek Cypriot encampments, the White House again forced the Turks to back off, and Greek
Cypriot forces abandoned their assault. Acheson, rightly fearing for the future of negotiations,
scrambled to convince Papandreou to offer Turkey more concessions. But the damage had
already been done. The two nations had come closer to agreement than ever before only to see
their hopes dashed by drifting to the brink of war. Makarios was now appealing for Soviet aid,
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and Papandreou maintained that the Greek people would never accept the Acheson plan as long
as it contained any hint of concessions to Turkey. The American mediator frantically reworked
his proposals to accommodate these considerations, but soon came to the conclusion that crucial
momentum had been lost. On August 15, he lamented the failure of his mission.119 After
Johnson’s victory in the November 1964 elections, assistant secretary of state for the Middle
East Lucius Battle told the president that “the problem of Cyprus will be with us for some time to
come,” but noted with optimism that “… for the moment, a Greek-Turkish war has been
avoided.”120 Regional stability and NATO cohesion had been achieved; this, after all, was the
real victory the administration had been fighting for in the first place. But while such diplomatic
triumphs were very real, assessments of their lasting significance were much too sanguine.
Johnson’s diplomacy had failed to bring about a conclusive Cyprus settlement, and tensions over
the island remained as hot as ever as 1965 dawned. Cautious of further entanglements in eastern
Mediterranean affairs – especially as the war in Vietnam continued to escalate – the Johnson
administration celebrated its survival in what had been a very close call and, in what would
prove to be a fateful decision, began diverting its attentions from the Greco-Turkish situation
altogether. By failing to see the stalemate over Cyprus and the growing appeal of Makarios’s
struggle for what it was – a deepening ethnic dimension to the eastern Mediterranean’s crises –
LBJ and his advisors missed a crucial window of opportunity, in the process stoking the fires of
Greek ethnic nationalism and giving its chief exponents new fuel for their diatribes. As Greece
headed into the latter half of the 1960s and toward domestic disaster, it would be the ghosts of
Cyprus and the lingering ramifications of failed American intervention that tipped the nation
over the edge.
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Domestic Deadlock, Constitutional Crisis, and the Greek Coup of 1967
By the time he won the presidency in his own right in November 1964, Lyndon Johnson
had already presided over a significant period of American involvement in the eastern
Mediterranean by taking an active role in efforts to resolve the Cyprus crisis. U.S. mediation,
however, had failed; and a period of relaxed American policy toward Greece followed in the
wake of the 1964 humiliation. Most observers would never have expected Johnson to risk
another entanglement in Greek affairs, and ironically, it was precisely this lack of interference
that led to the most controversial (and best-documented) aspect of the administration’s
Mediterranean policy – its diplomacy in the period leading up to the Greek coup d’état of 1967.
Since the end of the civil war, the specter of communism had haunted Greece, whose
political system after 1949 was marked more by instability and suspicion than by any real
progress toward amnesty and recovery. KKE was banned following its defeat, and the 1950s saw
a period of conservative rule that included extensive persecution of former communists. During
this time the government imprisoned, tortured, and executed hundreds of leftists in terror
campaigns that dwarfed those of the 1920s and 30s. Thousands fled abroad to avoid such
crackdowns. The political ascendancy of the right heralded disaster for the left, which suffered a
catastrophic loss of prestige in addition to the immediate traumas of postwar harassment. Until
1974, the only legal leftist party in Greece was the Union of the Democratic Left, or EDA.121
Illegality, however, did not beget nonexistence, and much of the turmoil that plagued Greek
politics in the years after 1949 can be attributed to rightist fears of a communist resurgence, and
the widely held belief that EDA was simply a front for the outlawed KKE exacerbated the
situation. With the rise of two conservative prime ministers in the 1950s – Alexander Papagos
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and Constantine Karamanlis – stability seemed finally to have returned to the chaotic political
arena.
Karamanlis especially appeared to many Greeks to be the leader of the future. Before
becoming prime minister, he had served as minister of public works, in which capacity he set
into motion wide-ranging modernization programs throughout the country. While in power he
also managed to reduce the influence of IDEA (the Sacred Band of Greek Officers), a rabidly
anticommunist organization that represented the Greek military’s preponderant influence in
politics. And Karamanlis proved able to consolidate and balance support betterthan any of his
successors, marginalizing EDA and forming strong ties with the military while maintaining his
independence from it.122 Led by an anticommunist par excellence who also proved capable of
holding a moderate line and checking the excesses of the extreme right, Greece seemed bound
for normalcy and prosperity.
The political and economic stability of the Karamanlis years prompted a reduction in
U.S. aid to Greece. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations viewed the current Greek
state of affairs as evidence that American involvement since 1947 had worked its magic; and
while this new Greek “independence,” was a double-edged sword, especially when it gave rise to
irredentist policies toward Cyprus and associated antagonisms with Turkey, it at least indicated
the Greek people had established a cohesive, noncommunist identity. Moreover, bulwarks had
appeared in Greek politics that seemed certain to crush any communist threat should it arise.
EDA was enormously weakened. Communism also appeared to have little appeal for the Greek
body politic, who under a comparatively conservative regime were witnessing economic revival
for the first time in decades. And at the very least, American observers noted, Greece possessed a
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formidable military apparatus supported by the Western alliance. Even if democratic lines of
defense failed, a prescient U.S. security report concluded, “IDEA would undoubtedly use its
influence against the formation of a government in which communists had a dangerous degree of
power.”123 Reassured by an interlocking conservative safety net, the United States entered a
period of noninvolvement in Greek affairs, actively cooperating and compromising with the
Karamanlis government while simultaneously approaching Greece according to a decidedly
hands-off policy.
The parliamentary elections of 1958 shattered this American complacency. To the
chagrin of Karamanlis and his U.S. allies, EDA, through the newly instated system of
proportional representation, won 78 seats in parliament, becoming the leading opposition party
and severely weakening the center. The resulting political crisis triggered an extended period of
Greek civil unrest that enhanced the political fortunes of the centrist party EK (Enothiki Kentro,
or Center Union), led by George Papandreou, and culminated in Karamanlis’s decision to resign
in 1963.
Karamanlis’s resignation propelled George Papandreou to the forefront of Greek politics.
In this capacity, the Center Union’s leader was able to achieve a smashing electoral triumph in
February of 1964, carving out a new space for the Left, which had exercised almost no political
power since 1949. As demonstrated, he also catapulted the dormant Cyprus issue into the
limelight of Greek and international attention. Yet for the purposes of analyzing the lead-up to
the 1967 coup, George Papandreou’s rise to power was most significant because it paved the way
for his son Andreas’s domination of the country’s political scene for the next four years.
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Andreas initially exhibited little of the popularity that made his father such a formidable
political figure. Educated in the United States, the younger Papandreou had witnessed from a
distance the upheavals of the civil war and postwar years. He thus lacked the firsthand
experiences and political savvy of his compatriots – a lethal combination in the chaotic
environment of the early 1960s in Greece. But even had Andreas grasped the intricacies of
domestic politics, he was guilty of an even greater crime for those voicing their discontents:
association with America at a time when Greek ethnic nationalism railed against perceived
attachment to and dependence on the United States.
Andreas may have been a pariah, but he was quite aware of his vulnerability. He, like
Makarios, also acutely sensed that his greatest weakness, a keen and personal familiarity with the
United States, could be turned into a political tool. He quickly set out crafting a new image at
home as the face of contemporary Greek anti-Americanism. After a brief and fruitless flirtation
with the idea of using his background in the U.S. to advance his father’s political interests,
Andreas shifted to attacking Washington’s interventionist policies in earnest. To the younger
Papandreou, America was responsible for the current economic and social stagnation of the
Greek nation after the rebound of the late 1940s and 1950s. It was the driving force behind the
current political chaos, inserting itself into regional affairs when appropriate and taking its leave
as soon as its own gains had materialized. And the failure of Greek diplomacy to achieve long
sought-after goals was also the fault of the United States, with the 1964 Cyprus debacle only
lending weight to such polemics.124
In addition to his stridently anti-American discourse, Andreas sought to shift the Greek
political momentum to the “center left” by strengthening labor and youth organizations within
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the Center Union. Citing the example of similar movements in France, Andreas maintained that
such a shift would prevent communism from gaining a foothold by presenting more moderate
alternatives to the radical left. Yet for the time being, any opening to the left was political
suicide. Political opponents, the monarchy, and even members of EK viewed Andreas’s
maneuverings with suspicion, casting them at worst as an attempt to establish a popular front
with EDA and at best a destabilizing force that would deliver votes into EDA’s hands.125
The U.S. may have been able to tolerate either Andreas’s attacks or his political
shuffling, but the combination raised warning flags, especially as Andreas was quickly gaining
popular support and seemed poised to follow in his aging father’s political footsteps. The Greek
constitutional crisis of 1965, however, ensured that he went from a nuisance to a hot-button
priority. The Αποστασία (“Apostasy”) of 1965 resulted from a scandal in which ASPIDA, a
group of centrist Greek army officers, allegedly sought to prevent rightist domination of the
military by distributing posts and promotions to members. Such nepotistic arrangements were
nothing new to Greece, and the ASPIDA incident probably would have made little impact had it
not been for the purported role of Andreas Papandreou in the scheme.
The reaction was quick and overwhelming. Minister of Defense Petros Garoufalias
proposed the formation of a committee to investigate ASPIDA and was quickly shouted down by
both Papandreous; his subsequent resignation convinced George Papandreou to succeed him,
thereby assuming personal control of the army and bringing the prime minister into open conflict
with King Constantine. A heated exchange developed between the two during which the king
repeatedly refused to accept the elder Papandreou’s self-appointment as defense minister.
Eventually Constantine suggested that the prime minister choose another individual to fill the
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position, a solution Papandreou vehemently rejected. After more abortive correspondence, the
prime minister threatened his resignation if his self-appointment did not receive royal
recognition. When Constantine remained unyielding, Papandreou resigned. Minutes afterwards
the king swore in a new prime minister, Speaker of the Parliament Georgios AthanasiadisNovas.126
But the former leader, who soon afterwards went into exile, was far from defeated.
Largely because of the rapidity with which he was replaced, George Papandreou garnered a great
deal of support from the Greek public, who now saw the monarchy as hostile to any party that
pursued interests different from its own. From abroad he actively participated in the Center
Union’s struggle for survival, ensuring that the party remained in tense conflict with the palace.
Yet even as his popularity soared he began facing significant political challenges from the most
unexpected source – his upstart son Andreas. The ASPIDA scandal and subsequent
governmental crisis forced Andreas to learn the ropes of Greek politics, and learn them quickly.
Despite his initial maladroitness he proved more than fit for the task, rallying enormous public
support by his impassioned condemnations of the out-of-touch monarchy, its military
apparatus, powerful Greek economic interests, and, above all, the entrenched power of the
United States. Among his demands were economic modernization and industrialization that
would allow for more equitable distribution of income. The special powers of the monarchy and
top economic figures would be eliminated. In matters of foreign policy, Greece would no longer
answer to the Western alliance, instead pursuing its own agenda over that of NATO.
Andreas’s calls were neither novel nor shocking to the Greek people. His calls for
λαοκρατία, or “people power,” combined with diatribes against the privileges of the palace and
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nationalist lambasting of the elusive yet convincing specter of “foreign intervention,” had, at one
time or another, formed integral parts of his father’s rhetorical arsenal, and resonated profoundly
with enormous segments of the Greek populace eager to leave behind the troubled past. But what
made such demands so venomous this time around was the unprecedented instability of the
political arena, coupled with the absence of any sort of stabilizing figure following the departure
of George Papandreou. In such a climate, Andreas was free to use his oratorical skills to harness
and organize latent Greek xenophobia, including anti-Americanism in the wake of the Cyprus
crisis, into a force with political significance – but also with a significant price.127
By late summer 1965, Greece was at a political impasse. The prospect of reform on the
Andreas Papandreou model frightened conservatives, and the more startled they became, the
more they suspected Andreas of communist sympathies. Moreover, while convenient when
things were going well, U.S. reluctance to intervene in Greek affairs meant that the present crisis
was a problem for Greece alone. This noninterventionist pose further polarized the country’s
politics, adding to the frustrations of both the right and the left, which, despite the anti-American
discourses of the latter, paradoxically both felt they had been cheated out of implicit promises of
support made to them by the Americans.
Despite such discontent, U.S. policymakers, remembering well their last venture into
eastern Mediterranean affairs, vowed to let the problem remain a Greek one. As the political
deadlock worsened throughout late 1965, the risk of a military coup increased, and on several
occasions the CIA pushed for covert intervention in order to undermine Papandreou’s influence
with cash before paranoid military factions destroyed it by force. Senior planners in Washington,
national security adviser McGeorge Bundy chief among them, opposed such plans. Soon, Greek
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politicians themselves began to request American mediation in what was fast becoming an
unpredictable and uncontrollable environment. Both the palace and the Papandreous courted
American officials in an attempt to use U.S. influence as leverage in negotiations between the
monarchy and Center Union, with the king even going so far as to send a personal message to
President Johnson.128 Yet the most significant exchange occurred between Andreas Papandreou
and his American liaison, chargé d’affaires Norbert Anschuetz. In talks, the younger Papandreou
tamed his anti-American rhetoric and assured the U.S. diplomat that any political changes made
by another Center Union government would be moderate. Conceding that he may have been
“imprudent,” Andreas sought to control the fires he had set and, in so doing, ensure American
support for the calling of new elections.129
Anschuetz proved a reluctant customer in what was, in any case, a tremendously hard
sell. If the U.S. sanctioned new elections and the Center Union emerged victorious (for all intents
and purposes a foregone conclusion by 1965-66), vital pro-American elements of Greek society
would undoubtedly be alienated. Even these bottom-line consequences assumed Andreas would
keep his word and pursue only moderate reforms. Following the Andreas-Anschuetz talks,
George Papandreou hurried to reassure U.S. officials with promises that political reconciliation
in Greece was possible and that conservative interests would not be endangered by a Center
Union victory. By now, however, officials within the Johnson administration had made up their
minds. With his leftist leanings and flagrant anti- American outbursts, Andreas was too much of
a loose cannon to be protected, much less aided. From now on, “constructive influence,” not
crisis resolution, would be the modus operandi of America’s Greek diplomacy.130 In the midst
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of perhaps the greatest threat to Greek democracy since the civil war, the Johnson
administration’s chief policymakers ignored the advice of the domestic Greek forces best able to
evaluate and respond to the current crises.
With the decision made to abandon both Andreas and the problems he had created, the
template for complete disentanglement from the Greek political crisis seemed complete. But
once again, the whirlwind pace of developments precluded such a tidy extrication. By the fall of
1966, the king had repeatedly approached U.S. ambassador Phillips Talbot to inform him of a
plan, hatched by George Papandreou, to bring in an objective mediator and in the meantime
install a temporary, nonpolitical government. Talbot equivocated. The scheme reeked of an
attempt to draw the United States further into an impetuous political vortex in order to advance
the interests of one side over the other. But further developments seemed to confirm that Greece
was indeed ready for stability. On September 29, George and Andreas Papandreou, finally
eschewing their characteristic equivocation, directly requested that American officials serve as
mediators in discussions with Constantine. Again they vowed that the Center Union would avoid
forming a coalition with EDA, upheld the promise of a nonpolitical interim government
throughout the negotiation period, and pledged their support for NATO and Greece’s role within
the alliance.131
For once, both sides’ commitment to cooperation seemed legitimate. Investigations
into the ASPIDA scandal had all but cleared Andreas, and major political leaders on both the
right and the left were ready to make concessions to avoid a military putsch. Yet at another
crucial juncture, and in full view of a settlement process, the Americans backed and filled.
Andreas’s exoneration, rather than clearing the ASPIDA issue from the political docket, had
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catapulted the younger Papandreou into hero status with his party. His popularity greater than
ever before, the right feared that the sudden power shift in his favor would tempt the Center
Union to abandon plans for negotiation, or even more likely spark a coup led by fearful
rightists.132 Such concerns were well founded. The CIA continued to issue troubling reports
indicating profound discontents in the military, noting that right-wing elements of the Center
Union’s opposition were increasingly considering installing an “extra-parliamentary
government.”133 Seeking to avoid calamity while maintaining a minimum of intervention, the
United States pushed George Papandreou and the palace to reach an immediate deal on their
own. The long-awaited arrangement came on December 18. With a plan for the establishment of
an interim government under John Paraskevopoulos, a politician supported by both the Center
Union and its opposition, and the calling of new elections after another election law had
cleared the legislature, Greece appeared, at long last, to have averted political catastrophe.134
With stability at hand, ambassador Talbot expressed his belief that the crisis was over and
that American concerns could now be put to rest. And such would have been the case if not for
the continued brazenness of Andreas Papandreou, who found himself shortchanged by a deal his
father had brokered without consulting him. Andreas had simply invested too much in spirited
opposition to the monarchy to let the issue die. His intensifying invective terrified the palace,
which saw the younger Papandreou as both an obstacle to the recently concluded settlement and
a rallying pole around which a shattering Center Union victory could be organized in the
upcoming elections. Despite such concerns, American observers in-country believed a return to
normalcy was around the corner, and consequently rejected increasingly radical palace appeals
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for assistance. When asked if the U.S. would support extra-parliamentary measures in a January
28, 1967 meeting with Constantine’s political chief Dimitrios Bitsios, CIA station chief Jack
Maury maintained that “U.S. reaction would be extremely unfavorable.”135
Ambassador Talbot likewise sought to prevent a drastic turn of events. On February 11
he approved a CIA plan, to be sent to Washington for review, for a “limited covert political
operation” that would entail providing “support for certain competitive elements” in order to
reduce the gravity of the almost-certain Center Union electoral victory. The success of the plan
would result in the strangulation of both the Center Union and Andreas Papandreou, forcing the
party into a moderating coalition, injuring the politician’s image with his followers, and calming
the passions of both sides in the crisis.136 In so doing, it would steer Greece back onto the track
of stability rather than allowing its continued slide into a confrontation with despotism.
Washington proved unsympathetic. Particularly in light of the escalating hot war in
Vietnam – a commitment fast consuming both America’s military and moral resources – a
digression in Greece, as with anywhere else, was a prospect to be avoided. Greater European
troubles, too, filled the docket of global disturbances: the aftermath of Charles de Gaulle’s 1966
withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated command structure, as well as the
tremendous effort required by Washington to stabilize global economic networks in the midst of
Britain’s sterling crisis, drew critical attention away from the impending disaster for Greek
democracy. Misgivings at the highest levels of policymaking, moreover, mirrored the vacillation
of officials like Talbot. In meetings held by the National Security Council’s 303 committee on
covert operations, chairman Walt Rostow expressed his doubts that the nature of Andreas’s
threat merited such meddling in Greek politics, citing “other examples of leftists settling down
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after an election.” Cyrus Vance and State Department representative Foy Kohler shared
Rostow’s reservations. On March 14, Secretary of State Rusk rejected the CIA plan, supplying
his belief that “the possible political gain is outweighed by security risks… if the dual-national
Greek-Americans are concerned about the prospects and if $200-300,000 will make the
difference, they should have no trouble raising that sum themselves without involving the United
States.”137 The fate of democracy in Greece had been subordinated to official doubts and other
international dilemmas.
Throughout the late winter and early spring of 1967, American officials stood back while
Greek tensions moved further and further to the boiling point. On March 17 George Papandreou
met with Talbot and voiced his concerns about a reactionary “junta” that was putting pressure on
the king to suspend the constitution. The American ambassador confirmed that a conspiracy
indeed existed, but took care to note that there existed “no evidence that [the] army leadership is
actually plotting to create conditions leading to a deviation from [the] constitution.” The most
important factor in the coming days, continued Talbot’s report to Washington, was “[the] attitude
of [the] king,” who was frantically seeking a politician with whom he could draw up plans for
the formation of a coalition government that would ensure a stable transition from the interim
government under Paraskevopoulos. Such a man seemed to arrive in the figure of Panagiotes
Kanellopoulos, who on April 3 achieved Constantine’s approval for a government in which he
would serve as prime minister.138
But even as Kanellopoulos and the king sought to hold the line, forces beyond their
control had decided to carry out plans of their own. Since 1964 the CIA station in Greece had
known of a military conspiracy involving a group of Greek army officers led by Colonel George
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Papadopoulos. For three years the conspirators had held posts at various points in the country,
and due to this geographic separation had been unable to coordinate their actions and seize
power. By April 1967, however, they had all returned to posts in the capital, and from there
surveyed the fragmented political scene. To the conspirators, the time for negotiations had long
passed. Any elections would result in spontaneous violence leading to another civil war or in a
victory for Andreas Papandreou and thus a communist takeover. After Kanellopoulos’s
appointment on April 3, the die was cast. Papadopoulos and his collaborators settled on the early
morning hours of April 21 – a day when several influential political figures, including the
Papandreous, would be in Athens – to carry out their plans.139
Sensing the impending danger, Constantine held frantic conferences with Talbot on April
9. The young monarch reminded his interlocutor of Greece’s integral role in NATO and the
damage Andreas Papandreou represented to the cohesion of that alliance. He also sought a
straightforward profession of the American position, to no avail. Yet Constantine was scared,
and Talbot knew it. Much too late, the U.S. ambassador realized the reality of the dire situation
in Greece. “We share,” he wrote, “[the] king’s fear that events in Greece [are] approaching
[the] climax,” but added “we have found little taste for compromise in any quarter.”140 But
Talbot and the king were quite alone in their views. George and Andreas Papandreou habitually
downplayed the danger of a coup, resting sure in their belief that even if such a drastic turn of
events seemed to be on the horizon, U.S. intervention would prevent it.141 Washington, too, was
reluctant to whip itself into hysterics over the possibly of a putsch. On April 20, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle ordered Talbot to present George Papandreou with an

139

Laurence Stern, The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy (Times
Books, 1977), pp. 42; Miller, pp. 132.
140
Quoted in Miller, pp. 133.
141
Blantas, pp. 67.

105
American plan for final negotiations with Constantine; in the event of further complications,
Talbot was to serve as a mediator.142 Obviously, policymakers in the states had finally reached
the conclusion that some measure of overt U.S. involvement was merited, to calm the strained
nerves of the palace if for no other purpose. Again, they believed diplomacy would do the
trick. In a tragically ironic twist, the United States had opted to extend a hand to the
preservation of Greek democracy just as the iron fist of an indigenous conspiracy moved to crush
it.
In the early morning hours of April 21, 1967, Papadopoulos and his fellow officers
carried out the long-expected coup. Tanks barricaded strategic areas of the capital, ensuring that
no major resistance could be mounted. Politicians and military leaders suspected of harboring
left-wing sympathies were arrested. The colonels even managed to convince the Commander-inChief of the Army, Gregorios Spandidakis, to activate a NATO contingency plan, formulated to
be put into action in the event of a communist coup, allowing special forces units to seize control
of the Greek Defense Ministry. Soon thereafter, the royal palaces, parliament building, and
scores of communications stations fell to the coup leaders, and numerous political figures were
arrested. By six in the morning, the country was under the control of a military dictatorship that
would hold power for the next seven years.
During the early hours of April 22, following probably the most momentous day of his
diplomatic career, Talbot lamented the events that had taken place: “So far as I perceive we have
now completed reportage of the day of the rape of Greek democracy. I am certain that Greece
will long rue this day’s events, whose long range effects are hard to foresee.”143 The ambassador
could not have guessed how prophetic his remarks would prove to be in the coming decades. The
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Johnson administration had in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 encountered the most open opportunity
yet for the exercise of American power toward the goal of Greco- Turkish reconciliation. In a
great and ultimately tragic irony, its actions – nominally driven by concerns of democracy
promotion for democracy’s sake and by accurate perception of ideological problems – had failed
to take account of the true nature of the problem, and contributed profoundly to the political
deadlock that culminated in the end of Greek democracy altogether. The military junta
represented the capstone of an extended period of Greek political strife that began with the
resurgence of the center in 1963 and came to the forefront with the 1965 Αποστασίa. It would
forever alter the way Greeks discussed, analyzed, and even remembered their past. And, as we
will see, it would become, by virtue of its powerful direct and indirect ties with U.S. Cold War
diplomacy, a wellspring of anti- American sentiment that has yet to run dry, and that has taken
its place alongside other historic discontents in the modern Greek xenophobic lexicon.
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V. The Eastern Mediterranean and the Shock of the Global, 1967-1981
Richard Welch had long sought to unravel Greece’s complexities. As a Harvard
undergraduate, his courses in classics exposed him to the nation’s rich history and linguistic
traditions – and his proficiency at the latter attracted the attention of the U.S. government, who
recruited him into the CIA following his graduation in 1951. It was only fitting that the gifted
classicist’s first posts should be in Athens and Cyprus, where he distinguished himself as a
deeply knowledgeable area specialist before moving to senior intelligence roles in Latin
America. After the fall of the Greek junta, Welch’s expertise was sought to provide much-needed
strategic perspective on events in Athens, and he reassumed his erstwhile post as station chief at
the end of 1974. Yet his second post in Greece was to be tragically short. Two days before
Christmas 1975, a group of armed men, sympathetic to anti-American Marxist terrorist
organization Revolutionary Organization 17 November, followed Welch and his wife home in a
stolen Simca. As one restrained Welch’s wife, another fired a fatal shot at the station chief from
a close-range .45 caliber pistol. “It was a symbolic assassination,” in the words of a post-incident
report by Laurence Stern, himself a classicist, historian, and keen observer of contemporary
Greece. “It could have been anyone in the American establishment.”144
The Welch assassination – the first of a CIA agent – caused severe disruption and
internecine strife within the agency. William Colby, its director, broke character in stridently
condemning security lapses within the organization and publicly mourning the loss of a senior
officer. But the killing also cast into high relief the changing international currents of the 1970s.
While terrorism and politically inspired murder would each emerge as especially jarring
evidence of globalization’s disruptive potential, they joined a litany of other global disturbances
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that illuminated the new interconnections – often unwillingly forged – between modern states.
The Seventies would see erstwhile empires and superpowers alike challenged from within by
restive minority groups and from without by former colonies, who now used their global voices,
natural resource reserves, and non-aligned status to disrupt great power grand strategy.
Heretofore-underdeveloped nations or areas recently defeated in wartime would recover their
economic dynamism and exert newfound influence over the comings and goings of international
finance. And the decade would witness the rise of non-state actors – especially dissident and
reformist voices, carrying messages of liberation often forged through global linkages – that had
unprecedented impacts upon international relations. In the 1970s, a full picture of the global
arena could no longer be painted with the traditional palette of statecraft. Decades-old
understandings of the world’s diplomacy were, for the first time, being tested as new power
centers emerged. Human rights, environmentalism and – as 1968 had powerfully shown –
domestic protest respected few nation-state boundaries, and had the potential to transcend
altogether the crumbling bipolar order the superpowers had created.145
Such developments affected the shape of grand strategy across the globe, and nowhere
was this truer than in the eastern Mediterranean, where traditional Cold War paradigms and
assumptions were challenged and often abandoned altogether. The period of the Greek junta
coincided with a time of transition within U.S. foreign policy circles, as the superpower faced
new challenges in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa alongside its ongoing crisis in
Vietnam. Faced with competing strategic priorities that spanned the globe, Washington could no
longer spend its increasingly stretched energies on disputes it regarded as tangential – and
distracting – to the overriding pursuit of NATO stability. Domestic turmoil, too, reoriented
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American strategy, as a beleaguered Nixon administration struggled to manage crises abroad
while its legitimacy at home crumbled. The result was a failure of diplomacy in the eastern
Mediterranean that resulted in the rupture of the long-standing Cyprus dispute. In the face of the
greatest threat to regional stability since the Suez Crisis, American policymakers proved
unwilling to intervene decisively and forestall Turkish aggression. In the aftermath of Ankara’s
1974 invasion of Cyprus, Washington watched with growing alarm as events in the Persian Gulf,
the Middle East, and Africa threatened its regional supremacy – while remaining largely ignorant
of the profound sociological and psychological changes occurring nearby in eastern
Mediterranean societies. Nixon’s successors, though more willing to take an active role in the
region’s affairs, likewise faced too many items on the global docket to exercise true leadership.
For its part, the Soviet Union expressed little interest in the eastern Mediterranean, preoccupied
instead by internal dissent, the return of competition with the United States and, by the end of the
1970s, a costly war in Afghanistan that would put on full display the limits of superpower
adventurism.146
But while the superpowers’ strategic shifts furnished the international environment in
which the eastern Mediterranean navigated the 1970s, deep changes, long brewing in the
region’s societies, had the greatest impact upon the cadences of everyday Greek, Turkish, and
Cypriot life. Domestically, the eastern Mediterranean Seventies were a period of sociocultural
ferment driven from above by regime change and globalization, but also, and profoundly, by the
actions of indigenous populations and their quest for new identities. Emerging from dictatorial
rule, Greeks embraced newly reinstated political organizations, took opportunities provided by
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institutional support for social mobility and individual economic dynamism, and participated in a
newly open sphere for public discourse. The reinstitution of democracy allowed political voices
demanding a critical rereading of the past, and in such an environment, pre-junta cultural
institutions came under intense scrutiny. Greek civic culture also became highly critical of the
paths that had brought Hellenic civilization to its current position, and popular sentiment,
articulated and supported by the new establishment, turned toward mass politicization. By the
end of the decade, most Greeks had begun to question legitimacy claims long held by key
institutions of Greek life, opting instead for new readings of the national past – and visions of the
national future – that returned to the traditional emphasis upon the uniqueness of Greece’s
civilization and provided new avenues for its course through the future.
Turks throughout the 1970s likewise sought new national direction in the wake of
turmoil. But stability was not so easy for Greece’s eastern neighbor to achieve after a 1971
military coup d’etat, and interim governments – formed by coup leaders acutely aware of the
Greek junta’s domestic crises across the Aegean, and careful to heed their lessons – dominated
Turkish politics until the middle of the decade. But the provisional governments were ultimately
succeeded not by a single leader capable of mobilizing broad popular support for reconstruction
and reconciliation, in the mold of Greece’s Karamanlis, but rather by a coalition of rightist forces
that only intensified left-right conflicts. With partisan strife frequently boiling into the realms of
widespread riots, assassinations, and targeted terrorist activity, the military – ever-present
guardians of Atatürk’s reformist legacy – concluded that only decisive intervention in the
political sphere could safeguard Turkey’s future. The resulting effects on Turkish culture and
society would set the stage for the country’s path through the 1980s.

111
Both the Greek and Turkish nations during the 1970s therefore dealt with the many
changes of regime transition. And both societies had to learn the “grammar of a system of
competing power blocs,” to use the phrase of Henry Kissinger, as globalization coexisted with
and often overrode the processes of European integration and the protection of Atlantic alliance
cohesion as the key shapers of the region’s foreign policy. Ultimately, the societies of the eastern
Mediterranean proved to be adept students. The 1970s, in the words of Daniel Sargent, “opened
dilemmas that would define a post-Cold War era, dilemmas whose persistence into the twentyfirst century made manifest the failures of decision-makers during the 1970s to remake the
international order in order to master the dilemmas of their own – and our own – times.”147 As
U.S. presidents and Soviet statesmen alike confronted a changing geopolitical arena in which old
directives of Cold War strategy were no longer relevant, their responses to such dilemmas
yielded mixed results. The promise of détente wilted by the end of the decade with the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan – proving in no uncertain terms that neither Washington nor Moscow
was any longer the arbiter of global politics. America’s will to extend its influence across the
globe, though soon to be reborn under Reagan, similarly suffered grave defeats with the rise of
terrorism and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. But while both Western and communist bloc
policymakers responded to the shock of the global in fits and starts, the eastern Mediterranean,
like societies elsewhere now emerging from long acquiescence to great power demands,
harnessed the power of changes in the international order, using them as springboards for
cultural self-assertion and for the coalescence of new identities as old regimes – and rituals of
nationhood – faded into history.
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The Strategic Turns of the Seventies
All states had to adapt to the rapid changes of the 1970s. But it was the superpowers that
faced the greatest trials in navigating the changed global arena. This was the case particularly for
Washington, where Richard Nixon’s accession to the U.S. presidency in January 1969 came at a
time of great national turmoil. American involvement in Vietnam was entering its fourth year,
and had reached peak costliness, with more than three hundred servicemen dying per week. The
domestic economic and sociocultural ramifications of the war combined with civil rights issues
and an active student movement threatened to tear the nation apart, as widespread protests and
political disturbances underpinned a pervasive sense of malaise. The years of Lyndon Johnson
had opened up rifts in the body politic; it was incumbent upon his successors to take on the
monumental tasks of resolving and then healing those divisions. “In these difficult years,” the
new president reflected in his inauguration speech, “America has suffered from a fever of words;
from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans
discontents into hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading. We cannot
learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another, until we speak quietly enough so
that our words can be heard as well as our voices.”148
In foreign policy, Nixon likewise promised changes in American conduct, especially
regarding the increasingly divisive Vietnam War. Pledging to deliver “peace with honor,” he and
his diplomatic team embarked upon new policies premised upon classic balance-of-power
considerations and careful triangulation of interests between great powers, all calculated to bring
Hanoi – and any other geopolitical opponents – to the negotiating table on terms favorable to
Washington. The administration’s approach to foreign policy bore no resemblance to its
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aspirations for domestic bridge building. Instead, the president and his national security advisor
Henry Kissinger pioneered a new style of policymaking in which executive prerogative and
personal management served as the primary levers of statecraft. By keeping the conduct of
diplomacy lean, and often secretive, the Nixon-Kissinger team could confront the new challenges
of globalization just as they emerged: swiftly, nimbly, and flexibly. Such a policy, in the view of
its chief architect, was simply a dictate of changing international realities. As Kissinger argued,
the United States could no longer operate on the same principles of existential threat vis-à-vis the
communist world that had driven earlier policies. It now had to respond to a world drastically
changed, one in which “the hallmark, today, of relations among states, even among continents, is
interdependence rather than independence.”149
In practice, the Nixon-Kissinger relationship hinged largely upon the deeds of the latter,
and Kissingerian diplomacy fully embraced the new opportunities of flexibility and strategic
versatility. The secretary of state adeptly grasped the changed drivers of global politics in the
form of popular discontents, shifting poles of economic power, and the rise of transnational
forces, his official communications rich with multifaceted analysis of the interconnections
between seemingly disparate global events.150 And, despite his many critics, Henry Kissinger’s
diplomatic achievements as national security advisor, then secretary of state reflected both a
powerful understanding of traditional balance-of-power statecraft and a preternatural sense for
their application to a changed world. In East and Southeast Asia, Kissinger worked assiduously
to effect a settlement to the long-running Vietnam conflict, playing the delicate dynamics of
Sino-Soviet rivalry in pursuit of an end to the war. The NSA, controversially, demonstrated the
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value of a tacit Sino-American alliance by supporting Pakistan, a key ally of the People’s
Republic of China, during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.151
For Moscow, the rise of discontents within the communist bloc and the maturation of a
Sino-American thaw in the late 1960s and early 1970s signaled new threats, many of which
required new responses and global engagements to circumvent. And international pressure on the
Soviet Union had in any event rarely been higher than in the early years of the Seventies. The
suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 shocked observers on both the left and the right who
had placed hope in the promise of détente, and Leonid Brezhnev’s eponymous doctrine claiming
Soviet rights of interference to prevent the endangerment of socialist regimes foreshadowed an
era of increased involvement in protecting and expanding the domains of international socialism.
Much of this involvement naturally originated in the Third World. Under the ambit of Andrei
Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs for nearly three decades, from 1957 to 1985, the Soviet
state actively pursued aid and training initiatives in developing nations, with the prominent
example of Cuba often overshadowing equally influential involvements in regions as far-flung as
southern Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent.152
And, just as with Kissinger, much of Gromyko’s diplomacy unfolded according to
personal predilections, which in turn reflected earlier convictions gained during his first years in
Soviet diplomatic realms, neither misguided nor incorrect, that the United States actively sought
containment and circumscription of the Soviet Union’s sovereign conduct of foreign policy. But
though his views of American motivations may have been premised on outdated perceptions,
Gromyko’s sensitivity to emergent arenas of superpower competition in the 1960s and 1970s had
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much to do with the same sets of concerns facing Washington – new power centers, power
alignments, and transnational forces across the globe.
The aggregate effect of all such influences upon American and Soviet policy was what I
will term distraction by attention – the tendency to overlook traditional strategic theaters through
increased, sustained, and often obsessive attention to emergent ones. It was a variation on
strategic patterns that had characterized the Cold War confrontation from its very beginning,
when American and British strategy fixated on the notion of a communist monolith as the
expense of accurately diagnosing ethnic and nationalist movements bearing no allegiance to the
international communist bloc. But the emergence of new international concerns did not spell a
turn away from old perceptions of major threats and opportunities. As Niall Ferguson has
demonstrated, Soviet-American rivalry, despite the initial promises of détente, remained the
central focus of both superpowers’ global policies during the 1970s.153 Both powers’ turn
outward to new global commitments represented departures from prior areas of focus – but this
did not translate to paradigm shifts in overarching priorities. The United States still sought to
contain the Soviet monolith wherever it emerged – and developing states’ flirtations with
Marxist developmental models to many represented a dramatic surge in Moscow’s international
influence. Likewise, the Soviet Union continued holding out moral, economic, and military
support to regimes in the developing world whose path into modernity intersected with
opportunities for the extension of Marxism. Perhaps nowhere were such distractions clearer than
in the eastern Mediterranean, stalemated by the strictures of dictatorship and by the intransigence
of regional powers.
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The Globalization of Greco-Turkish Disputes
In the eastern Mediterranean, superpower distraction ultimately ended the Greco-Turkish
stalemate over Cyprus, but not by way of the long-sought settlement favorable to regional
stability. Instead, the last years of the Athens junta saw the issue dramatically escalated, as it
emerged from tense stagnation with the explosive actions of Greek militant nationalism on the
island. When Turkey invoked the Treaty of Guarantee to forcibly bring about a solution, the
United States chose to restrain its hand, with Washington’s strategic focus on the Middle East
and its crucial relationship with Ankara demanding a light response. But these were not the only
forces in play during the decade. Indeed, the enduring developments of the eastern
Mediterranean Seventies stemmed in large degree from a confluence of domestic political rebirth
and changing international circumstances.
The Johnson administration’s diplomatic efforts had done nothing to prevent either the
suspension of democracy in Greece or the escalation of Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus.
With the failure of a second American attempt at mediation on the island in 1967, the issue
entered a new period of stagnation. The accession of the Athens junta in April of that year
contributed to a lessening of tensions in the immediate term, as the new dictator made it clear,
despite the regime’s virulent nationalist rhetoric, that peace with Turkey would be his modus
operandi toward Cyprus. Yet peace, though welcome for the island’s beleaguered inhabitants, led
no closer to a definitive solution, and as Cypriots neared their first full decade of independence,
their ethnic divisions – as well as the determination of each community to see through a
satisfactory settlement – had grown more conspicuous than ever before. “Even my brief visit to
Cyprus was depressing with respect to the Turkish Cypriot predicament,” reported Robert
Komer, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, in a May 1969 memorandum.
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The Greek sector’s economy is booming, while the Turk Cypriots stagnate barricaded in
their enclaves. The growing economic disparity between the two communities is even
more visible. Despite this, I see little give among the Turkish community in Cyprus or
their backers in Ankara… indeed… the greater the economic disparity the more
determinedly the Turk Cypriots would insist on the full measure of their rights.154
Intercommunal intransigence, however, belied powerful intracommunal rivalries.
Terroristic violence on both sides had posed problems since the days of EOKA’s
counterinsurgency campaigns, but by the beginning of the 1970s its tempo had increased
markedly, with more than two hundred assassinations in 1970 alone. The Turkish minority,
frustrated by a lack of concrete achievements on Cyprus, had already broken with Ankara over
numerous issues, a trend accelerated with the appointment of Rauf Denktash as leader of the
Turkish Cypriot community in 1973. Concerned over the likely ramifications of intensified
violence toward the island’s Turks, Denktash throughout the year increasingly pushed for
autonomous control over Turkish forces on Cyprus, further straining relations with Ankara.155
Frictions within the Greek Cypriot community proved even more divisive. Archbishop
Makarios had sensed the unviability of enosis in the wake of Turkey’s increased involvement in
the island’s affairs throughout the 1960s. By the end of the decade, he had abandoned any
dreams of union with Greece in favor of a more “attainable” solution that could accommodate
the indisputable reality of Turkish influence on Cyprus, as well as safeguard Cypriot sovereignty
against the machinations of either Athens or Ankara – not to mention Washington or London.
But Makarios’s views were at odds with influential figures in the Greek Cypriot community,
who rose to protest – often violently – what they saw as an insufferable affront to the cause of
Hellenism. Chief among these was EOKA’s former leader, George Grivas. Recalled from
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Cyprus by Athens in 1967, Grivas had spent the intervening years watching with growing
contempt as Makarios tempered and ultimately jettisoned his once-radical support for enosis. By
1971, Grivas had become convinced that the archbishop represented not only a step backward for
Hellenism, but a roadblock to Greece achieving its future destiny. Under cover, and with the tacit
support of Athens, Grivas returned to Cyprus in late 1971 to form EOKA-B, a successor
organization to the guerrilla outfit he had formed sixteen years earlier.156
EOKA-B never enjoyed the broad support of its predecessor. The absence of a visible
colonial aggressor in the mold of the British, exhaustion from a full decade of intercommunal
conflict, and the quite accurate perception of Grivas as an agent of the Athens colonels all
contributed to apathy on the part of Greek Cypriots. Lack of widespread backing, however, did
not prevent sudden and violent action by EOKA-B or its sympathizers. As early as March 1970,
the terroristic inclinations of enosis hardliners went on full display when Makarios narrowly
escaped death after his helicopter was shot down over Nicosia. Pro-enosis and anti-Makarios
sentiment also came from the Greek Orthodox Church itself, where three of the island’s bishops
in March 1972 openly broke with the archbishop by calling for his resignation as President of the
Republic at the Holy Synod. Embattled, Makarios took fateful steps to cement his wavering
legitimacy, bolstering the strength of his personal militia in the months following the Cypriot
Church’s “ecclesiastical coup.”157 But for all its potential to explode again into violence, the
Cyprus crisis, by the dawn of 1974, had stalled, mired in the inertia of intercommunal tension. It
would take George Grivas’s death in January of that year, as well as a series of dramatic actions
by the junta leadership in Athens, for it to emerge again as a flashpoint of hot conflict.
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The Crisis Explodes: The Long Summer of 1974
After Grivas’s death, control of EOKA-B shifted to the regime in Athens, which was
facing its own formidable challenges of legitimacy. Attempts at liberalization throughout 1973
by junta leader Papadopoulos had backfired tremendously, culminating in the disastrous uprising
of November 17, 1973, in which military forces slaughtered 24 students and civilians following
staged anti-dictatorship demonstrations at Athens Polytechnic University. The uprising
galvanized Greek public opinion, already turning against the junta, into active resistance. It also
led Dimitris Ioannidis, head of the military police and a former junta hardliner, to stage his own
successful coup against Papadopoulos on November 25 to stave off an outright regime collapse.
Ioannidis’s foreign policy differed drastically from that of his predecessor. The new
leader eschewed caution on the Cyprus issue, vociferously denouncing the “communistic”
machinations of Makarios (whom he termed “the Red Priest”) and placing assertive movements
toward enosis at the top of Greek diplomatic priorities. U.S. ambassador Henry Tasca, sensing
that Ioannidis’s regime sought to engage in dangerous and destabilizing adventurism, issued
repeated warnings to Washington about the likely actions of the new Athens leadership,
suggesting an immediate drop in military aid levels and the adoption of a public pro-democracy
and pro-Karamanlis stance. Kissinger rebuffed such requests. “All elements of the mission
should stay out of the domestic maneuverings now going on in Greece,” the secretary of state
counseled. “The mission should monitor developments, not participate in them.”158
But developments on the ground, as Tasca well knew, were moving so quickly and with
such intensity that non-involvement was a virtual impossibility. Keenly aware of the regime’s
weakness and fearing for their personal futures, hundreds of Greek army officers in the early
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months of 1974 scrambled to secure economic and political safety in the event of Ioannidis’s
ouster, with many fleeing abroad. The increasing politicization of the officer corps and the
hemorrhaging of the dictator’s core support group, warned the British ambassador, boded ill for
the regime’s stability, which was in any case severely jeopardized by growing expressions of
popular discontent. Concerned by rumors that the CIA had supported the coup against
Papadopoulos – in all likelihood, concocted by Ioannidis to cement his tenuous rule – Tasca
continued to plead for direct American involvement to forestall another calamitous turn of events
in the eastern Mediterranean. On March 20, 1974, in a meeting with Kissinger and senior State
Department officials in Washington, the ambassador made his case for a U.S.-supported return to
democratic governance, arguing that only active promotion of the dictatorship’s fall could
preserve vital American interests in the region from being shattered by a Greco-Turkish war.
Again, Kissinger was unmoved. The question of democracy in Greece, in the secretary’s view,
was unrelated to the potential ramifications in foreign policy: “With all respect, this issue is
being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn’t between democracy and nondemocracy. We conduct foreign policy here, not domestic policy. We don’t muck around with
other countries. Now before we change course, I want to hear overpowering reasons why we
should.” Compatibility with the interests of American realpolitik, not concern over future crises,
would continue to dictate the United States’s policies toward the Athens regime. “We work,”
Kissinger concluded,” with whoever is in power as long as they are not anti-American.”159
While such anti-Americanism had always been a concern for Washington, it was even
more pressing in the changing environments of the 1970s, when the transatlantic superpower
faced significant challenges that called into question its role as leader of the free world. The
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recent oil crisis of 1973 had demonstrated the limits of American power when faced with
resistance by strategically important, often non-aligned oil-rich nations determined to protect
their interests in international arenas.160 The Middle East had again emerged as a key point of
American focus with the Yom Kippur War, which demonstrated the growing power of Arab
states – and questioned traditional assumptions about the stability of Israel’s as a Middle Eastern
security bulwark – following the disastrous Six-Day War six years earlier. And all global issues
– much less Cyprus, an island American administrations had heretofore considered only as an
element of broader regional strategies – were lower priorities than usual for Nixon and Kissinger
in the early summer of 1974.
By June of the year, the series of prolonged court battles over the Watergate scandal had
boiled over into near-certain prospects for Nixon’s impeachment and conviction. Soon the
controversy was tearing the administration apart. Between March and April, the president had
been labeled an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the illegal plot, and by May the timing and
circumstances of his exit from office, not the fact of the departure itself, was in question.
Kissinger was by no means immune to the fallout. Already under popular and congressional
scrutiny for his role in the overthrow of Chile’s Salvador Allende in September 1973 and under
withering attach on all sides for his policies on Vietnam and détente, the secretary of state sought
to extricate himself from a political spiral, especially as it seemed likely that Nixon’s successor,
Gerald Ford, might opt for a less controversial replacement.161
American distraction, then, played an essential part in the Cyprus drama that was to
follow. But so did the diplomatic moves of Makarios, which displayed none of the sensitivity to
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great powers’ international and domestic concerns they had exhibited the previous decade.
Seemingly unaware of Watergate’s magnitude, the archbishop, beleaguered by ongoing
opposition from pro-enosis members of the Greek Cypriot community and by the threat of
military action from Athens, issued a letter to Greek president Phaedon Gizikis in which he
angrily accused the Ioannidis government of recent plots against his life. Demanding the
immediate removal of Greek army officers from Cyprus, Makarios stressed the profound damage
that aggressive attempts on his life and leadership had wrought on the entire Hellenic
community:
I am sorry to say, Mr. President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as
Athens… the national interest dictates harmonious and close co-operation
between Athens and Nicosia… I do not desire [the] interruption of my co-operation
with [the] Greek Government. But it should be borne in mind that I am not an
appointed perfected or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an
elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand an appropriate conduct
by the National Guard towards me.162
The archbishop had no illusions about the reaction from Athens, which he rightly
anticipated would be swift and incandescent. But, as he had come to expect from years of skillful
diplomatic maneuvering, the United States would intervene to prevent its clients from taking
violent actions to disturb the regional status quo. He sorely miscalculated.
On the morning of July 15, Makarios returned to Nicosia from meetings in the Troodos
Mountains. Shortly after arriving at the presidential palace, his guards sounded the alarm as tanks
and infantry, supplied and transported by the Athens government, surrounded the complex and
demanded the president’s surrender. As his bodyguard delayed the attack, Makarios fled by
automobile to a nearby British sovereign base at Akrotiri, from which British forces airlifted him
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to London and safety. Ioannidis’s agents on Cyprus quickly installed Nikos Sampson, an exEOKA fighter and staunch supporter of enosis, as the archbishop’s successor.163
As Makarios had sensed, the only major player with the power to bring about a settlement
of the situation was the United States. Yet he had not anticipated the lukewarm reaction of Henry
Kissinger, whose primary concerns lay in the implications of the Cypriot coup for Soviet plans,
not on Greco-Turkish relations. Fresh from shuttle diplomacy in the greater Middle East and
acutely sensing the potential ramifications of a prolonged Cyprus dilemma for future Soviet
influence in the area, Kissinger by May 1974 had washed his hands of any efforts to bring the
Cypriot problem to a universally acceptable resolution. “Having heard Kissinger’s explanation of
the U.S. position,” recalled Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “I asked him point blank,
‘Does the U.S. government support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, or not?’
He was evasive, but his answer boiled down to the admission that Washington would basically
be happy to see the division of the island into two parts… Once again Washington was showing
its indifference to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states, which meant
nothing when set against the economic and strategic interests of the USA and NATO.”164 A
division of the island, while preserving the tensions between its communities, would quarantine
any further violence behind internationally sanctioned partition lines. Kissinger saw in division a
way to halt any further unraveling of the Cyprus imbroglio. He would not have to wait long.
In the early hours of July 20, 1974, Turkish battalions under the command of Brigadier
General Gen Tuncer came ashore on the northern tip of Cyprus, several kilometers west of the
port town of Kyrenia. Greek Cypriot resistance, though substantial as Turkish forces moved
inland, had by the late afternoon dissipated as word of the invasion swept the island. By
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nightfall, Tuncer’s forces had gained control of over one-third of Cypriot territory, and more than
than 3,000 Greek Cypriot households had been abandoned. Fourteen years after the Treaty of
Guarantee codified its right to do so, the Turkish government had intervened decisively to
advance its national goals vis-à-vis Cyprus.165

Domestic Fallout in Greece: The Fall of the Junta and the Return of Karamanlis
The invasion of Cyprus delivered a fatal blow to the already grievously injured Athens
dictatorship. Within two days of the Turkish invasion, President Gizikis called an emergency
meeting of old guard politicians, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Spyros Markezinis, and
Evangelos Averoff, to appoint a national unity government while Greece made the transition to
democracy. The new provisional government contacted former Prime Minister Karamanlis, since
1963 in exile in Paris, to invite his return to power. Flying to Athens on July 24, Karamanlis
assumed his erstwhile role amidst broad, nationwide television and radio coverage and cheering
crowds at the international airport where he arrived. The days of the junta were over.166
With the fall of the dictatorship, years of great domestic trial for the Greek people came
to an end. Yet even the restoration of democracy, long sought after by exile politicians such as
Karamanlis himself, placed problems on the horizon. The Turkish invasion had quite clearly and
dramatically brought the era of American primacy in eastern Mediterranean diplomacy to an end.
Washington had failed to forestall the rupture of the Cyprus crisis – and, worse, it had signaled
its tolerance for decisive, violent unilateral action by the region’s actors. Disillusioned with the
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United States’s demonstrated unwillingness to intervene on her behalf, Greece turned inward
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, convinced that the only way forward was to rely on national
self-sufficiency rather than risk a future in the hands of the great powers.

Figure 1: Greek Cypriot women stand with photos of lost loved ones following the Turkish
invasion, August 1974 (Gündem Kibris, Kıbrısın geçmişinden çok özel fotoğraflar, 1974)

Moreover, Ankara’s aggression and the lukewarm American reaction shifted long-held
strategic paradigms in Athens, driving home the reality that the major threat to Greek national
security was not the communist bloc, but the traditional foe to the east. National protection in
this changed strategic environment emerged as a key priority of post-junta governments, and the
means for achieving it were twofold. On the one hand, Greeks should exert concerted effort on
the diplomatic stage to defend and advance their national interests, even if this meant running
afoul of traditional alliances. Thus did Karamanlis lay the groundwork for expanded ties with the
communist states of Eastern Europe, antagonizing Washington, and – as we will see – did
Andreas Papandreou consciously position Greek interests as antithetical to those of the Western
alliance.
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On the other hand, new narratives of nationhood and national honor had to be crafted – or
resurrected altogether – to guard against further foreign exploitation as Greece entered a period
of post-junta reconstruction. The task required little effort. Powerful antecedents for the rebirth
of ethnic nationalism already existed, stretching back to the days of the Megali Idea and the Asia
Minor catastrophe, and the Turkish invasion gave Greeks the firmest evidence yet of a hostile
outside world characterized by persistent threat to the Hellenic people and by perfidy on the part
of Greece’s “allies.”
For its part, the United States, though sensitive to the gravity of such changes in the
Greek political landscape, had few concerns as to the long-term status of Greece within the
Western alliance. America’s failure to forestall the Turkish invasion may have been a
disappointment to the Hellenic community, but as Ambassador Tasca assured the State
Department in August of 1974, the damage was by no means grievous:
During the crisis, it [the Greek body politic] has felt let down by its NATO allies
which it felt could have compelled Turkey to observe its cease-fire. On the other
hand, I believe when the dust settles the basic elements tying Greece to the United
States and its NATO allies will be given their appropriate weight. They are a
small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces.
Geographically, they clearly need friends. With democracy in the process of being
restored, many friends will be apparent… Our traditionally close ties with this
country, and particularly its people, will prove to be strong and I believe can be
decisive.167
While Tasca had accurately identified many of the essential perceptions that would drive
Greek policies in the coming period, he grossly overestimated the country’s psychological ties to
the Western alliance. Under Konstantine Karamanlis and his successor Andreas Papandreou,
Greek domestic and international politics entered an era of self-examination and reassertion that
would set the country on new trajectories. The remainder of the 1970s would see Greece’s
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strategic direction turn outward: to Europe and the promises of supranationalism, to solidarity
with regional allies who likewise sought an alternative to superpower dominion, and – most
important for its subsequent history – to broader ethno-historical affinities with the Orthodox
world.

Changes in Greek Society: Metapolitefsi
News of Karamanlis’s homecoming following a decade of self-imposed exile swept
through Greece, and thousands of Athenians lined the runways and tarmacs of the airport to greet
him as he arrived. In cities across the country, crowds gathered to chant in unison: “Ἐρχεται,
έρχεται!” – “He is coming! He is coming!”168 The fanfare of Karamanlis’s return symbolized the
momentous domestic transformations ushered in by the fall of the military dictatorship. The
readiness of the Greek people, even after the trials of the junta period, to enthusiastically
welcome the leadership of one of Greece’s most famous conservative elder statesmen
underscored the country’s need, by the mid-1970s, to set aside decades of political strife in
pursuit of national unity. Karamanlis’s promises to rehabilitate prisoners and exiles across the
political spectrum, to seek economic reconstruction for the Greek nation, and to prosecute the
leaders of the junta indicated the desire for a new direction forward. Far from temporary
measures delivered as stopgap initiatives to forestall the outright collapse of the Greek nation,
they presaged a new national zeitgeist, a reformist spirit that would come to dominate domestic
Greek sociopolitical agendas throughout the post-dictatorship period. Metapolitefsi – “beyond
the political,” a term observers applied to the years following the colonels’ ouster – would serve
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as a backdrop against which Greeks embarked upon the formidable tasks of reconstruction,
rehabilitation, and reformation.169
The institutional changes of metapolitefsi constituted the most dramatic restructuring of
Greek society in decades. Though Karamanlis’s government would not go so far as Andreas
Papandreou’s in changing the fundamental ethos of Greek society, as we will see in the next
chapter, it nonetheless introduced sweeping changes in the conduct of everyday Greek life.
Throughout the Karamanlis era, concerted efforts at political rehabilitation resulted in a civic
sphere permitted to debate openly and widely, and official pronouncements re-legalizing leftist
parties – including, crucially, the communists, outlawed since the civil war period – served as the
tangible markers of this new political permissiveness. Obstacles to openness that had long
pervaded Greek civil society likewise lost much of their weight during metapolitefsi – largely as
a result of widespread skepticism around the long-unexamined role of the Church, the military,
and even the family in modern Greek life. It was, in many senses, a precursor to the Eighties
under Papandreou, when more wholesale transformations would be witnessed.
But not all changes were institutional, nor as visible. The same centrifugal international
forces that had driven Soviet and American policymakers to reconsider traditional strategic
paradigms during the late 1960s and 1970s likewise reshaped global societies from below, and in
Greece, as elsewhere, groups skeptical of existing power arrangements turned inward to form
new social organizations with growing domestic power. During metapolitefsi the conspicuous
shifts in Greek life associated with Karamanlis’s reforms were accompanied by a shift toward a
power social formation focused on reformation, an invisible association of everyday Greeks who
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participated in what Dimitris Kitis has called an “anti-authoritarian chóros (space, milieu).”
Within the chóros, citizens from all segments of society signaled their intentions to collectively
resist the institutional trappings that had long held Greeks in a state of conservative bondage.
And while previous anti-authoritarian sentiments had been articulated and channeled through
party lines, the chóros of metapolitefsi effectively shifted leftist agitations and discontents from
conventional settings, like the factory floor and university hall, into the streets and restaurants of
mainstream Greek life.170
Perhaps nowhere was this anti-authoritarian examination stronger than among youths of
the extra-parliamentary left, who had lost allegiance to the Communist Party as a result of the
latter’s perceived service to traditional bourgeois values. Once the primary conduit for leftist
political consciousness among Greek youths, the youth wing of KKE (Κοµµουνιστική Νεολαία
Ελλαδας, hereafter KNE) had throughout the dictatorship period stressed the importance of
adhering to traditional Greek social values in the pursuit of a communist society, alienating those
who viewed with disdain its overtures and accommodations to conservative bastions in Greek
life. As a result, young Greeks increasingly adopted movements like anarchism,
environmentalism, and feminism, which in turn tied leftist youth communities to global networks
of new identity politics. The shared tastes, cultural artifacts, and experiences of young Greeks
during metapolitefsi forged powerful community bonds within which older ideas found
expression through new avenues of creation and consumption. And the post-junta Greek youth
experience paralleled, materially and spiritually, paradigms seen elsewhere, especially in West
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Germany and the United Kingdom. Punk rock, to take one example, served as a particularly
influential pathway for political activation in Greece, with leading artists stressing the
importance of preserving Greek lyrics and Greek themes as essential to conveying its proletarian
roots.171
Interrogations of traditional Greek culture extended far beyond the realm of politicized
youth revolt. The legitimacy of systems that had long governed the rhythms of everyday life in
Greece also came into doubt, with religious and communal practice the most notable examples.
Church attendance in three villages in the Peloponnese more than halved from 1972 to 1980, a
pattern paralleled in major urban areas with even greater intensity. And kinship ties, a bastion of
Greek communities, lost much of their weight as new generations adopted values contrary to the
conservative mores that had predominated prior to and during the dictatorship years. A survey of
Athens families for the 1984 census revealed striking figures on the changing composition of
family units: whereas the last census of 1978 had placed the average household size at 5.3
individuals, reflecting the prominence of extended families under a single roof, by six years later
the average had fallen considerably, hovering just above 3.6. The figures were even more
pronounced among younger generations, who were more than three times more likely than
middle-aged Greeks to live alone or in pairs.172
The cumulative sociological effects of such transformations are hard to quantify. But
what is obvious is that throughout the 1970s Greece underwent a qualitative shift in conceptions
of the self, as well as the self-within-nation, that lacked a unifying political expression but
nonetheless exercised considerable influence upon the course of post-dictatorship politics.
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Disparate communities of Greeks who had formerly identified with political parties across the
spectrum now proved incapable of finding a single political voice. But they were part of national
and international networks of shared experience. They would not have to wait long for a
charismatic figure capable of uniting the anti-authoritarian amalgam into a cohesive party.

The Turkish Seventies: Paralysis
While Greece had felt the worst shocks of governmental deadlock and domestic
discontent during the 1960s, it would be the fate of Turkey to experience such shocks the next
decade. The roots of the crisis of the Seventies stretched far back, all the way to the 1950
election, which ostensibly offered the Turkish people the first democratic process in the nation’s
modern history. But deeper institutional elements also contributed to the stalemate of the 1970s.
Though the political tensions following the 1950 election provided the proximate cause of later
disturbances, Turkish society had never been able to throw off the trappings of authoritarian rule
acquired under over six centuries of Ottoman dominion. The rise of a “loyal opposition” to the
ruling class, so integral a part in the rise of other successful democratic systems, never occurred
in Turkey; and so the tradition of a strongman garnering enough support for effectively one-party
rule, while simultaneously allowing the semblance of parliamentary democracy through the
tolerance of even re-legalization of nominally opposition parties, matured. Once in power, the
strongman’s party could also rely upon some general instability – ethnic disturbances on the
border, a brewing regional crisis, or urban discontent – to consolidate control and purge
opponents. By the end of the 1960s, the situation had produced deeply rooted intransigence on
the part of Turkey’s political entities and impenetrable deadlock in the nation’s parliament.
Military rule, since the founding of the Republic supported by a large segment of Turkish society
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as a means to assuage such woes, had after the 1960 coup begun losing much of its luster as a
solution.
But the stakes of inaction and paralysis had never been higher than in the early years of
the 1970s, with groups such as the Grey Wolves engaging in numerous high-profile arsons,
kidnappings, and assassinations throughout the decade. Officially named the Idealist Educational
and Cultural Foundation, the Grey Wolves rose to prominence during the late 1960s by
espousing radical nationalist agendas of pan-Turkic unification and anti-leftism. Though never
achieving an official political expression, the Wolves’ widespread grassroots support –
particularly among destitute Sunni Turks in the poorer neighborhoods of Turkey’s major cities
and disgruntled students at major universities – meant its influence rose incommensurately with
its representation at the polls.
Within years, the government’s tolerance of the Grey Wolves backfired as the
organization grew to encompass nearly fifty thousand members. Turkey experts widely agreed
that the group’s power had rapidly grown beyond the control of the state and that if left
unchecked could unravel the already fragile democratic transition following the 1971 coup.173 Its
terroristic activities, once carried out stealthily and usually targeting minor provincial officials or
academics, likewise escalated as “death squads” engaged in pitched gun battles and street
skirmishes with leftist militia. By 1976, the official death toll of Grey Wolves victims had risen
to more than five thousand. As the strength of the left grew in response to such neo-fascist
excesses, observers drew parallels with the first half of the 1960s in Greece, when deadlock had
given way to dictatorship.
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The strife of the Seventies represented the culmination of political conflicts between left
and right that had punctuated Turkish politics for decades. But it also had much to do with the
promulgation of a “threat narrative” within Turkish society, a powerful historical story of
suspicion, internal betrayal, and external pressure that mirrored and coexisted with similar
currents in contemporaneous Greece.174 When the breadth and intensity of the civil war reached
critical levels at the end of the decade, it would fall to the military, Turkey’s oldest guardian of
the Kemalist tradition, to prevent a headlong slide into chaos.

Conclusion
The 1970s witnessed the growth of the global as a primary driver of international politics.
Few would argue that global dynamics made their first appearance in the Seventies – research in
global history has demonstrated definitively that globalization can be understood as a process
stretching back centuries, if not millennia.175 But in world-systems terms the decade witnessed
unprecedented changes in global poles of power, as well as the depth and richness of
interconnection between nations. Diplomacy and economics were now unmistakably
transnational in nature, forcing accommodations and reassessments in traditional great power
assumptions. And developments on the global stage had ripple effects in domestic politics across
the world, as societies adapted to the shock of the global by forging new communities and
identities across national boundaries.
For the eastern Mediterranean, the international shifts of the Seventies effected changes
in superpower strategy that dovetailed with reconfigurations of internal political and social
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organization. The United States, having seen its intervention in Greek affairs climax with the
establishment of the Athens junta, elected to draw back its role in Greece – both tacitly allowing
and, at times, directly choosing to let regional events run their course. While the Nixon
administration had been preoccupied by the fallout of Watergate and could thus devote little
attention to the unraveling of eastern Mediterranean diplomacy, its successors, by virtue of their
avowed commitments to human rights and to new international dialogues, could be expected to
take a more active role in deepening Washington’s involvement in a resolution of lingering
problems in Greece, in Turkey, and especially in a now-divided Cyprus. Yet such was not to be
the case. The United States had found itself increasingly forced to adapt to global crises and
commitments, dealing with a shock of the global that proved all too acute. Its attentions were
now on the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, areas where new threats on the
horizon – often bearing little resemblance to the traditional bogeyman of international
communism – required more resources and attention.
But, as ever, the dual processes of synthesis and consolidation remained crucial shapers
of the eastern Mediterranean’s domestic experiences during the Seventies. Post-dictatorship
reforms in both Greece and Turkey furnished new avenues for political groups across the
spectrum to debate recent events and contest visions of the national future. They also paved the
way for the emergence of new voices entirely, often those of social groups who coalesced around
shared experiences, environments, and material cultures. As such groups synthesized influences
from abroad, they consolidated new identities – and articulated new readings of the national past.
Andreas Papandreou proved the master of both processes, deftly synthesizing his brand
of democratic socialism with popular attitudes toward the recent past while simultaneously
consolidating Greek political identity around a narrative of national independence. For a while, it
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seemed as though Greece would pursue a national path at long last unencumbered by the old
ghosts of ethnic nationalism and instead oriented toward supranational condominium. Yet as the
1980s were to show, such hopes were premature.
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VI. The Papandreou Turn and the End of the Cold War, 1981-1989
If the 1970s closed with the eastern Mediterranean buffeted by the often-tumultuous
currents of globalization, the 1980s began with the region asserting its control over a changed
world, embracing new opportunities accorded by regime transition and international power
shifts. As Andreas Papandreou and PASOK took the reins of power in 1981, they marshaled
widespread popular support for their vision not only of a Greece rehabilitated from the horrors of
dictatorship, but a Hellas recast as a dynamic, integral contributor to European and world culture,
just as at the dawn of Western civilization. Boardroom imperialists or politicians unaccountable
to the people, influenced first and foremost by imperial grand strategies or foreign influence, had
long governed Greece. Now it was time to reverse the tide, to explore the possibilities inherent in
the Greek “appointment with history.” And the left – long discredited and persecuted – would be
at the forefront of the national transformation. Throughout Greece, in the weeks prior to and
following PASOK’s historic victory, a rhyming phrase echoed at rallies and speeches: “Ο λαός
δεν ξεχνἀ τι σηµαἰνει η δεξιια – The people do not forget what it means to be governed by the
Right.”176
As it turned out, PASOK would not have to wait long to see many of its dearest wishes
come to fruition. Greece entered the European Community on New Years’ Day 1981, a decisive
break with the nationalist past, and was followed not long thereafter by Portugal and Spain, the
other two southern European democracies emerging from dictatorial rule. Throughout the
decade, Greek participation in regional and global economic networks, as well as its willingness
to make its voice heard in international arenas, blossomed. And tourism numbers, the perennial
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quantitative gauge of Greece’s cultural clout, improved dramatically during the 1980s,
generating revenues not seen in more than three decades.177
But while Greece’s global connections deepened throughout the Eighties, they coexisted
with domestic transformations in the body politic, where the openings of metapolitefsi gave
broad amplification to voices suppressed for decades. As with the compromesso storico in Italy,
Greece during the 1980s witnessed unprecedented accommodation between left and right, both
of which found common ground in articulating influential visions of the nation’s future. And just
as Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer had looked to events in Chile for inspiration,
Andreas Papandreou found in the struggles and political positions of those in the developing
world a model for a particularly Greek brand of centre-left socialism.178 Domestically, the result
was an unprecedented expansion of the Greek welfare state, a movement that attracted the
attention and allegiance of Greeks throughout society. Throughout the 1980s, Papandreou’s
governments – which held power for two terms from 1981 to 1989 –generated numerous changes
in the purview of the state, including the establishment of a nationalized healthcare system, a
meritocratic government personnel system, and sweeping improvements in workers’ rights
through new laws safeguarding the rights of strikers and unions. Though, as we will see, its
successes were mixed, and marred by scandals in the latter part of the decade, they were
nonetheless a radical – and welcome – departure from decades of dominion during which Greeks
faced the humiliation of foreign control.
Papandreou also cast new stones in foreign policy, where he substantially increased
the reach and intensity of Greek power projection. The prime minister caused controversy by
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laying claim to contentious areas of the Aegean Sea to directly challenge Turkish regional
supremacy, and he attracted the ire of fellow Western powers by building new economic and
strategic bridges with the communist world throughout his tenure. At the same time, Papandreou
gained rich dividends at home for pursuing Greek national interests even when they ran afoul of
the United States. The nation finally had a modern champion in the form of the maverick
politician, former economics professor, and strident critic of American policy. His was a
particular brand of Greek passion, a reconciliation between global, anti-imperialist struggle and
Hellenic ethnic nationalism that Archbishop Makarios had perfected in previous decades, and the
new prime minister now employed it deftly to articulate a new vision of redemption and
international prominence for the Hellenic Republic.
The Papandreou era represented the greatest period of national consolidation in modern
Greek history. By the end of the 1980s, Greece would again be a dynamic actor in eastern
Mediterranean affairs, neither crippled by domestic turmoil nor restrained in its responses to
international provocations. It would proudly assert its will regionally and globally, and its
people, after long decades of division, could begin to articulate a new identity as members of a
strong, unified modern Hellenic Republic. Rediscovering old hallmarks – the concerted pursuit
of Hellenic honor, regional self-assertion, and solidarity with Orthodox civilization – was part
and parcel of a transformed Greek nation. Greece was hardly alone in its concerted pursuit of a
new national direction – its nearby socialist neighbors in France, Spain, and Italy likewise
charted the frontiers fashioned by the breakdown of existing domestic and foreign policy
paradigms in the 1970s and 1980s. But the coalescence of a new Greek identity carried with it
the much darker currents of ethnic nationalism that would resurface with the end of the Soviet
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Union.

The Papandreou Shifts
The 1981 elections in Greece made history in a number of ways. The first landmark, and
the most obvious, was the electoral victory of a socialist government for the first time in Greek
history. And the victory was not just clear; it was decisive. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) nearly traded its parliamentary standing with New Democracy, gaining 79 seats and
almost half of the Hellenic Parliament. The Communist Party, too, performed well – reentering
the government with 13 seats and a promise to pursue coalitions with PASOK should progressive
causes come under threat. For the first time in the nation’s modern history, leftists held the reins
of power in Athens. Their agenda to transform Greek life was obvious to observers both foreign
and domestic. “The vote,” the New York Times reported the day of PASOK’s victory, “was not
really a protest action since even Socialist militants acknowledge that living standards have
improved substantially under the long conservative rule. It was above all a desire for change.”179
More important still was the deeper significance of PASOK’s victory, which represented
a break with ideological strategies Greek politicians and political parties had used since the Civil
War. While the ghosts of 1944-1949 had haunted the Greek psyche since the communist defeat
at Mt. Grammos, old guard centrist politicians such as Karamanlis had until now been firmly in
control of the prevailing narrative – one that stressed the necessity of firm, experienced
governmental intervention to preempt a tragic seizure of power by forces on the left who wanted
to see Greece’s territorial and cultural sovereignty subsumed under the banner of international
communism. But after his win, Andreas Papandreou tapped the power of more recent horrors
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perpetrated by those on the right, reversing decades of popular knowledge of Greece’s modern
history. In this narrative, the junta and its American supporters, not communists, had caused the
greatest tragedy in the long-running Hellenic passion play. It was now time for the Greeks to
reconstruct the shattered nation by joining together in defense of its national honor and in
support of its long-beleaguered people. The story was not at all unparalleled. Across the globe –
especially in the developing world, and particularly in nations emerging from years of
dictatorship – messages of national rejuvenation found articulation from all manner of political
voices, usually under conditions of new liberality and openness similar to the ones in Greece.
Papandreou’s socialism bore more in common with Latin American than other European
socialist movements. It blended a missionary, quasi-sacred ethos of mass politicization with
secular efforts at social justice and welfare. And it spoke in a language of unity that appealed to
common Greeks exhausted from years of division. It bears noting that Greeks were actively
discussing political alternatives to conservative rule, and that they were all too happy to embrace
Papandreou’s vision as the best option. In surveys collected across southern Europe shortly
before PASOK’s victory, Greeks were 30 percent more likely than Italians, Spaniards, and
Portuguese to reject the statement “all political parties are the same,” and were more likely than
all three nationalities to read newspapers’ politics sections daily.180
But the prime minister’s domestic agenda, while representing a decisive break with past
political culture in Greece, found key parallels in foreign policy, where Papandreou made
concerted efforts to expand Greece’s influence in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle
East. One of his first major diplomatic overtures came in December 1981, when Greece granted
diplomatic status to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Though creating a diplomatic
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mission rather than an embassy – a crucial distinction – Papandreou’s gesture nonetheless
indicated a willingness to challenge the United States head-on in one of its key areas of strategic
concern. It also reflected a new solidarity with developing states, one that signaled a decisive
turn away from Western strategic concerns and toward an embrace of Greece’s own path. Given
the contrarian Greek stance on a number of other Arab-Israeli issues, including recognition of
Israel (Greece remained in 1981 the only member of the Common Market not to have
ambassadors stationed there), observers could not have been terribly surprised by Papandreou’s
actions. But it was the intensity of his rhetoric that was so notable, as few Greek statesmen since
1947 had so stridently condemned America and its allies.
Subsequent years would witness even more examples of Papandreou’s unilateralism.
Toward the European Union, the prime minister obstinately resisted attempts to trim Greece’s
budget deficits through entitlement cuts as preconditions for financial aid and subsidies. The new
Greek government also veered into policy actions unambiguously antagonistic to the United
States. In May of 1983 Papandreou condemned American grand strategy in the eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East, which he accused of being driven by designs of “expansionism
and domination”; the same year, Greece freed a Jordanian terrorist U.S. intelligence claimed had
planned to bomb an international flight from Athens to Tel Aviv. Before the end of the year,
Papandreou would further test the strained Greek-American relationship by refusing to prevent
striking workers from blocking the entrances to U.S. bases. The incident sparked a long-running
dispute during which an American threat to divert arms shipments from Greece to Turkey
provoked an incensed response from a member of the Greek parliament, which was subsequently
disseminated broadly by a New York Times article. And following international condemnation of
the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union in 1983, Papandreou dismissed
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the backlash, asserting that the airliner “was in fact performing a CIA spy mission.” The prime
minister would have no sympathy for the losses of an America that even in the aftermath of
Vietnam and the decade of globalization arrogantly extended its power abroad, with disregard for
the potential ramifications. “We were the only ones who did not become hysterical over the
issue,” he concluded on KL-007, exhibiting the coldness that had become emblematic of his
administration’s views toward Washington.181
Papandreou’s statements were targeted manipulations of a wounded Greek psyche,
maimed by long decades of foreign domination that had resulted in the self-flagellation of the
military junta. By stymying the United States when and where he was able, the prime minister
demonstrated the resolve of a new Greece that would refuse, in unequivocal terms, attempts to
subvert her national honor. “In no other country of Europe,” wrote a reporter covering the region
toward the end of Papandreou’s first term, “is there such a chasm between magnificent past and
mundane present. The Greeks not only notice it; it wounds them. Out of that pain grows a special
Greek sense of pride hurt, of honor injured. It is so much a national characteristic that there is a
special word for it – ‘filotimo,’ or love of honor – and it helps give Greek politics its special
passion and turbulence.”182
All such regional developments transpired against the backdrop of a radically changed
Cold War system. As the 1980s dawned, it seemed that the pendulum of Cold War attitudes had
swung back to the system of confrontation that dominated the international environment after the
Second World War. In marked contrast to the recent successes of détente in promoting arms
reductions and the expansion of human rights agendas, the last years of the Seventies and first
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years of the Eighties witnessed renewed tension between Washington and Moscow over
geopolitical issues. The Carter administration’s responses to both the Iranian Revolution and the
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a conspicuous shift away from reconciliation
and back toward condemnation in the form of economic sanctions, public outcries and threats of
force should America’s vital strategic interests be jeopardized. And Reagan’s ascent only
promised to continue this slide into confrontation, as the candidate had made no secret of his
repulsion to Soviet communism on the campaign trail. The Soviet system, to the new president,
was a corruption of natural politics that would ultimately find itself in the dustbin of history.
“When a disease like communism hangs on as it has for half a century or more,” he had written
in 1975, “it’s good now and then, to be reminded of just how vicious it really is… Communism
is neither an economic or a political system – it is a form of insanity – a temporary aberration
which will one day disappear from the earth because it is contrary to human nature.”183
The new president’s actions confirmed his words. Reagan’s administration increased U.S.
troop levels in Europe, modernized NATO weaponry, and took unilateral actions to ensure the
strategic superiority of the United States – including a controversial decision in the spring of
1983 to unveil the Strategic Defense Initiative, a missile shield defense system whose
deployment was news to the Europeans, and could jeopardize ongoing efforts at arms limitation
talks with the Soviets. Such actions often drew the disapproval of allies accustomed to more say
in the deployment of weaponry. Despite such protests, the transatlantic relationship during the
Reagan years was quite warm. France, long the greatest check on American hegemony in
Atlantic affairs, took its greatest role yet in the Atlantic alliance when in 1981 Socialist candidate
Francois Mitterrand won a sweeping victory in the presidential election against Giscard
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d’Estaing. Initially wary of the new French president’s agenda (especially after his decision to
include communists in the government, a choice Reagan outwardly condemned), Washington
was pleasantly surprised when Mitterrand publicly supported American weapons deployment in
Europe, even going so far as to personally pressure the German Bundestag to embrace U.S.
missiles. And this is to say nothing of the legendary friendship between Reagan and British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who shared the American president’s views on domestic
politics as well as statecraft.184
The new administration in Washington did well when it could reassume the mantle of
American leadership in Europe, a mutually approved relationship with a template laid over the
course of four prior decades. But its relations with the developing world proved much more
complicated. To Reagan, unrest in the Third World had one source: perfidious Soviet designs on
global expansion. The eastern Mediterranean proved to be no exception. In contrast to the
conventional strategic imperatives that drove U.S. relations with Western Europe, NATO’s
southeastern flank had over the course of the prior two decades been caught in the vortex of
vacillating American policies that all too often abandoned regional stability in the interest of
broader grand strategies or other pressing crises. Ever since the Johnson administration’s
disastrous mishandling of the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent Greek domestic political turmoil,
U.S. administrations had largely moved with caution in the region – Kissinger’s failure to
intervene in the 1974 Turkish invasion notwithstanding. For Reagan, such a low-touch approach
was not an option. Key events in the late 1970s and early 1980s made the Middle East, North
Africa and, by extension, the eastern Mediterranean a key focus of U.S. foreign policy decisions.
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When in the early years of the Reagan administration Muammar Qaddafi’s Libyan regime – the
likely sponsors of the later 1988 Lockerbie airliner attack – hurled death threats and promises of
increased terrorist bombings at Washington and its allies, Reagan opted to showcase American
leadership in the region. Throughout 1981, military confrontation between U.S. and Libyan
aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra demonstrated in no uncertain terms the extent of Washington’s
commitment to regional stability.185
In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, rather than Greece, occupied the bulk of the
Reagan administration’s attentions as it kept its eye on the restive Middle East. While Greece
had felt the sting of internecine conflict leading to authoritarian dictatorship two decades past, it
was the fate of Turkey during the 1980s to repeat the same lessons. The intense terroristic and
left-right conflicts in Turkey during the 1970s erupted on September 12, 1980, when a military
junta under Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff, seized power. The third seizure of power
by Turkey’s military in twenty years caught few by surprise. Evren had even commissioned a
report, six months prior to the coup, enlisting the aid of members of the Turkish bureaucracy to
determine whether military intervention was necessary again in the first place.186 Washington
likewise registered little surprise. The hand of the United States in Evren’s coup, largely invisible
as the colonels seized power in Greece in 1967, was now on full display. Ankara station chief
Paul Henze, upon news of the coup, hastily cabled Washington with a single message: “Our boys
[in Ankara] did it.”187
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As far as the United States was concerned, events in Ankara, much like events in Athens
in 1967, ensured the survival of a stable ally in one of the most important domains of American
grand strategy. The Reagan administration clung to this belief particularly strongly, and events
elsewhere in the world seemed only to confirm that the correct course of action was preservation
of the Turkish status quo. The administration’s policy toward Turkey was perhaps best
encapsulated in the words of UN ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who defended American
support for authoritarian regimes by contrasting them with the inherently inflexible
totalitarianism of leftist movements:
Although there is no instance of a revolutionary “socialist” or Communist society
being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into
democracies – given time, propitious economic, social, and political
circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for
representative government… The conceivable contexts [for U.S.-backed regime
change] turn out to be mainly those in which non-Communist autocracies are
under pressure from revolutionary guerrillas. Since Moscow is the aggressive,
expansionist power today, it is more often than not insurgents, encouraged and
armed by the Soviet Union, who challenge the status quo. The American
commitment to ‘change’ in the abstract ends up by aligning us tacitly with Soviet
clients and irresponsible extremists like the Ayatollah Khomeini or, in the end,
Yasir Arafat.”188
The junta would remain in power for nearly two years before a June 1982 referendum
overwhelmingly approved a new constitution and one-party rule under Turgut Özal’s Motherland
Party. Özal oversaw the implementation of numerous neoliberal reforms in the Turkish economy,
which will be discussed below, as well as a conspicuous turn toward the European Community –
a project that often clashed with the government’s simultaneous emphasis upon traditional
conservative values. But it seemed that the overall tide had finally turned in favor of Turkey’s
integration into the global system, an adoption of liberal democracy and peaceful transition over
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chronic instability. Throughout the 1980s, billions of dollars in economic aid flowed to Turkey
through the OECD to support and further such stability, mirrored by massive increases in arms
shipments through the expansion of existing agreements. Direct American military involvement
likewise expanded through joint Turkish-American drills and Turkish cooperation with the Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force, a military unit developed under the Carter administration to
rapidly respond to events in the Persian Gulf region. In comparison to many areas of U.S.
intervention throughout the 1980s – particularly in Latin America and Africa, where American
actions or economic restrictions resulted in widespread poverty and social unrest – Turkey
emerged from the decade quite well, its coffers full of American money to be used for
infrastructural reform and increased national defense expenditures.189
Andreas Papandreou watched all such developments eagerly. Intimately knowledgeable
of U.S. politics and thus of the domestic pressures under which Reagan made decisions, the
Greek leader wasted no time exploiting America’s regional activities for domestic gain. When in
February 1983 the White House announced an aid agreement with Turkey that would nearly
double U.S. military contributions to Ankara while keeping aid to Athens constant, Papandreou
sent a stern missive to Reagan condemning the imbalance and warning that such actions would
“diminish the chances of reaching agreement on the status of United States bases in Greece.”190
For his part, Reagan regarded Papandreou as a minor concern, further inflaming both the Greek
prime minister and Greek citizens.
Official documentation of the Reagan administration’s eastern Mediterranean policies is,
as of this writing, under declassification review. But available sources indicate that Washington’s
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strategic priorities in the region throughout the 1980s ultimately had little to do with the eastern
Mediterranean itself. In tackling the new challenges of the global Cold War, Reagan and his
foreign policy apparatus regarded the eastern Mediterranean as a traditional Western European
nation. They failed to sense that the Papandreou movement channeled something much deeper –
a solidarity with the developing world premised upon a vigorously articulated notion of recent
history that placed American perfidy at the center of national humiliation. Reagan’s actions, like
those of leaders before him, thus played into the very narratives of national betrayal Papandreou
sought to promulgate.

Changing Economies and Societies in the Eastern Mediterranean
Though globalization, Washington’s strategic shifts, and the neoliberal turn of the
Eighties all shifted the rhythms of eastern Mediterranean life, radical diplomatic realignments
unfolded in neither Greece nor Turkey, both of which remained firmly in the Western security
camp. The same could not be said for either nation’s domestic spheres, which continued the
dramatic transformations begun in the 1970s as each emerged from military dictatorship. The
Papandreou era witnessed wide-ranging economic and political reforms in Greek society, all
designed to bring Greece into modernity faster than the first metapolitefsi governments. Some
were unmistakably pragmatic, even essential for Greece’s socioeconomic survival: agrarian
reform along cooperative lines – largely to ensure non-disruption to the nation’s lucrative
agricultural exports – and reform of healthcare laws to create a sustainable medical system and
introduce more rigorous vetting of drugs and pharmaceuticals. But the prime minister went
further in introducing reconciliation measures, such as the modernization of the police forces, the
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reinstitution of dismissed police personnel, and the simultaneous recognition of the wartime
resistance and abolition of Metaxas-era legislation.191
From 1981 to 1985 Papandreou also engaged in what historian Philemon Bantimaroudis
aptly calls “experimentation,” in this case testing the limits of state intervention via his new,
“third way” form of Greek socialism. He oversaw an enormous boom in the number of state
employees and entitlements, increasing pensions for the elderly and lavishing farmers with
subsidies and direct monetary compensation – often as a direct political technique to ensure
continued support at the polls.192 But such investments came at considerable cost to other sectors,
such as technology, that were cementing the economic viability of other Western European states
as Greece increasingly fell behind. In the words of political scientist and Balkan scholar Judith
Kleinman,
By increasing direct government intervention in the economy, the socialist government of
Andreas Papandreou precipitated a further deterioration in the business climate. Promises
of investment incentives and five-year development strategy have given way to
nationalizations and increasing government involvement in private-sector business
decisions, including the establish of workers’ councils to sit on the board of firms.
Conflicting signals and inconsistent policies deterred domestic entrepreneurs from
expanding capacity and foreign investors from seeking investment opportunities in
Greece.193
Relative economic decline, however, did not prevent PASOK from winning another term
in office from 1985 to 1989, although with slimmer electoral majorities. But PASOK’s second
term was blighted by the plagues of its own making, as swelling state budget deficits precipitated
a fiscal crisis only exacerbated by market downturns in 1987 and 1988. Notably absent amidst all
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such financial crises, however, was widespread condemnation of PASOK and its policies among
everyday Greeks. Despite the obvious problems inherent in the Greek welfare state’s expansion,
broad consensus endured between the Greek state and the nation’s citizens as to the necessity of
expanding popular access to state resources in the wake of the dictatorship years. By combining
near-universal social entitlements with the rhetoric of national self-sufficiency and a “third path”
distinct from the Western alliance, Papandreou painted a portrait of a Greece homogeneous in
national direction and character if not in social or cultural organization. It was a testament to the
prime minister’s success as a rhetorician and storyteller that he managed to minimize the impact
of social cleavages and competing internal and external factions within Greek society, even as
such forces reshaped the international environment within which Greece itself operated.
Profound social changes also characterized Turkey during the 1980s, although their
mechanisms proved different from those in Greece. Whereas Greeks had embraced the promise
of democratic populism in response to decades of bitter internal division, Turks following the
1980 coup still searched deeply for unification and national direction. The nation’s leaders found
the answer in looking outward, first to membership in the European community and then in the
increasingly complex system of neoliberal economics that took hold across the globe throughout
the decade. During the Eighties, Turkish governments passed sweeping economic legislation that
transformed Turkey’s primarily import-substitution economy into a powerful export-driven
engine. Unprecedented economic growth followed. Between 1983 and 1988, the nation’s GDP
rose more than thirty percent. Foreign infrastructural aid, already lavished on Ankara by the
Reagan administration, also expanded substantially in lockstep with economic reforms through
institutions like the International Monetary Fund.194
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But, as elsewhere, neoliberalism brought mixed blessings. Export-oriented economic
policies clearly ran afoul of labor interests, which had come to play an integral role in Turkish
politics as a moderating influence on extremist excesses. And following the 1980-1983
dictatorship, the government no longer sought to placate restive citizens, instead opting for
decisive – and often harsh – regulations meant to forcibly usher Turkey into the global era. The
post-junta government under Özal’s Motherland Party enacted fundamental changes to the
political and judicial systems that, while on the surface representing a break with the period of
military rule, in practice enshrined the junta’s aims in legislation. Laws stipulating the
composition and permissible activities of the judiciary, police forces, university faculty,
professional organizations, and trade unions carried the veneer of attempts to restructure society
toward greater preparation for new production models and economic dynamism; but in actuality
they served to circumscribe those elements of Turkish civil society that had long checked
authoritarian tendencies.195
The many contradictions of neoliberalism presented a crisis of legitimacy for the Turkish
state that would persist into the 1990s. This crisis, though bearing little resemblance to the
violence of the 1970s, nonetheless set the stage for a repolarization of Turkish politics between
various oppositional groups – rich and poor, reformist and traditionalist, globalist and insular,
and as always left and right. Just as with Greece, the next decade would see proximate
circumstances and specific events ignite these incipient discontents.
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Conclusion
Historian Geir Lundestad, in describing transatlantic relations during the 1980s, paints
the decade as one of ambiguity during which the United States asserted itself more strongly on
the European stage than it had in decades while simultaneously dealing with the independent
actions of European states who sought the role of intermediary or “third actor” between
Washington and Moscow. After the vicissitudes of the Seventies, which saw the Atlantic alliance
challenged by the growing economic and strategic prominence of East Asia, by the resurgence of
Soviet international involvement, and by the disastrous failure of the Carter administration to
bridge divides through “trilateralism” along the Washington-Tokyo-Berlin axis, hopes were high
at the start of the 1980s that new leaders could restore transatlantic harmony. Yet this was not to
be the case. Throughout the decade, Europeans would resist Washington’s wishes and forge the
future on their own terms, often taking actions directly contrary to the wishes of the United
States.196 Ultimately, though, the West’s momentous victory at the end of the 1980s
overshadowed any such animosities. The decade ended with the fall of the Soviet bloc, and the
solidarity of the U.S.-led Western alliance has thus often been held to be a key contributor to the
fall of communism. The reality, however, is that U.S.-European relations during the last decade
of the Cold War reflected the dynamics inherent in a transformed superpower’s negotiations with
allies who had found their own national directions – often those at odds with Washington’s
wishes. And even as the Berlin Wall fell and the West celebrated the end of the Cold War, it
began facing the challenges of the post-Cold War era, when resurgent states and new identities
would begin reshaping the world the superpowers had created.
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For the eastern Mediterranean, many of the same patterns dictated developments in the
1980s, with shifts in the nature of superpower influence painting a new strategic picture. The
dominance of PASOK throughout the decade saw Greece’s old allegiances with the United
States challenged for the first time at the highest levels of government – and unilateral actions on
the part of the Greek government signaled a sea change in Washington’s ability to effectively
manage regional developments. But while Greece presented new challenges for the United
States, its relationship with Turkey – emerging from its third period of military rule and
embracing the opportunities of neoliberal globalization – proved more stable in the 1980s than at
any other time in the Cold War period.
Yet the new global environments of the 1980s coexisted with more fundamental changes
in each nation’s societies. The national traumas of the junta period had found expression in
Greek political culture of the Seventies, where numerous attempts at national reconciliation had
taken place, but they also found a place within the long-running story of national subservience to
and betrayal by the great Western powers, articulated with renewed vigor by the governments of
Andreas Papandreou. Among radical segments of society, such ideas had an even deeper impact,
as had been the case for decades. Revolutionary nationalist and terrorist groups had long
embraced anti-Americanism and xenophobia as key narratives explaining the current crisis of
Hellenism. But Papandreou’s positions gave them potent fuel to inflame future political passions,
as the much-loved politician gained widespread popular support for his polemics against U.S.
“imperial” influence.
Turkey, in marked contrast to Greece, courted the favor of the United States throughout
the 1980s by virtue of its proximity to the hotbeds of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Its
position as a key ally proved lucrative, as economic reforms brought increased revenues into
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state coffers and opened the door for much-needed foreign aid. But on the domestic front, Turks
adjusted unevenly, and frequently unwillingly, to the shifts occasioned by neoliberal economics,
as profits and privileges trickled through society irregularly. Despite their different national
circumstances, Greece and Turkey would both enter the last decade of the twentieth century with
societies dramatically transformed from within by a synthesis of external and internal pressures.
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VII. The End of the Cold War Era: Ethnic Nationalism Returns to the Eastern
Mediterranean, 1989-2003
The speed and peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s collapse caught most analysts by
surprise. It had long been clear that Moscow’s problems were formidable, even terminally
damaging to the Soviet regime. But when Mikhail Gorbachev decided in the last years of the
1980s to make openings to democracy in Eastern Europe, the resulting ripple effect – the growth
of a region-wide democratic momentum that culminated in the November 1989 dismantling of
the Berlin Wall – shocked even the most perceptive of observers. In the aftermath of the Soviet
bloc’s implosion, crucial questions begged to be answered. What would come of more than four
decades of superpower competition now that history, in the infamous words of political scientist
Francis Fukuyama, had ended with the decisive victory of liberal democracy? How would the
United States – the lone “hyperpower” after the demise of the Soviet Union – respond to its
newfound circumstances, and how would it wield its unparalleled power?
Despite the optimism of Fukuyama and others, the end of the Cold War fell far short of
ending historical conflict altogether. On the contrary, the post-Cold War period saw the global
resurgence of age-old national and ethnic conflicts – the latter of which would explode with
particular ferocity in the Balkans. The eastern Mediterranean, having recovered from the traumas
of dictatorship and regional conflict during the 1970s and 1980s, emerged into the post-Cold
War arena with new identities crafted in the crucible of national tribulation. With new
geopolitical circumstances replacing the Cold War system of superpower competition and
clientelism, Greece and Turkey each found new global canvases for their expression.
By the decade’s end, Greeks and Turks alike had decisively asserted these identities in
response to external events, ultimately emerging as deft manipulators of the globalization
processes that had caused such powerful tumult and reexamination of traditional assumptions
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over the past three decades. But in both nations the 1990s also built from powerful foundations
laid in earlier decades in sowing the seeds for the eastern Mediterranean’s 21st-century travails.

Greece in the Early 1990s: The Overstretch of Social Welfare
Papandreou’s ambitious social welfare provisioning finally found its limit in the first
years of the Nineties, when Greece’s budget deficits prompted dramatic cuts in public-sector
pensions and unemployment benefits. Particularly taxing was the establishment of the Social
Insurance Organization (IKA) early in PASOK’s first government, which through political
pressure was forced to extend coverage to non-contributing public employees. Within a year the
program’s finances had become overstretched and the number of pensioners dangerously high,
but Papandreou’s government refused to reassess allocations.197
By the early 1990s, the situation had grown so dire that the European Economic
Community specifically cited fiscal reform of the Greek national insurance system as a
precondition for agricultural and infrastructural loans. The conservative New Democracy
government that came into power in the nation’s 1990 elections promised to rein in state
expenses, but insurance and pensions by this point had become so prominent an issue among the
Greek population that serious reversals on social entitlements were politically impossible. New
Democracy, in any case, proved incapable of meeting the demands of Greek voters, whose
appetites for expanding welfare provisions and extension of Greek national sovereignty had been
whetted by nearly a decade of Papandreou’s leadership.
Frustrated, Greek voters chose to reinstall Papandreou and PASOK in 1993. But a return
to the socialist experiment of the 1980s, hoped for by millions of Greeks, was not to occur.
Throughout 1994 and 1995, Papandreou struggled with health issues and the fallout of a scandal
197

Takis S. Pappas, “Why Greece Failed,” Journal of Democracy Volume 24, Number 2, April 2013, pp. 31-45.

157
which found him accused of lavishing government gifts on a high-profile young mistress. After a
three-month period of hospitalization in January of 1996, the leader retired from politics; that
summer, he died at his home in Athens. Amidst a period of national mourning, Costas Simitis,
the leader of PASOK’s pro-modernization and pro-Europe flank, won leadership of the party in
an internal vote against Akis Tsochatzopoulos, one of Papandreou’s close friends and political
advisors.198
Simitis was to have no time for adjustment. One day after he assumed the role of prime
minister, widely read Greek magazine Gramma headlined a story covering dramatic events
brewing in the region. At the end of 1995, the Turkish cargo carrier Figen Akat had run aground
on the Imia islets in the Aegean, jurisdiction over which had been vaguely defined and divided
between Greece and Turkey, with resulting confusion over the limits and responsibilities of
Turkish salvage rights. The issue soon attracted broader audiences within the Greek and Turkish
governments, each of whom regarded their counterparts’ geographical and legalistic
understandings as erroneous. Though the incident had until mid-January 1996 seemed minor,
capable of resolution through high-level talks between the governments’ ministers, the release of
the Gramma article escalated the issue into a full-blown crisis over national sovereignty. Within
days, public opinion had mobilized against suggestions of Turkey’s ownership, buffeted along by
exploits such as the raising of a Greek flag over the disputed region on January 26.199
Key institutions, embattled in the past decades by reformist currents, seized upon the
opportunity to galvanize public opinion with great success. An increasingly radicalized Orthodox
Church, suffering from declining membership and attendance and seeking avenues for continued
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relevance, played the leading role. While Orthodox religious leaders had influenced the course of
eastern Mediterranean diplomacy throughout the Cold War, their pronouncements had always
been measured, strategic, and designed with the intent either of playing the great powers’ hand or
of leveraging non-alignment for global political visibility. The Imia dispute, by contrast,
provoked wholly visceral and confrontational responses from the clergy. Christodoulos, soon to
be promoted to chief cleric in 1998, viewed Turkey’s provocations as nothing short of an act of
war, one which would see the Greek people respond decisively, as was their historical destiny:
“The choice we are confronted with is peace or freedom, peace or national humiliation. And
when confronted with this dilemma the correct historical choice cannot be peace.” Nor were the
future archbishop’s words a product of acute tensions, aberrations unrepresentative of his more
measured political stances. Two years after the Imia crisis, Christodoulos advocated publicly for
the military “recapture” of Constantinople from Turkey, lobbying unsuccessfully to endorse the
support of key church dignitaries.200
But Orthodox leaders’ condemnation of the Turkish enemy underpinned a much more
pervasive sense of ethnic nationalist identity within the Greek nation. As the locus of Greek
social power in the post-dictatorship era had shifted from key institutions to grassroots
sociocultural formations, so, too, had the primary seat of xenophobic narratives shifted from
official pronouncements to a broader diffusion throughout the Hellenic ethnos. Crises in the
Balkans throughout the 1990s would put such transformations on full and dramatic display.

The Balkan Wars: Ethnic Nationalism Reborn
The Imia and other Aegean disputes demonstrated the changed foreign policy behavior of
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the Greek state following a decade of self-assertion under Papandreou, and highlighted the
degree to which ethnic nationalism could coexist with new understandings of the self and
political community. But few diplomatic incidents of the 1990s were as conspicuous or as
significant as Greece’s stance during the Yugoslav conflicts that rocked Europe in the first half
of the decade. The conflicts grew out of the interplay between the fall of the Soviet Union, which
destabilized Eastern Europe, and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism throughout the Balkans,
which threw into question decades-long systems of religious and ethnic coexistence. As
Yugoslavia disintegrated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the answer
emerged with bloody clarity. Key ethnic groups – particularly Croatian Serbs – strove for
independence and national sovereignty, both of which seemed finally possible after centuries of
rule under hegemonic powers. In response, the Serbian community under Slobodan Milosevic
increasingly invoked violent nationalist rhetoric – accompanied by violent ethnic cleansing – to
seek the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous “Greater Serbia.”201
In form Greece proved loyal to its NATO commitments, allowing troops and supplies to
pass through its ports en route to their military operations. But among everyday Greeks, NATO’s
activities in the Balkans cast salt into old wounds and betrayed a perfidious double standard. The
United States, in particular, seemed all too ready to intervene to save Balkan Muslims after
having watched with indifference as its Greek allies had engaged in protracted crises with
Turkey. “Why, they ask,” began one article covering the domestic Greek response to the conflict,
“is NATO bombing the Serbs when no one has lifted a finger against the Turks who have done
similar things to Greeks, they claim, on the disputed island of Cyprus?”202
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Even more shocking to outside observers was the extent of Greece’s identity chasm with
the West. The greatest indications of support for Serbia occurred not among those with vested
interests in the conflict – arms merchants, diplomats, or Greek leaders expressing public
pronouncements of solidarity with Orthodox brethren – but among the everyday members of the
body politic. Journalists, academics, and pundits alike trumpeted the existential necessity of
supporting Orthodoxy against all attackers, especially as it came under assault from a West
seeking its destruction. At the popular level, widespread pro-Serb and anti-Western
demonstrations reflected a transformed national identity that conveyed old currents of ethnic
nationalism within the new languages of anti-Americanism and xenophobia.
And the perceived role of the United States in perpetrating a war on Orthodoxy was the
single greatest unifying characteristic of Greek xenophobia in the 1990s. When U.S. President
Bill Clinton visited Athens in October 1999 shortly after NATO’s air strikes against Belgrade, he
expressed excitement at “experiencing that wonderful quality of Greek hospitality.” His hosts
had something quite different in mind as they lined the streets of the capital city during the days
of his visit, breaking windows, vandalizing storefronts, and clashing with armed police. The
Greek media also joined in the fray. A litany of scorn characterized the U.S. president in the
editorial columns of one prominent Athens newspaper: “criminal, pervert, murderer, impostor,
bloodthirsty, gangster, slayer, butcher, stupid, killer, foolish, unscrupulous, dishonest,
disgraceful, and rascal,” among others. The paper was not alone, and the world took notice: in
the last months of the twentieth century, several European news outlets remarked, with evident
surprise, that Athens and not Paris or London had become the most anti-American capital in
Europe, and arguably in the world.203
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But such sentiments did not stop at anti-Americanism. Even more alarming were
expressions of solidarity with Orthodox civilization, often cast as outright endorsements of the
violence Milosevic and his allies were perpetrating against those perceived as culturally impure.
In the aftermath of the Serbs’ seizure of the town of Foca, during which they staged some of the
worst anti-Muslim ethnic cleansing of the war, Greek media steadfastly refused to cover the
atrocities, focusing instead on the exploits of Greek volunteer contingents and the sundry
sufferings of Serbs caught in the crossfire. Gross violations of human rights and sweeping acts of
genocide had no place alongside the story of Greek-Serb connection via a shared Orthodoxy.
Takis Michas, a journalist traveling through the former Muslim part of Sarajevo in late 1997,
recalls the reaction of a Serb policeman whose attitude changed dramatically when he discovered
Michas’s Greek ancestry: “A smile lit up his face and he said, ‘Greeks and Serbs are brothers!’
He then embraced me and began pulling me toward the café where he had been sitting to offer
me a drink. ‘Together we will fuck the Muslims!’ he said gleefully.”204
It was within the context of the Yugoslav Wars that Golden Dawn, a far-rightist political
organization established in 1980 just prior to PASOK’s first electoral victory, saw the first surge
in a level of popular support that would rise to new heights in the next two decades. Originally a
fringe pro-junta party advocating a return to military dictatorship during the Papandreou era, in
the first years of the Nineties Golden Dawn expanded its popular appeal through active
engagement in the nation’s major foreign policy concerns. A naming dispute with Macedonia in
1991-1992 gave the group increased coverage in mainstream media, but its true apotheosis came
with the Balkan conflicts, when Golden Dawn mercenaries joined the Greek Volunteer Guard – a
few members of which participated in the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre.205
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Golden Dawn gained immediate infamy for its avowedly anti-immigrant, racist, and
hyper-nationalist views. When during a particularly contentious 1999 soccer match between
Greece and Albania an Albanian supporter burnt the Greek flag, Greek news reacted angrily to
the cultural affront. But whereas most popular anger diffused quickly, Pantelis Kazakos, a longtime Golden Dawn member, took more drastic steps. On the night of October 22, 1999, Kazakos
confronted a group of immigrants on a street in central Athens, shooting and killing two of their
group and seriously wounding seven others. The individual shooter’s actions were widely
condemned throughout the national media, but Golden Dawn itself capitalized upon the incident,
forming a hooligan organization called Galazia Stratia (Blue Army) describing itself as a “fan
club of the Greek national teams” charged with the sacred duty of “defending Greek national
pride inside the stadiums.”206

The PASOK Implosion
In the last years of the 1990s, a series of events conspired to greatly weaken PASOK’s
appeal among its core constituents of lower- and middle-class Greeks. Perhaps the earliest and
most damaging were a series of corruption scandals in 1997, during which seven PASOK
ministers were found to have diverted public funds into personal retirement and vacation
accounts over the course of nine years. The incident and the subsequent highly televised legal
proceedings drove a wedge between the historical legacy of PASOK as a progressive party
representative of everyday Greeks and the conduct of its senior members. Membership dropped
throughout the late 1990s.207
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The foreign factor – long a key plank in the initial platform that drove Papandreou and
PASOK to power – also emerged as a key element contributing to the party’s demise. While
Greece had in 1997 won the honor of hosting 2004’s Summer Olympics in Athens, international
concerns soon turned to the elevated rates of terrorism that had recently plagued the country in
the form of targeted assassinations by 17 November. Seeking assurances of safety for their
athletes and spectators, fellow European nations and the United States placed considerable
pressure upon Simitis’s second government to allow international aid for terrorist monitoring and
detention in the run-up to the games. The government’s acquiescence provoked a strong reaction
among the Greek public, which railed against perceived intrusion in Greek sovereign matters by
outside powers.208
But PASOK’s final blows did not come until the elections of 2004 and 2007, each of
which demonstrated the party’s deep problems in resonating with a once-supportive public. In
both elections New Democracy emerged triumphant, in the former case placing PASOK into
opposition for the first time in over a decade and in the latter election inflicting the greatest loss
yet for Papandreou’s party. By the time of the first austerity measures imposed upon Greece
during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, PASOK had ceased to be a leading force in Greek
domestic politics. PASOK’s implosion eliminated the progressive center from Greek political
life, and in its place arose the extremes – communists, fascists, and extreme entities across the
rest of the political spectrum. Centrist consolidation would not occur again until 2012 with the
emergence of SYRIZA – an acronym for the Greek Συναπσπισµός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς,
the Coalition of the Radical left – which harnessed the combined power of heretofore scattered
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and largely impotent leftist groups.209

Cyprus and Irredentism Resurface: The Rise of Golden Dawn
A host of financial developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s, from the general
movement toward globalized finance to the encouragement of high-risk borrowing patterns
brought about by easy credit conditions in the 2001-2008 environment, by the end of the first
decade of the twenty-first century had created a fragile economic situation in the Eurozone. With
the onset of the global recession in 2008, the bubble burst, with ten European Union states
simultaneously requesting bailout funding to save themselves from the worst excesses of a
combined banking, competitiveness, and government debt crisis.210
Greece was by far the worst hit of the debtor nations. Hundreds of billions of Euros in debt
(of which France owned some 10%, sparking widespread terror at the prospect of default), it found
itself in the humiliating situation of accepting enormous bailout packages from the European
Union member states – France and Germany chief among them – in order to stay afloat.
Domestically, the Greek situation fared little better. Forced to enact stringent economic austerity
measures to eliminate wasteful spending programs and closely ration available revenues, the Greek
government rapidly encountered the sociocultural fallout of decades of poor fiscal management.
In major cities throughout the nation, protests erupted over the length and breadth of budget cuts.
Outrage at the economic situation soon blended into expressions of disgust at the state of Greek
politics, where corruption and mismanagement had destroyed the nation’s solvency and set it on a
course toward crisis and humiliation. Especially among the youth, disillusionment and depression
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ran rampant. By late 2010, some 30% of Greek youth aged 18-29 were unemployed; by 2012, the
number had climbed to over 55%.211
Most disturbing of all, however, were the virulent (and often violent) expressions of hatred
directed at foreigners, from the Eurozone members now debating the amount of money to lend the
beleaguered Greek government to the illegal immigrants flooding the nation’s port cities.
Xenophobia, to be sure, was nothing new to the modern Greek political scene. Views of the outside
world had always vacillated between respect and admiration, as with the assistance of the European
Philhellenes during the War of Independence, to ethnocentric invective, largely directed against
the traditional Turkish foe. Yet the protests that erupted in the wake of the debt crisis revealed the
extent to which the Greek body politic had come to internalize their struggles – economic, social,
political, and demographic – as the product of victimization at the hands of outsiders. The
xenophobia of these protests grew out of contemporary discontents, yet drew most of its inspiration
from the country’s historical experience. The role of foreign powers in betraying Greek interests
on Cyprus featured prominently.
Among the most visible of xenophobic groups was the far-rightist anti-immigrant party
Golden Dawn. Founded in 1985 during Andreas Papandreou’s first term as prime minister, Golden
Dawn existed on the fringes of Greek politics until the eruption of the Macedonian naming dispute
in 1992 when its leader, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, coordinated a massive attack on foreign students
at the Athens University of Economics and Business.212 From the beginning, Golden Dawn’s
rhetoric blended old-style Greek ethnocentric irredentism with narratives of national victimization
similar to Andreas Papandreou’s polemics. But whereas the leader of PASOK had sought to forge
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an independent Greek foreign policy while preserving economic and political ties with other areas
of the world, particularly the West, Golden Dawn espoused an agenda of violent rebellion against
any who had conspired – in recent times or historically – against Mother Greece and her
interests.213
Cyprus, the island whose affairs had for decades been inseparably connected with the
objectives of outside powers, formed a key weapon in the group’s rhetorical arsenal. As early as
April 2005, with the economic crisis just over the horizon, Golden Dawn devoted its
semicentennial issue to coverage of the Cyprus Emergency, highlighting Britain’s perfidy toward
its erstwhile allies: “The struggle was a slap in the face of the notorious British imperialists,
proving that all Greeks would fight until their last breaths for their curtailed rights and natural
dignity… if the despots, taking refuge behind false promises and cowardly international
diplomacy, would not extend freedom to the brave Cypriot soul, it would be taken with blood!”
The article went on to link Cyprus’s historical betrayal with the island’s contemporary state of
affairs, which represented nothing more than the ongoing captivity of Hellenism: “Our brave
Cypriot brothers… still languish under the foreign yoke. On a divided island they stand for honor,
for Greece eternal, in the memory of their predecessors – Freedom or Death!”214
For Golden Dawn and similar organizations, the past is a fertile ground for stirring present
agitations. Tapping into the sundry disillusionments of contemporary Greeks by pointing to
historical disappointments, they effectively connect the Cyprus issue to age-old concerns over the
captivity of Hellenism, and with Greece’s modern troubles vis-à-vis the European Union. By
internalizing betrayal, they rationalize a stridently xenophobic platform predicated upon the same
firm ethnic identification that first facilitated the island’s division.

213
214

“Η Ιδεολογία Μας: Θεός-θρησκεία” (“Our Ideology: God-Religion”), Χρυσή Αυγή, Οctober 1990.
Χρυσή Αυγή, April 2005, 12-15.

167
The Turkish Nineties
As we have seen, the Turkish Eighties were punctuated by the challenges of globalization
and neoliberalism. And while the 1980s had brought much-needed stability to the Turkish
Republic after the widespread tensions and violence of the Seventies, the nation’s political scene
proved far from inactive. In 1987, restive Kurdish groups on the southeastern borders of Turkey
waged an insurrection and threatened to secede from Ankara. When the central government
issued emergency legislation effectively placing the region under martial law, the specter of a
return to dictatorship pervaded Turkish politics. It was thus in an atmosphere of considerable
political tension that Turkey entered the 1990s, and not a few spectators awaited the National
Assembly elections of October 1991 with expectations of another military intervention should
the parliament emerge fractured.215
But by and large, the politics of Turkey in the 1990s avoided the feared instabilities. The
1991 election swept the True Path Party – immediate predecessor to Turkey’s modern-day
center-right Democratic Party – into power, and elections in 1995 tended more conservative with
the victory of the Islamic Welfare Party. While the Welfare Party’s religious agenda prompted a
brief crisis in 1997 when the military issued a memorandum that effectively outlawed the
organization (thus presenting the existing government with a fait accompli resignation),
transitions to coalition governments proved peaceful, and the internecine violence that had
marred the 1970s made a far more limited appearance.
But, as ever, the greatest transformations could be found in the social arena, where the
shockwaves of globalization and shifting modes of economic development were felt most
acutely. Turkey had failed to find workable solutions for the domestic discontent surrounding the
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adoption of neoliberal economic models in the 1980s. Its government had also gone further,
deliberately blocking attempts by unions and other labor organizations to influence policy
direction. By the end of the Eighties, the Turkish working class had responded to this
marginalization through nation-wide collective organizing in pursuit of higher wages, better
working conditions, but above all democratization of the labor legislation process. And the
Turkish government found opposition from new sources altogether as the 1980s faded into the
1990s. Public servants, long loyal to the state, had as a result of shrinking state budgets found
their career trajectories and earning potential weakened. In 1992 they organized their own labor
union for the first time since 1971.216
Economic woes would soon add to the strained sociopolitical situation. In early 1994,
American credit agencies lowered Turkey’s credit rating in response to expanding Turkish
deficits in foreign trade. The consequent run on the Turkish lira precipitated a financial crisis that
prompted Ankara to accept harsh austerity measures and aid agreements with extensive structural
adjustment provisions. Center-right politicians and social democrats were held largely
responsible for the financial catastrophe, largely because their platforms had promised new
socioeconomic arrangements to stanch the worst wounds of neoliberalism. As popular opinion
sought a scapegoat for turmoil, the Islamic Welfare Party gained increasing support, culminating
in its 1995 electoral victory. As discussed earlier, the Welfare Party’s time in office was cut short
by the threat of intervention by the military, which watched the party’s tolerance of
fundamentalist Islam, drift toward desecularization, and flirtations with other Islamic powers
with alarm.217
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Socially, such developments were mirrored by broadening discontents over the uneven
distributions of neoliberalism’s benefits. Particularly in urban areas, skyrocketing rates of
poverty, declining salaries for public workers, continued difficulties in negotiating the
democratization of labor policy formation, and the elimination of many public entitlements had
eroded the political base of many of Turkey’s mainstream parties, and tensions akin to those of
the 1970s began to rebuild as extremism gained a foothold in the major cities of Istanbul and
Ankara.218
In response, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, hereafter
AKP) – a coalition of conservative parties – emerged in 2001. AKP enjoyed immediate and
consistent electoral success, achieving pluralities in the 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 legislative
elections. The party’s founder, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, quickly emerged as its key leader and
cultural figurehead, and would step down from official party leadership to assume the role of
Turkish president in 2014. AKP – a pro-Western, pro-European Union liberal democratic party
committed to building broad consensus – seemed the long-awaited remedy to Turkey’s political
woes. But as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis approached in 2008, unsettling antidemocratic
acts – including the growth of unilateral actions by Erdogan – suggested to many that the threat
of authoritarianism was returning to Turkish politics. Or perhaps Erdoganism was simply the
latest defense of Kemalism, promulgated by AKP’s leader to weather the current crisis and
preserve Atatürk’s republic.
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Conclusion
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, the eastern Mediterranean could
reflect on a range of experiences in recent decades that had radically changed the nature and
limits of nation, society, and identity. Over the course of sixty years, Greeks and Turks had
endured the tumults of world war and subsequent global division along ideological and
geographical lines. They had each, by virtue of their crucial strategic positions, fallen into a
much grander game of grand strategy unfolding between superpowers who sought to gain
influence – and, in the case of the Soviet Union, security – as older powers lost their grip on the
region. And both Greece and Turkey had felt the full domestic ramifications of deep involvement
in superpower strategy, as entrenched conservatives institutions in both nations, supported tacitly
if not often explicitly by the United States, subjected their countries to dictatorship in the face of
political turmoil.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, Greek and Turkish societies had also transformed
from within. From the time of its independence, Greece had drawn from the classical tradition in
regarding itself as a unique civilizational strand with a sacred history, a Hellenic community
bound by ethno-historical honor and by irredentist readings of the past. Turkey, entering the
brotherhood of modern nation-states a century after its Greek counterpart, likewise tapped the
reservoir of its deep history and shared cultural experiences in crafting a modern state and
modern citizens. Institutionally, identities manifested in distinct ways: for Greece, a deep
populist ethnic nationalism awakened in moments of national crisis or by the rhetoric of a skilled
orator, and for Turks, a diverse but conservative body politic, influenced by the traditions of
Islam and agrarianism, that coexisted with military guardianship of the modern secular
democracy. The Cold War period did not supplant such identities, readings of history, and
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institutional arrangements, but instead gave them new regional and international canvases upon
which to be expressed. And when the international environment furnished by Soviet-American
rivalry gave way to less familiar global circumstances at the end of the twentieth century, it was
such transformed identities that shaped Greek and Turkish responses to the outside world. The
situation was not unique to the two major powers of the eastern Mediterranean. But as nascent
national entities with long histories and deep cultural roots to ages past – antiquity, religious
animosity, and centuries of imperial rule – new views of the nation and its place in history were
bound to have a particularly strong impact.
Still, there were no conspicuous signs of crisis on the horizon at the beginning of the
twenty-first century. Indeed, it seemed that the worst times for both Greece and Turkey had
already passed. While the 1960s and 1970s had witnessed profound instability across the eastern
Mediterranean, the last two decades of the twentieth century were marked by concerted – and
largely successful – attempts by both governments to consolidate control and social harmony in
the wake of military dictatorships and potential conflicts on the foreign policy stage. In place of
intransigence and mutual suspicion had arisen cooperation in the wake of mutual suffering and a
willingness to pursue the benefits of transnationalism over the selfish gains of nationalism.
Yet as coming years would show, the brief period of stability, global accommodation,
and diplomatic goodwill belied deeper and darker currents. The eastern Mediterranean had
responded to the global unevenly, but constantly, throughout the second half of the twentieth
century, and its path into the next bore the scars of its ordeal. Moreover, as they recovered from
national traumas in the thirty years between the 1970s and the turn of the next century, Greeks
and Turks had been given opportunities to synthesize international influences and indigenous
cultures in the pursuit of consolidating identities – and such identities needed only another major
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crisis to emerge with their full force. When proximate causes arrived in the form of the global
recession of 2008-2009, the resulting explosion of popular discontents in the eastern
Mediterranean represented not an acute response to temporary circumstances, but the apotheosis
of recent national experiences conditioned by suffering, suspicion, and the adoption of new
narratives that stressed the many betrayals of globalization.
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Reflections on the Eastern Mediterranean’s “Imagined Communities:” Greece and Turkey
at the Crossroads of Globalization
The Cold War cast a long shadow over interstate relations in the second half of the
twentieth century. But its impacts stretched far beyond diplomacy and statecraft, as the strategic
landscapes sculpted by the superpowers accelerated the transformation of cultures, societies,
economies, and identities across the globe. In the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere,
superpower competition cast into high relief struggles that had long unfolded between (and
among) segments of society offering alternative visions of the future. Under the auspices of
Soviet-American rivalry, Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots contended with the manifold challenges of
modern nationhood, reconciling age-old animosities with the new realities of twentieth-century
geopolitics. And, as this thesis has argued, the region’s Cold War experiences were conditioned
throughout by a consistent and powerful synthesis of foreign influence alongside consolidation
of domestic roles, power dynamics, and identities. The tangible intrusion of superpower action
marked high points in the region’s involvement in global politics. But indigenous factors were
always the primary drivers of developments as each society sought to answer penetrating
questions about identity in the modern era.
Such questions, though, had arisen long before the Cold War, when the nascent Greek
and Turkish nation-states expended copious blood and energy to cement cohesive national
identities. For Greek politicians like Yiannis Makryiannis, Ioannis Kolettis, and, later,
Eleftherios Venizelos, the contemporary world, wrought by Great Power competition, gave
Greece a chance to fulfill its ancient destiny as chief exponent and defender of Hellenic
civilization. Across the Aegean, Turkey – emerging from over nine hundred years of Ottoman
rule – similarly sought to reconcile its glorious past with the political fragmentation and
existential inertia of the present. For both Greeks and Turks, the period of national consolidation
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moved in fits and starts. It involved a careful negotiation of new and deep foreign influences –
immigration, communism, the growing presence of the British and the Americans – with longrunning currents of ethnic identity, instilling a struggle between synthesis and consolidation that
would last throughout the century. And as the foreign factor emerged with greater prominence
with the coming of the Second World War, the eastern Mediterranean often had no choice but to
participate in rapid synthesis. In the aftermath of great national traumas – war, forced migration,
occupation, genocide, and internecine violence – Greeks and Turks had to align themselves in an
increasingly polarized world whose superpower leaders frequently trivialized, and rarely
recognized, the peculiarities of national and regional experiences. In a sense, the eastern
Mediterranean had entered the Cold War long before superpower competition began in earnest,
its people already weighing competing visions of a modern society.
But the Cold War proper, when it came forcibly to the eastern Mediterranean in the
aftermath of Hitler’s defeat, accelerated the tempo and raised the stakes of internal debates. As
integral powers on the southeastern flank of the Western alliance, both Greece and Turkey
benefited from Marshall Plan aid, rhetorical support, and the steadfast protection of the United
States should conservative agendas come under threat. But for NATO’s leaders, the Cold War
would present regional challenges with far deeper roots than Soviet-American rivalry. While the
eastern Mediterranean remained strategically aligned to Anglo-American interests, neither
Washington nor London could control the insidious undercurrents of ethnic nationalism seething
within both Greek and Turkish politics throughout the immediate postwar decades. The 1950s
saw tensions over Cyprus inflame regional passions more significantly than at any point since the
Greco-Turkish War, and the 1960s, a great time of tumult elsewhere in the Western world,
witnessed the intensification of domestic conflict in both of the eastern Mediterranean’s NATO
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members. When dictatorships threatened the democratic process in both nations, the United
States – now the chief arbiter of eastern Mediterranean affairs – misread and misdiagnosed the
eastern Mediterranean’s messages, ultimately failing to intervene decisively to forestall the
dismantling of democracy in its birthplace. Still weary from wars spanning two generations, the
Greek and Turkish people braced for more years of darkness.
The following decade, however, would witness a rebirth of civic dialogue alongside the
suspension of democracy. The 1970s changed the world order, rearranging poles of international
influence and proving the limits of superpower reach, and the eastern Mediterranean proved no
stranger to their transformative power. In the aftermath of dictatorship, Greece chose the road of
political reconciliation, moving “beyond politics” to chart a new course for the maimed Greek
nation. Politicians, for decades exponents of bourgeois values and closely tied to the
conservative factions that had led Greece into catastrophe, now embraced the language of
democratic socialism to salve wounds and rebuild rapport, and key institutions of Greek life for
the first time lost their power as an organizing force for the ethnos. Though Karamanlis stopped
short of the dramatic transformations his successor Papandreou would enact, his leadership of
metapolitefsi Greece made clear the nation’s decisive break with the past. At the same time,
Turkey faced the rise of political polarization, social inequality, and even terrorism while growth
and development caused the familiar shockwaves of economic expansion and contraction. For
both Greece and Turkey, the Seventies represented a period of accommodation with the global
that, though punctuated with turmoil and domestic violence, suggested the enduring supremacy
of international interconnection. Looking abroad for economic development, supranational
condominium, and cross-cultural influence, both nations, after decades of strife, seemed to have
placed the ghosts of myopic ethnic nationalism squarely in the past.
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Ultimately, however, the new identities expressed and consolidated during the 1970s held
deep national significance, as the rhetoric of reconstruction and reconciliation served to
rejuvenate and solidify the power of the ethnos. When Karamanlis handed the political reins to
Andreas Papandreou and PASOK in 1981, he symbolically passed power to a modern-day
Venizelos, a figure with broad popular appeal and grand visions of reviving the lost glories of
Hellenism. But Papandreou had taken to heart the lessons of his predecessors’ ill-fated attempts
at national rehabilitation. In their place, he synthesized his intimate knowledge of American
politics, international relations, and the Greek domestic realm to vigorously assert Greece’s role
on the foreign policy stage. In Turkey, the economic and diplomatic trends of the 1970s and
1980s – most notably deepening commitments of American aid and increasing commercial
connection with the outside world – exposed rifts in society between those who had benefited
and lost in the first phases of globalization. Marginalized Turks began to find their voice and
articulated political visions hearkening back to the days of Islam, an attempt to shield the nation
from the worst excesses of deepening global systems. The particularly observant among students
of the region might have seen developments for what they were – a reckoning between deeply
rooted notions of eastern Mediterranean identity and the vicissitudes of a changed international
sphere, the continuation of synthesis versus consolidation.
Few observers, however, would have expected the dramatic turn of events in the Balkans
at the beginning of the 1990s. Though the decomposition of the Soviet Union had long been
recognized for its potential as a geopolitical domino, the sheer savagery of resulting shifts in
southeastern Europe left even experts stunned. While the former Yugoslavia descended into war
and genocide, the nations of the West rose in unison to condemn the internecine violence. But
Greece had emerged as a nation concerned, as ever, with national and civilizational identity, its
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capacity for self-assertion honed by the PASOK years and now directed outward with particular
vitriol. Turkey, too, struggled with the ghosts of its authoritarian past throughout the last decade
of the twentieth century, as the growth of membership in Islamist parties demonstrated. The
dawn of the post-Cold War world highlighted what Greeks and Turks had long known: great
power politics, while furnishing the environment in which each society acted, were far from the
primary drivers of Greco-Turkish behavior. At the center of developments had always been the
character of each nation’s people, shaped by the constant interplay of domestic politics and the
challenge of consolidation amidst ever-changing influences from outside the nation. It was this
legacy they now carried into a new century.

Some months ago I discovered a rare book on the Greek community of Istanbul. It had
been loaned to me by a professor at the University of Thessaloniki, an expert on Greek Cypriots,
who I had the pleasure of meeting, entirely by chance, through a mutual instructor acquaintance.
In my best mixture of Greek and English I drafted an email letting him know I still had the book,
and soliciting updated contact info for a return shipment. But a quick moment later, I received
the ding of an auto-reply. Professor Markezinis, it said, was on research leave for another two
months. He’d gone to northern Cyprus to work with a Turkish colleague on an oral history of the
1974 invasion. The process of traveling north was an arduous one, requiring express permission
from both the Turkish and Greek governments and usually reserved for medical professionals or
researchers (and even then, only a few academics were lucky enough to gain access, even for
truly novel research). But, as Prof. Markezinis had told me during our last conversation, things
were getting easier nowadays. The soldiers at the border weren’t so heavily armed. They smiled
and told jokes and even brought candy for the Greek Cypriot children on the other side of the
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fence. And there was real progress, he thought, on the longed-after territorial settlement, now
that a new generation of young Cypriots was gaining political conscience and demanding greater
inclusivity. Maybe, I thought, as I reshelved the book on Greco-Turkish relations, there was hope
for the twenty-first century. I remembered the lyrics to an old song by the Greek folk singer,
George Dalaras:

On the straits of the Bosporus,
Yiannis weeps at sunset.
And Mehmet, by his side,
Drinks and sings to him.
A Turk, I am, and you are Greek
I belong to a people, and you to a people too.
You, Christ, and I, Allah
But we both sigh “Aaah,” and “Vaaah.”
With a little love and wine,
I drink, and you drink too.
Drink a little from my cup,
I, your brother, and you, my brother too.219
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Yiorgos Dalaras, “Μες στου Βοσπόρου τα στενά,” Mikra Asia (1972).
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